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Abstract
Microfinance in Latin America:
Poverty Alleviation and the Impact of Institutional Mimicry
Lindsay Jouben
Microfinance has become a program of choice in the international development
community. The World Bank has promoted microfinance programs under the idea that poverty
alleviation can be accomplished by mainly providing credit. 1 As such, these policies are often
replicated throughout the developing world. This replication is done through international
organizations adopting a standard of best practices for the microfinance field. Best practices
consist of a complex set of standard by which all banks must adhere if they receive funding from
the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. These best practices, following neoliberal
economics, lay out how microfinance should operate according to the World Bank. This
dissertation looks specifically at this replication through institutional mimicry by questioning the
actual impact of the neoliberal economic policies enshrined in the best practices model of
microfinance. It examines several distortions that neoliberal best practices create on two
dimensions: economic and socio-cultural. The economic distortions concern issues of debt
cycles, self-sufficiency, and the role of the economically active poor with the argument that
clients who participate in Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) face increasing levels of poverty.
Furthermore, it is argued that socio-cultural distortions like social capital creation, local
conditions, and gender targeting increase poverty as well. Using a comparative case study
analysis of MFIs in Latin America, this dissertation demonstrates economic and socio-cultural
effects for MFIs departing from best practices: first, the lower level of indebtedness of their
clients and, second, the offering of a wider array of social programs in the community. These
findings are a preliminary indication that departing from best practices contributes to poverty
alleviation. Essentially, I argue that for microfinance to be successful it needs to question
neoliberal best practices within microfinance policies and focus on tailoring microfinance
programs to local political and social conditions.

Vivienne Walt “Does Microfinance Really Work? A New Book Says No” Time (Jan 2012),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2103831,00.html
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of microfinance is increasingly pervasive in less developed countries.
Microfinance, at its core, is a collection of banking practices built around providing small loans,
usually without collateral, and accepting small savings deposits. The larger intent of
microfinance is that the provision of such small loans will lead to broader income generating
activities and enterprises. Ideally microfinance is set up to allow the poor to have access to the
capital they need to create or expand a microenterprise and generate income, and therefore be
able to build both individual and community assets. With access to microloans, therefore, every
poor individual and poor community would possess the potential to reduce their own poverty and
create sustainable bottom-up economic and social development. The microfinance industry has
spawned an important political connection between women’s empowerment, and loans, which
has created a social cause for donors and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to get behind and
continue to fund microfinance programs. With this in mind microfinance became one of the most
important international development policies to emerge over the last thirty years.2
Microfinance began to break with the traditional forms of economic development when
Muhammad Yunus developed a project in Jobra, Bangladesh to foster economic growth and
sustainability. By promoting small loans to farmers, he developed the idea that through
individual entrepreneurship poverty reduction could occur, and would do so within a generation.
With this in mind, he created the Grameen Bank in 1983, which allowed for the poor of
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Bangladesh to have access to small loans through group lending; a mechanism that meant that
for one loans each borrower in a group was responsible for each other and repaying the loan.
This meant that the poor, despite having no collateral would have access to the capital they
needed. He structured his credit program by instituting daily repayment programs of small
amounts and group lending where each member had to be trained before given loans.
Additionally, Grameen’s mechanisms followed a loan length of a year, weekly repayment
installments where repayment started one week after the loan start, and an interest rate of 20%.3
This is the traditional microcredit model that made the Bangladesh loan program successful.
Microfinance in Yunus’s vision was to foster economic growth from the bottom up. It was
designed to give small business loans, as well as, banking and credit services to the poorer
populations of a country in an effort to initiate sustainable livelihoods. In order to create
sustainable livelihoods, Yunus focused on giving loans to women, who were seen as more likely
to repay the loans, accept smaller amounts, and invest the income into their families creating
economic sustainability for future generations. Seeing high repayment rates meant that the
“targeting” of women for microfinance loans would become a key component of the best
practices model, regardless of the social or political conditions in which women lived.
The idea of group lending further led to the growth of microfinance because it ensured a
steadier repayment rate and allowed the idea of microfinance to grow and attract early funding
from the International Fund of Agriculture and Development, the Ford Foundation, and the
government of Bangladesh. Microfinance began the move out of Bangladesh and into the
surrounding areas when other non-governmental organizations, like PRODEM (the original
NGO and precursor to Banco Sol) saw the potential to eradicate poverty through financial
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access. The Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Microenterprise (PRODEM)
created the market for microcredit in Latin America and grew the industry from a loan only
strategy to a large-scale financial services development program. Microfinance, therefore, is the
“provision of a range of financial services in addition to credit, such as options for insurance
schemes or opportunities to save.”4 The microfinance revolution developed through the adoption
of micro-credit and by the start of the new millennium microfinance has grown because of the
spread of information and the extent to which some microfinance institutions have experienced
success through mobilizing public savings and created greater access to capital markets.5
International best practices of microfinance can be traced back to the economic
development policies of Robert McNamara during his term as president of the World Bank. In
1979, the Bank started to use “program loans to induce reforms” which was meant to be
“structural adjustment lending to promote trade liberalization.”6 The World Bank would aim
their policies at structural problems. In 1980, the Bank set up the conditions under which loans
would be made, and for the first time developing countries would be forced to “adjust their
development patterns and economic structures.”7 These structural adjustment policies dictated by
the IMF and the World Bank in particular, did not promote long-term development and instead
threw local industries into markets in which they could not compete and instead only fostered
further declines into poverty.8 Under the guise of trade liberalization, the IMF and the World
Bank imposed policies upon underdeveloped regions claiming that if they wanted help out of
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poverty that they must accept conditions for the loans, which focused on opening up their
industries to the world market where they could not compete.
By the end of the twentieth century, a shift had been seen in poverty reduction strategies.
They were now focused on “promoting real and operational partnership, based on shared
responsibilities, and a systematic focus on the principles of policy coherence and governance.”9
Microfinance’s aim was to create “the virtuous cycle of economic advancement.”10 However, the
World Bank and the IMF in 1998 adopted Operational Policy 8.30, which incorporated
microfinance minimalism into its poverty reduction strategy.11 Minimalism is a credit only
approach to microfinance. This form of microfinance is meant only to dampen the resistance to
trade liberalization policies at local levels. The microfinance minimalism that comes out of the
World Bank and the IMF has gained recognition as “global best practices.”12 However, this is
not necessarily truly the best practice for microfinance. The programs that they follow
corresponds with the World Banks position on trade liberalization; in addition it devalues NGOs
as potential intermediaries for the poor making them follow certain policies to be certified
financial intermediaries, and ensure access to credit.13
Funding from the US government and World Bank saw the first moves to establish
microfinance in Latin America (Chomsky, 2003; George and Sabelli, 1994). A number of
microcredit programs began with the assistance of the Boston led advocacy body ACCION,
which used funds from USAID (Bateman, 2013). Most of the MFIs established in the immediate
wake of the Grameen Bank were deliberately structured to operate as NGOs with non-profit
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Heloise Weber., “The imposition of a global development architecture: the example of microcredit”
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Ibid., 540.
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Ibid., 550.
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Ibid., 552.
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Ibid., 552-553.
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status. In the early 1990s, the World Bank moved into the microfinance field through the
International Finance Corporation, which created the Consulting Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP). Taking their cue from the international funding community, which microfinance
institutions were dependent upon at this time, most international NGOs, bilateral development
agencies, and developed countries governments began to shift their microfinance policies to fall
in line with CGAP so that they could reassure continued funding and microfinance growth. The
international development community now signaled to the microfinance industry that it would
not help establish any other model of MFI and would seek to transform all existing MFIs into
new MFI models. This new forced model of microfinance centered on best practices, would
focus on more than group lending and small loans, and would instead have five key features:
access to financial services, group lending through joint liability, requiring deposit savings in the
bank, interest rates that took market value into consideration, and self-sufficiency within the
institution. This transformed microfinance from an NGO donor driven model to a
commercialized funding model that was more in line with neoliberal ideology and regular forprofit driven financial institutions.
In order for microfinance to become more sustainable, institutions began shifting to a best
practices replication model rooted in neoliberal economic development theory. This new growth
of neoliberal development focused microfinance programs meant that institutions were now
focused on becoming for-profit ventures. This model of microfinance is driven by the World
Bank, which focuses on economics and the ability to compete in the market place instead of
letting countries protect their new industries. One of the core imperatives of neoliberalism is a
firm belief in the financial self-sustainability of all institutions that operate in the economy and
society. This shifting political stance was a driving force behind the shift from Yunus’s
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microcredit model to a neoliberal microfinance model where interest rates had to be market
based. This spurred the next big development in microfinance, global best practices.
The best practices model is based on eleven core principles: access to financial services,
not just loans; microfinance is used to build assets; microfinance should be integrated into a
countries mainstream financial system; microfinance should be self-sustaining; microfinance is
about building permanent local financial institutions; other kinds of support may work better for
the destitute that are without income for repayment; interest rates ceilings are harmful to MFIs;
the government should enable financial services; donor funds should be used to build
institutional capacity of financial providers; there is a shortage of institutions, funds should be
used to build capacity; and microfinance institutions should measure their performance (based on
loan repayment and cost recovery, and number and poverty level of clients being served). Taking
their cue from the World Bank, most developed governments, bilateral development agencies
and international NGOs shifted their microfinance support policy and programs towards this new
approach. As such, this commercialized microfinance model was “firmly established as ‘best
practice’ and the only acceptable definition of microfinance.”14 The neoliberal policy making
establishment began to build support for the commercialized replacement of Yunus microcredit
with this new wave best practices model that followed neoliberal ideology by promoting free
trade policies to foster economic development.
Microfinance institutions have changed the game of development economics and done so
with negative effects. Microfinance in the last decade has changed the way development projects
are approached with a shift towards neoliberal development theories. Micro-credit originally was
thought of as a panacea for poverty alleviation, as well as a method for gender equality in

Milford Bateman., “The Role of Microfinance in Contemporary Rural Development Finance Policy and
Practice: Imposing Neoliberalism as ‘Best Practice’” Journal of Agrarian Change 12, no. 4 (September 2012), 594.
14
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oppressive societies. However, reflecting on the rise of neoliberal development thinking,
organizations promoting microfinance came to view it as a tool mainly for economic
development and growth – and unlike Yunus, they do not consider it a cure for broader social ills
and should not be considered so. In Latin America in particular, the arguments against inefficient
states that stifle market forces has found resonance with the microfinance industry that promotes
neoliberal reform of free market growth through lending initiatives. This project will look at the
neoliberal institutional approach to explain how microfinance organizations perpetuate a best
practices model that lead to mimicry within the field of microfinance. Current economic theory
is not adequate to assess the current global economic system in underdeveloped and developing
countries. The neoliberal institutional approach highlights how elites could assist the nation state
in meeting its interests.15 The commitment to a multilateralism approach that neoliberal
institutionalism has, highlights how economic elites continue to commit to those multilateral
practices not because they are most efficient but because the practices themselves are affecting
how elites define efficiency.16 The purpose of this project therefore is to show that microfinance
institutions hold to these defined efficient practices, i.e. the best practices.
This dissertation will look at the impact that the best practices model has on microfinance
institutions design. It will argue that MFIs can be more effective if they break from the best
practices model because they then are able to adopt policies that work within their local political
and cultural situations. As argued here, the reason for why this occurs falls into two different
categories economic and socio-cultural. The first category addresses how the model of
microfinance that is driven by the World Bank tends to focus on economics and the ability of

Jennifer Sterling-Folker., “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal
Institutionalism Compared” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 1 (March 2000), 104.
16
Ibid., 112.
15
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recipients to compete in the market place. This model stems from the World Bank’s and the
IMF’s microfinance minimalism strategy, originating as an attempt to dampen the resistance to
trade liberalization policies at local levels.17 This microfinance minimalism comes out of the
World Bank and the IMF that has gained recognition as “global best practices.”18 The second,
socio-cultural category addresses how MFIs have done little to understand the gender relations of
their clients so their programs are not effectively tailored to such issues, which greatly reduce
their impact. Furthermore, the targeting of women often creates gender distortions, as women are
not given access to information about financial services.
Microfinance today tends to focus more on the international level rather than the local
level, resulting in new problems because they are often constrained by policies that stem from
tax regimes, resource allocation, and trade agreements.19 The problem is that global economic
policies tend to be single-minded in that they focus exclusively on “global trade and attracting
inward investment” and tend to ignore those local level political and socio-economic factors that
create poverty.20 Microfinance today is heavily focused on the financial structures that surround
it, who finances microfinance is also who defines what microfinance is and how it is constructed.
Microfinance of today is greatly impacted by these trade regimes and political policy structures.
The point of this project is to look at the policy structures that surround microfinance and show
how the new microfinance is one of the financiers.
These policies are often adopted within a country with little regard to domestic social or
political structures. Replication of microfinance has become an industry standard adopting best
Heloise Weber, “The Imposition of a Global Development Architecture: The Example of Microcredit”
Review of International Studies 28 (2002), 550.
18
Ibid., 552.
19
Id. Discredited by Les Newby “Sustainable Local Economic Development: A New Agenda for Action?”
Local Environment 4, no. 1 (1999), 67.
20
Les Newby, “Sustainable Local Economic Development: A New Agenda for Action?” Local
Environment 4, no. 1 (1999), 67-69.
17
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practices in the belief that poverty alleviation is as simple as providing credit. Best practices are
circulated by the consultative groups, such as policy communities to assist the poorest by the
World Bank, the US Agency for International Development, the UN Development Program, and
other key donors.21 Best practices is solely concerned with fostering the “financial sustainability
of institutions that provide financial services” to the poor.22 In this dissertation, I argue that
governance for development needs to shift from a best practices model to what should be a “best
fit” model. This means following an institutional design that is best suited for the community in
which it operates. Essentially, for microfinance to be successful it needs to “question the
ideological forces, vested interests, and political pressures that promote institutional mimicry”
within the microfinance field.23 In order to move beyond this mimicry, organizations have to take
into account the broader influence from the state, society and redefine what socially acceptable
economic behavior is.24 Microfinance perpetuates mimicry through the agency of influential
organizations and knowledge-bearing professions that diffuse their preferences through network
ties linking those who adopt microfinance to those who develop best practices programs.25 This
leads MFIs to follow the best practices method for institution programs instead of following the
best fit model for development.
This dissertation will examine cases from Latin America because this is where
microfinance is growing rapidly with a focus on Bolivia and Mexico. The cases used are Banco

Jonathan Morduch., “The Microfinance Schism” World Development 28, no. 4: 617-618.
Christopher Dunford., “In Search of ‘Sound Practices’ for Microfinance” Journal of Microfinance ESR
Review 2, no. 1 (2000): 6.
23
David Booth., “Governance for Development in Africa: Building on what Works” Africa Power and
Politics Policy Brief 1 (April 2011): 1
24
Christine Oliver., “Sustainable Competitve Advantage: Combining Institutional and Resource Based
Views” Strategic Management Journal 18, no. 9 (1997): 697.
25
Isin Guler, Mauro Guillen, and John Muir Macpherson., “Global Competition, Institutions, and the
Diffusion of Organizational Practices: The International Spread of ISO 9000 Quality Certificates” Administrative
Science Quarterly 47, no. 2 (June 2002): 211.
21
22
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Sol and Compartamos because they are considered to be the most successful MFIs in Latin
America. Additionally, Banco Economico, and IDEPRO will be used as cases that were more
flexible in following best practices. Additionally, Pro Mujer will be used as a comparison case as
a control because it operates in both countries under consideration. All of these cases will stem
from Latin America because their experiences in the region have greatly changed the way that
microfinance is understood. These cases were chosen for their impact on the microfinance
industry and to highlight those institutions that follow mimicked patterns. These cases were
chosen to highlight some of the institutional designs that affect the best practices institutional
design for MFIs.
Certain banks were chosen because of their shifts from the best practices model to a best
fit model that would allow microfinance to have greater impacts among clientele; these include
IDEPRO and Pro Mujer. These were chosen because they are NGO’s with different objectives.
Pro Mujer was chosen for this study because with entry into each new country they have refined
and adapted their programs to meet the local needs and is used as a best fit model of
microfinance.26 In summary, these cases where all chosen because they are formidable MFIs in
the microfinance field and vary significantly with respect to their tight adherence to “best
practices.” Additionally, all of these cases were chosen for the differing degrees to which they
follow the five basic aspects of best practices including; how they are set up, how they are
regulated, lending type, and percentage of loans to women, and the poverty level of clients. Each
of these cases was chosen because they add something to the story of how microfinance
functions. Whether they adhere strictly to best practices or they diverge in significant ways, each
case highlights how microfinance works in practice and how different models of microfinance

26
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can have different outcomes for their counties economic development and more importantly their
clients welfare.
This dissertation will use a case study approach using structured focused comparison.
This will be used to assess the institutional design of MFIs in Bolivia and Mexico, and
specifically, to see if a deviation from best practices results in more programs begin adopted that
can have positive impacts for clients. In particular, it will offer initial evidence that MFIs
departing from best practices contribute both economically and socially to its clients with (a)
lower rates of indebtedness in its loans and (b) a wider array of community programs targeted at
social and gender issues. Employing the method of structured focused comparison, this study
will look at the different case studies and show the underlying theme of institutional mimicry
that hinders microfinances’ impacts. The different case studies will develop a broader
explanation for the distorting effects that this hindrance can have by looking beyond the simple
economic explanations and taking into account socio-cultural effects.
These case studies will highlight how institutional mimicry through best practices affects
microfinance institutions’ structure. In order to do this, institutional characteristics will be
defined as the bank’s financial structure primarily. The types of financial structures are NGOs,
which are unregulated by government; full banks, which are regulated; and non-banking
financial institutions, which are intermediaries allowing for loans but do not allow for savings
and lack regulation from government. The clients of the non-regulated institutions have no
protection from bank failure and traditionally rely on subsidies from the government to exist.
Additionally, institutional sustainability will be defined through the institution’s ability to remain
stable despite economic shock and includes indicators like, deposits, debt to equity, number of
borrowers, interest rates, loans disbursed, and outstanding loans. Institutional effectiveness is the
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MFIs ability to have positive economic outcomes for their clients and includes indicators like
gender, household financing and consumption, as well as financial services and products offered,
and development objectives that include gender empowerment increases, the ability of the MFI
to introduce educational, health, and welfare reforms. This dissertation will highlight trends in
the microfinance field by looking at institutional policy and industry standards. Finally, I will be
looking at yearly report documents obtained from mixmarket.org on each bank to trace what
policies they have adopted compared with financial data of clients to highlight the economic and
social development impact that MFIs have depending on whether they follow best practices or
deviate to a best fit model.
This dissertation consists of five more chapters. The next chapter is the literature review.
It will cover the background concepts of microfinance and how it got to the best practices
methodology. Additionally, it will cover the impact of institutional mimicry on poverty
alleviation. Lastly, it will cover an assessment of the microfinance literature focusing specifically
on neo-liberal development models, debt cycles, self-sufficiency, the economically active poor,
gender targeting, local political practices, and social capital creation. Chapter three will cover the
theoretical argument including the hypotheses. It will lay out the economic explanations and the
socio-cultural explanations that impact the effectiveness of microfinance institutions. Chapter
four will lay out the research design in detail. It explains how the structured focused will be
done, the case study methodology, as well as the cases selected. Chapter five will present the
empirical analysis. It will look at each of the cases and highlight how each adheres to or diverges
from the best practices methodology, as well as, the impact that the lending practices and social
programs by these institutions have on their clients. This will highlight how the best practices
method of microfinance impacts clients.

13
As argued in the dissertation’s final chapter, its contribution to the debate on
microfinance and poverty alleviation will be discussed by looking specifically at the impact that
best practices has on institutional formation and therefore limits their outreach capabilities.
When the World Bank looked into this in 2008, they concluded that poverty alleviation was
nothing more than the use of credit to positively impact household welfare. 27 Poverty alleviation
by MFIs is defined by three key indicators: establishing permanent institutions that can withstand
economic shocks; engaging in practices that help the poor by reducing interest rates, by not
focusing solely on repayment, by providing needed financial services, and by benefiting the
women that they make loans to through social welfare programs; and finally, poverty alleviation
should provide additional programs by which clients can maintain food, shelter, health and
family planning services, employment, and education. This is what poverty alleviation should
look like. However, this project argues that because of institutional mimicry and the adherence to
the best practices model, microfinance does not focus enough on poverty alleviation programs
but instead focuses too narrowly on economic outcomes and loan repayment.
Microfinance in the new millennium should focus on finding alternative funding sources
from internal structures such as existing banks, as well as working with aid agencies like NGOs
to determine the best target population. The reformulated institutions can then work toward
reducing corruption and making stronger portfolios among their clients. Interestingly, with
funding that is not dependent entirely on government, microfinance programs would therefore be
able to work in post-conflict societies, or societies that are in the midst of rebuilding government
structures. This approach would bring about a new understanding of the way development

Vivienne Walt “Does Microfinance Really Work? A New Book Says No” Time (Jan 2012),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2103831,00.html
27
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politics and sustainability projects operate focusing on the local market structure as a step up
program into the global economy.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW: ORIGINS AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF MFIS
The literature review for this dissertation is divided into two general sections. The first
section introduces the reader to topic of microfinancing by overviewing the origins and evolution
of this phenomenon. Considered in this discussion are questions such as: what microfinance is
and how it differs from microcredit, what best practices include, how poverty alleviation and
elimination are measured, and what institutional mimicry is and how it takes shape in the
microfinance industry? The second section of the literature review covers the critiques and
assessments of microfinancing, including economic critiques, socio-cultural critiques, and
political critiques. As such, it has three subsections. The first of these examines economic
critiques focusing on access to capital and market forces, including, the impacts that debt cycles,
self-sufficiency, and economically active poor have on poverty alleviation. The second subsection deals with socio-cultural critiques focusing on the impacts of traditional social structures
including, issues of gender targeting, and the disregard for local social conditions. The third subsection will highlight the political critiques of microfinance; including, local political practices
that hinder microfinance and the role of international influence in microfinance. Finally, this
chapter will conclude with a summary of themes and arguments, highlighting the overall
argument of this dissertation that best fit models of microfinance are more successful in creating
poverty alleviation than best practices.
The Origins and Evolution of Microfinancing
Because this dissertation aims to explore the underlying structural differences in
microfinance models, it is of importance to note how the different models came to be and what
microfinance is today. Microfinance was developed out of the micro-credit schemes and was
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looked at as a positive step forward in creating sustainable financial assistance to the poor.
Microfinance is therefore, is a fully encompassing financial service that involves not just giving
out low collateral loans but also in fostering savings and providing financial training to
recipients. Microfinance was seen as a step up from the loan only micro-credit schemes because
it was to provide recipients with not only the financial training to use the loans appropriately but
also a savings mechanism so they could deal with economic shocks. The transition to the full
microfinance model came after the collapse of several micro-credit schemes after funding for
those programs stopped or fell through because it was predominately from governmental
subsides or international aid programs and NGOs. The following section is divided in two parts
to further address how microfinance transpired, including not only what best practices are but
also how they came to dominate the microfinance field. The first will illustrate what
microfinance is by looking at its origins and how microcredit became a more encompassing
model of microfinance known as best practices. Best practices encompass financial services to
the poor, not just loans. The second section addresses how microfinance became the
development policy of choice in Latin America. It will specifically highlight how microfinance
has diffused throughout Latin America through institutional mimicry. All of these things taken
together make-up how microfinance institutions design themselves in order to maintain support
from the World Bank, and as such have become the only model for microfinance that is
supported.
From Yunus’s Microcredit to Commercialized Microfinance
Microcredit began in 1976, when Muhammad Yunus piloted a research project to study
how to design a credit program to bring credit to rural farmers in Bengali, Bangladesh. This
method of fostering development hinged on the use of small loans to the rural poor, and the loans
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would be used to create sustainable farming methods to raise the living standard. “Microcredit”
programs began to gain a foothold as an economic development policy in the 1980s when the
World Bank began to focus on microcredit for poverty reduction. However, micro-loans were
viewed as incomplete programs that often failed to recognize the financial sustainability that they
attempted to foster. Programs for the new millennium appropriately focused on microfinance
programs that aimed to foster development through lending and developing financial skills,
manage growth and generate sustainable systems that deliver quality financial services.
Microfinance is simply a range of financial services, including loans, as well as insurance
programs and savings opportunities.28 There are three fundamental differences between microcredit and microfinance. The first being the role of profit motive, whereby micro-credit programs
run by NGOs and non-profits are most concerned with poverty alleviation and as such are not
concerned with profit. Microfinance on the other hand is a “for-profit venture.”29 The second
fundamental difference concerns the way the programs are financed. Micro-credit organizations
rely on subsidies and depend on external finance, where microfinance programs are expected to
become self-sustaining.30 The third and biggest difference between the micro-credit model and
the new microfinance models involves the actual lending methods. Traditional programs would
use group lending, while the new programs have revolutionized the group lending method to
include “group-lending contracts” and loans to individuals.31
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Elahi and Rahman (2006) address the links between microcredit and microfinance.32
They address how microcredit has become the foundation of microfinance and leading to a
second revolution in microfinance. The first revolution being the introduction of microcredit,
which focused mainly on loan distribution and recovery; while the second revolution of
microfinance focused on providing a full range of financial services. This is the main difference
between microcredit and microfinance. Woller (2002) further highlights this move by looking at
the possibility to provide financial services to the poor. Woller separates himself from other
scholars on this point by arguing the microfinance needs a second revolution in order to fulfill
the promises it makes. Woller’s main contribution here is to argue that operational policies of
microfinance institutions focus too heavily on the credit portion and therefore create
vulnerability and prevent the very poor population from participating. By not participating these
segments no longer have any access to financial services, including savings.
The case of Compartamos in Mexico is important in explaining how microfinance’s best
practices developed. This MFI has drastically changed the landscape of microfinance by
becoming a publicly traded organization that laid the foundation for a model of not only a
sustainable institution, but also more importantly it proved that the microfinance industry could
be profitable for investors. In 2007, Compartamos was put up for Initial Public Offering (IPO)
entering the stock market.33 When Compartamos entered the public market, it saw its investors
and managers make millions of dollars while their clients were charged up to 195% interest rates
on their microloans.34 The commercialization of microfinance has ultimately changed the face of
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the microfinance mission. The MFIs were no longer focused on social missions but instead were
concerned with financial sustainability and growth. The IPO offering of Compartamos saw high
profile MFIs begin to follow the Compartamos model, which includes microcredit, savings, and
insurance policies, all while maintaining self-sufficiency through high interest rates.
Compartamos’s operating model is a for-profit model that is the epitome of best practices in the
microfinance industry. In sum, the Compartamos case is important to look at because it started
the trend of commercializing microfinance. In addition, it changed the focus of microfinance
from its social mission to one of economic sustainability, and therefore contributed to the overall
restructuring of microfinance institutions around the world.
The Diffusion of Microfinance in Latin America
Microfinance in Latin America started relatively early, around the same time as the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. In the 1970s, informal organizations were lending small amounts
to low income individuals. These early loans were not in the same vain as the microfinance in
Bangladesh in that the loans were given to men who already had small business and therefore
had some collateral base to repay the loan.35 These early lending programs were developed in the
vain of Raul Prebisch, the Chief Economist at the UN Economic Commission for Latin America,
and were to focus on replacing imports with local produced manufactured goods.36 In 1975, the
UN Women’s Conference identified access to credit as a major obstacle to escaping poverty,
after acknowledging Yunus’ work. Coinciding with the UN World Conference of the
International Women’s Year the conference defined a plan of action for the implementation of a
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set of guidelines for the advancement of women, of which microfinance was a major plan
component.
Microcredit quickly assumed as much importance in Bolivia as in Bangladesh thanks to
pioneering institutions like PRODEM, established to provide microloans in the city of La Paz.
Most of the MFIs established in the immediate wake of the Grameen Bank were deliberately
structured to operate as NGOs with non-profit status. In addition, governments or international
funding initially funded the majority. The prevailing logic at the time was that since the Grameen
Bank had shown high repayment rates a possibility, little ongoing funding would be needed to
maintain an MFI. Since a key feature of Yunus’ microcredit was low interest rates, to give the
poor financial space to benefit and reinvest the loan, it began to become clear that it was not
possible to keep interest rates low and maintain a self-sufficient MFI. Morduch (1999), Seibel
(2005), and Jackelen (1989) among others noted that the Grameen Bank model would not be
self-sufficient and that repayment rates were actually lower than claimed which meant that
extensive donor funds and subsides would be needed to maintain this model of microfinance.
With the shifting economic theories to neoliberalism, financial self-sustainability of all
institutions that operate in the economy became an imperative resulting in the shift to the
commercialized microfinance model in Latin America.
The first major breakthrough came in Bolivia when the World Bank and USAID began
to look at restructuring the Bolivian economy to fall more in line with neoliberal policies by
recasting the subsidy driven Grameen Bank style microfinance model to a commercially driven
one. This was done by transforming the NGO PRODEM to Banco Sol. Advising on the Banco
Sol transformation was the US based ACCION that was also working on many microfinance
programs in South and Central America under contract to USAID. Rhyne (2001) highlighted
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how the transformation to Banco Sol was the effective way for commercialize microfinance to
expand around the globe. Bateman (2013), Lora and Marquez (1998), and Helwege and Birch
(2007) show how microfinance defused through Latin America through various programs
developed by FINCA, USAID, and IDB in Brazil, Bolivia, Columbia and Mexico, all stemming
from the idea that the expansion of the informal sector would be best way for the continent to
reach development goals. Bateman (2013) argues that the microfinance model was thoroughly
embedded in Latin America’s economy and financial system by the 1990s as significant
resources began to shift to microfinance. Additionally, Bateman (2013) highlights the
importance of the US and then World Bank funding for developing the microfinance sector in
Latin America.37 Christen (2000) estimated that the size of the Bolivian microfinance market in
1999 as having disbursed nearly 380,000 microloans with a market penetration rate of 163%.38
This massive growth of the microfinance industry in Bolivia led to further dispersion of
microfinance through International Finance and World Bank funding and support into Peru,
Columbia, Mexico and throughout the region. Microfinance began to be seen as a successful
development model that supported neoliberal commitments, further pushing it into the
economies of Latin America.
Growing Issues in MFIs: Questions of Best Practices and Institutional Mimicry
The literature has addressed many critiques of microfinance in order to better understand
how microfinance has grown out of Yunus’ model. It is important to look at what best practices
are and how institutional mimicry has perpetuated a new model of microfinance. Mimicry in
microfinance grew out of Compartamos’ move to an IPO. This resulted in a multitude of
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commercialized microfinance institutions charging high interest rates, and the British
government then funded a systematic review to look at the impact of microfinance. While they
were hoping to find support for microfinance, they instead found that despite thirty years of
operation, there was little if any evidence to support the positive claims of MFIs that they created
poverty reduction.39 The research team found that positive conclusions were only found through
inappropriate methodologies and faulty impact evaluations; they further concluded that the
microfinance model was “under existential threat.”40 The review concluded that there was no
evidence to support poverty reduction claims that have been a driving force behind microfinance
for the past thirty years. The study found that there were fundamental flaws within the
microfinance model itself that made it an “anti-development intervention.”41 This is important
because the vast majority of microfinance models are built upon the best practices model. This
study highlights that the mimicry of this model is what hinders the effectiveness of microfinance
institutions. The following section will discuss best practices and institutional mimicry in more
detail, as well as how poverty alleviation is defined and related to the best practices model of
microfinance.
Best Practices. MFIs have established a set of best practices for instituting and running
such projects. Although this began with the Mohamad Yunus microcredit model in Bangladesh,
the major differences between Yunus’ microcredit model and the best practices microfinance
model focused on lending practices. The new microfinance model began looking at these
institutions to “seek to establish permanent institutions and sustainable systems that deliver
quality financial services for clients (not beneficiaries)” and in doing so began to create a best
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practices model for microfinance.42 The best practices model also encouraged the growth of
savings before loans to help spur capital that is necessary for financial stability (Wright, G.,
2000; Yousif, et al., 2013; Arora, 2012; Bateman, 2013, 2012, 2010; Morduch, 2000). Bateman
(2010) showed that the best practices model of microfinance became the international
communities’ poverty reduction policy of choice.”43
As noted, the best practices model stems from the microcredit model founded by the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1983 (Yunus, 2011, 2003). Their model had five key features:
lends only to the very poor, deals with creditors in groups, requires creditors to deposit savings in
the bank, uses peer pressure of the group to ensure loan repayment, and requires good credit
standing to secure subsequent loans.44 The program was structured by instituting daily repayment
programs of small amounts and using group lending.45 This traditional microcredit model made
the Bangladesh loan program successful.
Today microfinance stems from the World Bank’s move into the microfinance field by
creating the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). CGAP produced the ‘Pink Book’ to
explain the core principles around which all microfinance programs now had to be built.46 This
new wave microfinance model established the best practices for microfinance (Aggarwall, 2013;
Ahlin, Lin, and Maio, 2011; Aitken, 2013, 2010; Bhatt and Tang, 2001; CGAP, 2006; Dacin,
1997; Dunford, 2000; Gine, et al., 2010; Rahman, et al. 2012; Sinclair, 2012). CGAP and the
World Bank set out the best practices model basing it on eleven core principles: access to
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financial services; assets building; integration in the mainstream financial system; selfsustaining; building permanent local financial institutions; other kinds of support for the
destitute; not capping interest rates; the government should enable financial services; capacity
building; and microfinance should measure its performance (based on loan repayment and cost
recovery, and number and poverty level of clients being served).47 Bateman (2010) showed that
developed governments, bilateral development agencies, and international NGOs shifted their
microfinance support policy and programs towards the World Bank approach.48 Existing
literature on microfinance has consistently shown that the most prevalent model of microfinance
is the best practices model; however, this literature does not question best practices in an
institutional design, whereas this dissertation hopes to fill this gap by looking at how the
institutional design of microfinance impacts poverty alleviation outcomes.49
There is literature that has shown that when using the best practices model problems
arise, but it does not propose an alternative whereas this dissertation proposes a best fit model.
The literature focuses on four main themes in critiquing microfinance; over indebtedness;
outreach and client targeting; gender empowerment; and the role of the government (Hilton
2012; Woller, 2007; Johnson; 2005; De La Torre, Gine, and Vishwanath, 2011). Ditcher (2007)
argued that the evidence for the alleviation of poverty within the best practices model of
microfinance was “largely a mirage.”50 Bateman (2010) argued that the best practices model at
the heart of microfinance “thoroughly disempowered individuals.”51 Ellerman (2007)
additionally argued that the best practices model sustained “programmes that [had] little if any
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development effectiveness.”52 In 2009, the World Bank even concluded in the PREM Moving
out of Poverty study that microfinance will only “help the poor subsist from day to day” and that
the poor felt that they lacked the “linkages [that] are crucial in helping them escape poverty.”53
Institutional Mimicry. The implication of best practices is that it creates a situation
where microfinance is adopted into a multitude of locations without regard to the local political
and social conditions. This is mimicry. Institutional mimicry stems from the policy sciences that
looked at policy transfer. Policy transfer occurs when countries come up against a policy need
and therefore look to other countries that have had the same set of circumstances. One of the
most pervasive policy problems has to do with poverty alleviation. Policy communities are an
important dynamic in the policy transfer of microfinance. They include organizations such as the
MicroCredit Summit Preparatory Committee, the Grameen Trust/CASHPOR, and the
Foundation for Development Co-operation (FDC), along with CGAP. The increasing number of
organizations like these allows for quick start up of tested models and systems, however, these
models often require substantial modification to make them suitable for local conditions.
Organizations such as those found within the policy communities do not possess the necessary
knowledge to modify the microfinance policies adequately. Replication of this kind is dangerous
because these policy communities are consultants, lenders, or donors who design and
recommend systems that they themselves do not fully understand resulting in incomplete or
blurred blueprints that center the focus on credit, which makes clients reliant on permanent
access to these services. This means that the policies focus too narrowly on the access to credit
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portion of the policy and neglect the services that should go with them like educational, business,
and savings portions of the programs.
What is most important here is the aspect of copying. When it comes to policy copying,
this is replication, or isomorphic mimicry. Isomorphic mimicry is not a new concept and has
roots in biology as the animal kingdom has many instances of camouflage that mimics other
animals for survival. Then political scientists began to look at structural isomorphism of states in
the global system.54 Organizational policy sciences then picked up the mimicry idea and focused
on how isomorphic institutions were set up around the world to look like successful
organizations.55 From these foundations, I have defined institutional mimicry as a form of policy
copying where institutions mimic successful institutions by actually copying their structures. In
the case of microfinance, this refers to the persistent copying of best practices modeling of
microfinance. This mimicry provides “less scope for learning” and results in a “one-size-fits-all
approach” to policy reform, which are best practices.
The most important literature on institutional mimicry is DiMaggio and Powell’s The
Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that capitalist enterprises are models of bureaucratic
organizations, and that this bureaucratization forms out of structuration.56 Additionally, they
highlight the fact that organizations compete for resources and customers as well as, political
power and institutional legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell further argue that mimetic institutional
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isomorphism is created when the environment creates uncertainty, and therefore organizations
may model themselves on other organizations.57
DiMaggio and Powell highlight how other organizational modeling structures do not
account for mimicry arguing that organizations tend to “model themselves after similar
organizations…that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful.”58 They argue that certain
kinds of structural arrangements can more likely be attributed to mimicry processes rather than
other models. They argue that organizations with disputed or ambiguous goals tend to model
themselves after organizations they perceive as successful. These organizations do this because
they are reliant on other organizations for legitimacy. Such organizations would find it to their
advantage to meet expectations of important constituencies about how they should be designed
and run.59 Additionally, the discount innovation through modeling by showing that innovations
are often adopted to enhance their legitimacy.60 Importantly DiMaggio and Powell argue that
mimicry is the effect of several characteristics of organizational fields. They argue that the best
indicator of isomorphic mimicry is a decrease in variation and diversity.61 The microfinance
industry operates on the assumption that microfinance can reduce poverty and therefore the goal
must be to extend microfinance to as many people as possible.62 The commercialized
microfinance industry has resulted from international capital being drawn toward profitable
MFIs like Compartamos.63 As international capital is drawn toward one model type of
microfinance mimicry among other microfinance institutions is bound to occur.
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Through the experimentation with micro-credit and micro-finance, MFIs have established
a set of best practices for instituting and running such projects. This began with the Mohamad
Yunus microcredit model in Bangladesh. The major differences between Yunus’ microcredit
model and today’s microfinance model lies within the lending practices. Microcredit focuses on
loans given through small group formation or rotating member repayment groups; however,
microfinance focuses on single individual lending (although they do group lending as well,
formulated within the joint liability framework); additionally, microfinance focuses on the
savings and full range financial services as well as lending). The new microfinance model began
looking at these institutions to “seek to establish permanent institutions and sustainable systems
that deliver quality financial services for clients (not beneficiaries)” and in doing so began to
create a best practices model for microfinance.64 The best practices model also encouraged the
growth of savings before loans to help spur capital that is necessary for financial stability
(Wright, 2000; Yousif, et al., 2013; Arora, 2012; Bateman, 2013, 2012, 2010; Morduch, 2000).
Bateman (2010) showed that the “microfinance model became the international development
community’s poverty reduction policy and programme of choice.”65 He argues that this model of
microfinance became a “behemoth” that was based upon on a “flawed understanding of basic
economic principles” and that the new model of microfinance diverted so much from the Yunus
Bangladesh model that it “abandoned almost all of the core principles upon which [Yunus] had
established the original Grameen Bank model.”66
Poverty Alleviation. A major theme in the microfinance literature is its ability to reduce
poverty. There are two approaches in the literature on microfinance. One is considered an

64

Wright., 129.
Bateman., 2010., 19.
66
Bateman, 2010, 19.
65

29
“institutionalist perspective” that highlights microfinances commitment to the
“neoliberal/globalization agenda” and focuses on financial self-sufficiency, while the other
approach is a “welfarist” approach that focuses on the sectors ability to realize its mission of
poverty reduction.67 There is a major debate in the literature between the two approaches but
ultimately the depth of outreach and support practices that allow MFIs to serve the very poor and
alleviate poverty are widely cited as the original and main goal of microfinance. As such, this
project will look at microfinance from the welfarist approach because the issue of whether or not
microfinance really does alleviate poverty is at the core of all arguments in the literature on
microfinance and as such casts my dependent variable in this light.
An important thing about the literature on poverty alleviation is that the different studies
address the different ways in which poverty alleviation can be assessed. Poverty alleviation is the
dependent variable because it is the key indicator of the effectiveness of MFIs. Poverty
alleviation is defined in the literature by three key indicators: MFIs should establish permanent
institutions that can withstand economic shocks; MFIs should engage in practices that help the
poor by loaning money at reasonable interest rates, by not pressuring clients for repayment, by
providing financial services, and by benefiting the women that they make loans to; and finally,
poverty alleviation should improve the quality of life of clients by providing means by which
they can maintain food, shelter, health and family planning services, employment, and
education.68 This is what poverty alleviation should look like and it is what MFIs should strive to
accomplish. However, this project argues that because of institutional mimicry the adherence to
the best practices model does not result in alleviating poverty but instead it results in
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overindebtedness, baring the very poor from the financial services that they need through client
targeting practices, creates more problems for women as they are the ones responsible for the
debt of the microfinance loan, and spurs corruption and soaring interest rates as the domestic
political systems frame the interactions between the MFIs and the state.
By 2009, the best practices model began to be criticized for not creating any positive
gains in poverty alleviation (Bateman 2010). This was due in part because of the first two
randomized control trials in the microfinance sector, which found a lack of positive gains in
poverty levels for clients. Banarjee, et al. (2009), Karlan, and Zinman (2009) both raised doubts
about the “causal link between microfinance participation and poverty reduction.”69 Karlan and
Zinman (2009) actually found that access to microfinance actually resulted in a decline in
“subjective well-being” highlighting the argument that microfinance does not have a significant
impact on poverty alleviation.70 Bateman and Chang (2012) argue that the microfinance model
perpetuate by best practices was a barrier to “sustainable economic and social development, and
also to poverty reduction.”71 Sinclair (2012) argues that there tends to be a gap between theory
and the practice of microfinance. Furthermore, he argues that no substantial reduction in poverty
can be “reasonably attributed” to microfinance.72 The literature on microfinance and poverty
alleviation continually indicates MFIs have problems with reducing poverty (Arunachalam 2011;
Karim 2011; Klas 2011; Khandker, 2005; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2011; Thrikawala,
Locke, and Reddy, 2013; Vijaya and Veerendrakumar, 2013).
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Batman (2012) highlighted the idea that microfinance was popular because it was the
“political serviceability of the microfinance concept that catapulted it into becoming the
international development agencies single most important policy.”73 Additionally, the World
Bank (2008) looked at microfinance and poverty reduction concluding that more research is
needed; importantly they defined poverty alleviation in relation to microfinance as the use of
credit to impact household welfare positively. Walt (2012) found that that impact of
microfinance on poverty of clients was zero.74
Karlan (2001) found that assessments of microfinance institutions often omitted former
clients creating a survivorship bias that overstates the program’s success.75 Armendariz and
Morduch (2010) showed that evidence on statistical impacts has been mixed at best, and that
there is no robust study that shows strong impacts, instead most of them show the possibility of
positive impacts.76 Coleman (1999) found that in the average microfinance program in Thailand,
the impact was not significantly different from zero after controlling for member selection and
program placement.77 Snodgrass and Sebstad (2002) found that in Peru, Zimbabwe, and India
there were no measurable increases in average incomes of participants. Additionally, they found
that in Peru there were actually negative impacts in the ability to cope with shocks. Nghiem,
Coelli, and Rao (2012) looked at the impact of microfinance in Vietnam. They used quasiexperimental survey structure in Vietnam and found no significant effect of participation on
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household welfare. 78 Having discussed how microfinance addresses the issue of poverty
alleviation, the next section discusses how institutional mimicry impacts microfinances ability to
achieve income growth that would alleviate poverty.
Critiques of Microfinance: Economic, Socio-Cultural, and Political Perspectives
A substantial literature has emerged that critiques the effectiveness of microfinance
programs. The field of microfinance when attempting to measure how well a program works
focuses mostly on impact assessments, which tend to be donor driven and used to justifying
funding. This leads to profitability and sustainability standards through which success is
ultimately measured and defined. Measuring success in this manner allowed practitioners, who
received funding from outside sources (not from loan repayment but from NGO/IGO/or
Governments) to “manipulate numerous (legitimate) accounting procedures to ensure that
published [repayment] rates remained high.” Herms and Lensink (2007) highlight the problems
with measuring the impact of microfinance in this manner. They argue that without measuring
education and health and infrastructure it is “unclear whether microfinance contributes to a
reduction in poverty.” Kaboski and Townsend (2005) add to our understanding of how MFIs
typically are measuring impact by looking at village-level MFIs in Thailand. They found that
“failed” institutions appeared in their data making the argument for needed exogenous variation,
which they do not cover, but instead argue that it is a “peculiarity of the Thai political
environment.”79 They do not address this issue further, and therefore like many MFI impact
assessments they tend to focus too narrowly on impact measurements and do not flush out what
they mean by impact nor do they provide a definition for what failure means. By measuring the
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impact of MFIs in this manner studies tend to completely overlook failed MFIs and focus
narrowly on successful ones, and therefore perpetuate a culture of mimicry in the microfinance
field.
This chapter seeks to bring together the literature by focusing on economic, sociocultural, and political factors all together to highlight a deeper understanding of microfinance
overall impact in reducing poverty. At issue therefore, is the question of whether or not the best
practices model based on the Bangladesh experience is effective for the wider variety of
developing country settings to which is has been applied. The widespread application of this
standard model in diverse setting is what I label “institutional mimicry.” This chapter will
consider three sets of factors that might distort or otherwise undercut the effective
implementation of otherwise well-intentioned development aid. The first set of factors include
economic critiques that focus on MFIs commitment to neoliberal development practices. The
second set of factors include socio-cultural critiques that focus on the commitments to lending to
women only through gender targeting practices, and the influence that social capital creation has
on the perpetuation of no collateral lending to the poor. Finally, the third set of critiques focuses
on political factors that include how local political practices can lead to misuse of loans, and how
the influence of international organizations perpetuates only a single “best practices” model of
microfinance.
Economic Critiques of Microfinance
As such, this section covers the economic logic of microfinance and best practices as
MFIs structures are tied to market oriented ideologies with a focus on an ability to compete in
the market place as a development strategy. The economic factors addressed cover issues of
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neoliberal market orientation that MFIs follow issues of debt cycles, self-sufficiency, as well as
the impact of the economically active poor clients.
Commitment to Neo-Liberal Development Models. Neoliberalism as a theory focuses on
“deregulation, privatization, and a withdrawal of the state from many areas of social
provision.”80 Harvey (2005) and Ong (2006) argue that when it comes to microfinance and
neoliberalist economic policies, the models of microfinance based on best practices “subjects
citizens to act in accordance with the market principle of discipline, efficiency, and
competitiveness.”81 When coupled with conditional funding from the World Bank and other
international organizations, microfinance reinforces neoliberal development models instead of
adopting new models for development and poverty alleviation.82 Hardy, Holden, and Prokopenko
(2003) find that the form of donor funding support (either startup or continuous funding) for the
MFI significantly affects the performance of the institutions and the value that it has to society.
They argue that ongoing support is needed but the support should be designed to limit aiddependency traps.83 Aid-dependency weakens incentives for sustainability while suppressing
competition for commercially driven development programs. Hardy, Holden, Prokopenki (2003)
further argue that support for MFIs should be given as a start-up grant and not continuously. This
would allow for a variety of experiments on how to start microfinance programs while
recognizing that a portion of such experiments would fail. The authors balance that failure by
arguing that such innovation would allow several institutions to operate within an area so that
failure of one MFI does not leave the poor without services.84 Meehan (2005) points out that
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with the current trends in the microfinance industry international donors would be unable to
provide the funds to accommodate the rapid scaling up of the industry.85
Cunningham and Stamer (2005) showed that microfinance’s ability to create sustainable
growth is also dependent upon its interaction with local economic development schemes. These
schemes follow the basic premise that “public businesses and non-governmental sector partners
should work together to foster better conditions for economic growth.”86 Newby (1999) however
showed that these types of programs have often been discredited for their focus on the local level
of economic development because they are often constrained by national and international
policies that stem from tax regimes, resource allocation, and trade agreements.87 The problem
however is that global economic policies tend to be single minded in that they focus exclusively
on “global trade and attracting inward investment” and tend to ignore those local level political
and socio-economic factors that can lead to a program’s success or failure.88 As such,
microfinance programs tend to fail when they mimic the political economy of other countries,
and are not tailored to the nation in which the MFI is to operate. Cunningham and Stamer (2005)
show that interaction with the local economy is essential when setting up a development project,
but MFIs tend to mimic already established successful programs and therefore set themselves up
for failure.
Ahmad (2003) additionally showed the problems with NGO fostered microfinance
schemes in Bangladesh. He found that such programs suffered from non-accessibility to the
poorest, low return, misuse and an overemphasis on repayment. He showed that microfinance
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should be given with services like education and healthcare awareness. Ahmad and many other
scholars have found that the overemphasis of microcredit in microfinance has been to its own
detriment.89 Ahmad therefore looks at why NGO fostered programs may fail. While he does
show that these programs are prone to failure, he does not really cover why. This project
theorizes that the resulting NGO fostered failure is actually a function of mimicry among the
NGO’s who set up microfinance programs.
Creation of Debt Cycles. According to the literature, over indebtedness has become an
issue for microfinance (Woolcock, 1999; Yaron, 1994; Ahmed, 2003; Rhyne, 2001; Armendariz,
Beatriz, and Morduch, 2010; Bateman, 2010). Over indebtedness is simply the creation of more
debt in order to pay off existing debt, a debt cycle. This is fostered by MFIs repayment rules that
encourage repayment of loans but do not discourage that repayment from another loan. Over
indebtedness is created by the proliferation of microfinance institutions. The proliferation of
MFIs has resulted in a multitude of institutions for clients to join.90 Clients took advantage of the
credit from so many institutions and began maintain two or more loans as outstanding at a time.91
Clients began to take on more than they could handle and in turn began using one loan to pay off
another creating debt cycles that began a quick route to financial disaster for many. Over
indebtedness occurs when clients take out an additional loan to pay back the initial loan, and then
repeat this process creating a cycle of debt from which the client cannot escape.
One of the major studies in the microfinance literature that looks at the impact of over
indebtedness is the Banana Skins survey.92 The 2008 survey “Microfinance Banana Skins Risks
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in a Booming Industry” argues that microfinance’s move toward commercialization has resulted
in mission drift where the desire for profits has resulted in a shift toward higher interest rates
over the desire to help the poor.93 Additionally, the study argues that the biggest problems with
microfinance are competition among MFIs for clients, and the role of government regulation.94
Hilton (2012) showed in the “Banana Skins” survey that the problem of over indebtedness in
microfinance was still an issue (Hilton, 2012, 2008).95 Other literature on over indebtedness in
microfinance has also shown that key themes are over lending, taking out loans to repay loans
and overconfidence in the joint guarantee. (Bateman, 2011; Copestake, et al. 2005; Copestake,
2007; Cull, Kunt, and Morduch, 2008, 2007; Dorfleitner, Leidl, and Priberny, 2013; Rhyne,
2003, 2001; Taylor, 2011, 2012).
Sriram (2010) argued that after a phase of intense competition in Bolivia led to “reckless
lending [and] over indebtedness of the client that eventually caused cracks” in the system.96
Additionally, she highlighted that the “overzealous suppliers of credit meant that the client…had
begun to resort to adverse usage of credit.”97 Weber (2004) showed that loans were typically
used for consumption and that repayment is often over-lapping resulting in vicious cycles of debt
and over-indebtedness.98
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Rhyne (2001) looks at the microfinance crisis in Bolivia highlighting one way that MFIs
become ineffective. She showed that many clients in Bolivia actually belong to more than one
MFIs, many clients had loans at Pro Mujer and at Banco Sol, and this created massive overindebtedness among clients.99 The over-indebtedness of the clients resulted in delinquency
problems as well as loan cycling problems. Rhyne argues that when the financial crisis hit Brazil
resulting in currency devaluation, the already over-indebted clients were hit harder because
demand for their wares decreased and they were unable to export their products because of
Bolivia’s crackdown on informal importing and exporting.100 The surrounding financial climate
of Bolivia created a problem for microfinance because they shifted from trying to help clients to
spending all their time extracting collections from customers. In response, the clients formed a
borrowers union to fight back what had become predatory microfinance institutions. Protests
were staged at Acceso, CrediAgil, and Caja los Andes, and Banco Sol, and they demanded full
debt forgiveness. The extra attention highlighted how these banks were illegally collecting debts
through harassments, using collected debts to make new loans, and mishandling membership
dues. As a result, Asofin and Superintendency of Banks collapsed, only to resurface later with
different leaders.101 Rhyne’s study is important because it showed not only how a financial crisis
sparked the downfall of MFIs but shows some insight into how MFIs could be mismanaged. This
section explained how over-indebtedness is problematic for microfinance’s ability to generate
poverty alleviation.
Commitment to Self-Sufficiency. The effect of subsidies has long been debated in the
microcredit and microfinance literature. The core focus of many microfinance scholars is to
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address the issue of how to make microfinance sustainable. Morduch (2000) shows this
conundrum by highlighting the fact that the Grameen Bank model, upon which most modern
microfinance likes to take its cues, is not sustainable. He showed that interest rates on their loans
would need to be doubled in order for the bank to break even.102 Rosenberg (1998) additionally
showed that only one percent of programs are financially sustainable and perhaps only five
percent would ever become so. The remaining 95% will fold or continue with the use of
subsides. Nancy Barry (1995) also argues that subsides programs are bound to fail. Buckley
(1997) highlights that sustainability in microcredit organizations is rare by looking at Kenya,
Malawi, and Ghana. By highlighting the issues in Kenya specifically, Buckley showed that those
who did receive credit from microcredit organizations did not move toward self-sufficiency or
graduate away from the credit program despite being in a fourth loan cycle. He showed that
profitability of these organizations was negligible. Buckley in essence showed how high
repayment rates could exist while the microcredit organizations continue to need to be subsidized
to exist.103
Furthermore, Morduch (1999) showed that subsidies originated from many funding
sources, primarily from donor agencies (NGO’s), regional banks that are rationed at a lower
interest rate, government bonds (also rationed at low interest of 4-5%), the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, and governments like Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands who
provide subsidies.104 Nieto (2005) showed that private institutional investors that channel funds
from donors, private lenders, investors, as well as, the World Bank and other multilateral
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agencies often finance microcredit programs.105 Microfinance has no way to differentiate
between successful and unsuccessful businesses, which in turn can create debt cycles, as those
within the programs use future loans to repay current loans and therefore are making no profit or
economic growth. In order for microfinance to be successful it would need to set up permanent
“institutions and systems that provide financial services during the loan period as well as the
long term” that would make the programs sustainable.106
The Importance of the Economically Active Poor. The literature shows that the clients
of microfinance are typically not the very poor, but instead tend to be the economically active
poor. Who actually gets the loans is a major point of study in the literature on microfinance. The
literature shows that many MFIs choose clientele based on their ability to pay back even a
fraction of the loan, and that while they claim to lend to the poorest of the poor they actually lend
to a groups that are economically active poor. Microfinance claims to help the poorest of the
poor and many NGOs and donors support these programs under that guise. The literature shows
that microfinance claims to help the poorest of the poor, because it looks good to say so and that
the distinction between extremely poor and economically active poor is an important distinction
for microfinance’s ability to reduce poverty.
Woller (2002) highlights this move by looking at the possibility to provide financial
services to the poor. His main contribution here is to argue that operational policies of
microfinance institutions focus too heavily on the credit portion and therefore create
vulnerability and prevent the very poor population from participating (Woller 2007, 2002).
Hartarska and Mersland (2012) looked at the mechanisms for effectively reaching poor clients
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and found that competition does not improve efficiency and that MFIs can only serve poor
customers if they remain financially sustainable.107 They show that while the literature on
microfinance is concerned with poverty outreach its main concern is with financial sustainability
and that MFIs often do not target the poorest of the poor. Bison, Dalton, and Wilson (2012) also
argued that the microfinance literature is shifting its definition of “success” away from the
helping the poor out of poverty and instead focusing on financial self-sufficiency.108
Furthermore, they argue that MFIs shift to giving larger loans to a more secure client base is
creating a shift away from poverty reduction and a shift away from helping the poorest of the
poor.109 Simanowitz (2002), among other scholars, have additionally argued that this shift has
deliberately excluded the poorest sectors from microfinance programs (Ahlin, 2003; Azzam, et
al., 2012; Elahi and Rahman, 2006; Hermes and Lensink, 2011; Jain, 2009).
Robinson (2001) argues, “savings facilities are often more in demand among the poor
than credit services.”110 She argues that it is important to make a distinction between the
extremely poor and the economically active poor. Furthermore, she argues that the “poverty line
is not directly relevant for microfinance.”111 As such, she highlights one of the key issues with
microfinance in that “when loans are provided to the very poor, the borrowers may not be able to
use the loans effectively.”112 Microfinance loans, despite claims otherwise, do not reach the
poorest of the poor because “the demand from poor people is not for the products and services
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that the microfinance industry has emphasized.”113 Measuring outreach is difficult as Khandker
(2005) and Dunford (2006) both argue that the problem occurs between measuring the core poor
and the moderately poor.114 Hulme and Mosely (1996) and Copesake et al. (2005) mirror similar
arguments showing that it is often the better off poor who gain the most from microfinance.115
This section discussed how poverty outreach is a prevalent issue with the mimicked program of
microfinance.
Socio-Cultural Critiques of Microfinancing
The literature on microfinance and socio-cultural issues has grown substantially. As such,
this section addresses the socio-cultural issues that impact microfinance’s effectiveness. It
focuses on the societies where microfinance programs are designed to operate and how issues of
social norms and traditional culture can impact the ability of programs to operate under the local
and regional conditions. The socio-cultural factors that impact effectiveness of microfinance that
are covered include issues of gender targeting and social capital creation. The last part of the
literature review section addresses these socio-cultural factors.
Gender Targeting. In addition to the previously discussed economic factors that impact
MFIs effectiveness, there are also socio-cultural factors, including issues of gender targeting,
local political practices, and social capital. Gender and microfinance has been a major focus in
research. A key issue in the literature is whether MFI loans ultimately improve the lives or
economic condition of women who receive the loans. The revolution that has become
microfinance over the last twenty years has not only focused on the importance of development
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for the poor, but also on many programs that have specifically targeted women in hopes of
empowering them, and thereby creating equality. The microfinance industry has spawned an
important political connection between women’s empowerment and loans which has created a
social cause for donors and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to get behind and continue to fund
microfinance programs (Dobra, 2011; Johnson, 2005, 2000; Jupp, Ali and Barahona, 2010;
Kabeer, 2001; Rankin, 2001; Weber, 2004; Yusuff, 2010; Uddin, 2013).
Mel, McKenzi, and Woodruff (2009) investigate the differences in profitability and
growth of enterprises run by females. They suggest that most female-owned enterprises grow
slower and generate lower profit levels than male owned enterprises.116 The question then
follows why microfinance continues to focus on loans to women. Rahman (2001), Karim (2008),
and Moodie (2013) argue that the issue with gender and microfinance stems from the Grameen
Bank model, where Yunus noticed that women were more reliable to repay their loans.117
Additionally, they argue that this high repayment rate actually stems from a “patriarchal
economy of shame” where by microfinance assumes that self-employed women would use the
loans, but in fact it is men that do so justified by “deeply entrenched systems of gender inequality
and kinship obligations.”118 Furthermore, Moodie argues that the activities undertaken through
microfinance loans are domestic in nature and that these informal sector jobs are always
“constrained by domestic responsibilities.”119
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When it comes to microfinance and gender in Latin America, the theme of the
feminization of poverty has arisen (Baden, 1999; Cagatay, 1998; Chant, 1997, 2003, 2008;
Davids and van Driel, 2005; Medeiros and Costa, 2006; Moghadam, 2005; and Wennerholm,
2002).120 Atal, Nopo, and Winder (2009) further this argument by looking at gender and wage
gaps in Latin America. They found that part of the wage gap stemmed from the difference in
types of jobs men and women get. Furthermore, they show that women’s presence in the region’s
informal sector is a contributing factor to the gender wage gaps. Haase (2007) furthermore
argues that women throughout Latin America lacked management skills and the ability to
transform human capital-education, experience, and skills – into revenue.121 Haas argues that
part of the problem is that the trend of gender segregation has resulted in women who are
unrepresented in the skilled labor market. The restrictions on where they work and what kind of
work they do are also important problems for female entrepreneurs in the region that
microfinance programs do not address.122
Additional literature on gender and Latin America culture highlights issues of Latin
culture and empowering women through microfinance. Silverberg (2014) argues that problems
with the way that microfinance employs group lending tends to cause problems in households,
which challenge societal norms.123 Silverberg and Hossain (2002) additionally argue that while
microfinance is promoting a benefit to empower women, and that MFIs target women with this
belief. Furthermore, they argue that women in particular in machismo societies, like Latin
America, are more intimidated by male organizations workers and therefore less likely to
Sylvia Chant., "The ‘feminisation of poverty’ and the ‘feminisation’ of anti-poverty programmes: Room for
revision?." The Journal of Development Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 165-197; T. Davids and F. Van Driel., The Gender
Question in Globalization: Changing Perspectives and Practice. (Ashgate, Aldershot Publishing, 2005).
121
Dwight Haas., “Closing the Gender Gap” ESR (Fall 2007), 6.
122
Ibid., 7.
123
Sarah Silverberg., “One Size Does Not Fit All: A Study of Microfinance Practices in Peru” Undercurrent
Journal 10, no 2 (Fall/Winter 2014), 49.
120

45
challenge the organization.124 The literature also highlights the domestic violence issues
surrounding microfinance as women are “reprimanded for being distracted from household
activities” (Hossain, 2002; Schuler, 1998; Pait, 2009; Silverberg 2014).125 Silverberg additionally
argues that women’s empowerment and independence could lead to more violence, as men in the
machismo Latin American society see microfinance as instigating problems as women become
more independent. Perhaps more importantly Silverberg argues that microfinances practices need
to be revised as women move into more active roles in the economy and contribute more as
heads of households.126
Johnson (2005) addressed the issues of gender targeting in microfinance programs by
looking at MFIs in Malawi. She found that MFI programs have done little to understand gender
relations in which their women clients are embedded and therefore their programs are not
tailored to have the greatest impact.127 Van Staveren (2001) also had found that by not including
indicators of market access microfinance loans would promote women’s labor but not market
accessibility. Additionally, she found that targeting of women often creates gender distortions, as
women are not given access to information about financial services. Wright (2000) discovered
that in Bangladesh for the Grameen Bank 63% of women had no control over the loan use and
that women are forced to take on loan repayment when the men misuse the loans.128
Claims for the benefits of gender targeting in microfinance have become an industry
standard. However, Johnson (2005) argued that MFIs had done little to understand the gender

124

Id.
Silverbert., (2014), 49.
126
Ibid.
127
Susan Johnson, “Gender Relations, Empowerment and Microcredit: Moving on from a Lost Decade”
The European Journal of Development Research 17, no. 2 (June 2005), 225.
128
Graham A.N. Wright, Microfinance Systems: Designing Quality Financial Services for the Poor (Zed
Books: London, 2000), 23. The ideal of an increased bargaining position of women stems from a 1960s hypothesis
of Blood and Wolfe, family sociologists that found that “the power balance within marriage is determined by
comparative valued resources of spouses” (Wright, 24).
125

46
relations of their clients so their programs.129 Allen (2006) stated, “male exclusion can lead to
negative consequences for women” because their participation is seen as threatening and such
resistance can lead to their loans being “hijacked.”130 Armendariz and Roome (2008) showed
that “excluding husbands can be counterproductive because of informational asymmetries.”131
Suresh, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009) found that women do not obtain a permanent increase
in income following the loan.132 Menon-Sen (2012) further argued the point that gender
mainstreaming and the thought of microfinance as a “magic bullet that can cure both poverty and
women’s subordinations, has further constrained the space for promoting women’s rights.”133
Gender and Best Practices. When discussing gender empowerment and microfinance in
Latin America, it is also important to look at the impact of domestic violence has in Latin
America. Violence against women frequently has the impact of restricting civil, political, social,
cultural, and economic rights. Ingoldsby (1991) argues that the cultural context in Latin America
of a machismo male makes aggressiveness and hyper-sexuality acceptable.134 Furthermore,
Wells (1968) argues that traditionally Latin American culture has focused on male dominance
and machismo as typified in the political and military strongman caudillos.135After the wars of
Independence in Latin America, the caudillo would take up rule by force establishing a caudillaje
political system that was characterized by armed patron-client sets and the use of violence.
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Kinzer (1973) follows that tradition that caudillos and machismo were part of the 19th century
power structure and that current references to machismo are stereotypes.136 However, Chant and
Craske (2003), Pena (2006), Mayo and Resnick (1996), and Wilson (2014) contend that the
traditional value system that has emerged out of caudillo rule has resulted in continued forms of
gendered oppression alongside political oppression, highlighting the populist and dictatorial
regimes of Peron of Argentina, Castro in Cuba, and Chavez in Venezuela.137 Certainly political
violence is Latin America is just as prevalent as it was in the 19th and 20th century. From that, the
acceptable use of force as a social construct has emerged. This has resulted in a sociopolitical
legacy of caudillos and machismo has creates asymmetric power configurations within
households. Adopting a similar definition as the UN, that gender based violence is any form of
discrimination leading to inequality, and using power in a sociopolitical context as embodied in
machismo, violence against women is still an issue in Latin America and machismo very much is
a modern concept contrary to Kinzer’s argument. Macias-Gonzalez and Rubenstein (2012)
follow support this argument as well, stating that gender is influenced by the norms and
behavioral codes of society.138 If the code is accepting of violence against women, violence will
ensue.
The intersection of violence and economics is an important factor to consider. Ellsberg,
Penna, Herrera, Liljestrand and Winkvist (1999) argue that asymmetry between partners creates
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interpersonal violence.139 Heise (1998) additionally finds that asymmetry can be created by
socioeconomic violence. A structural change in the family dynamic relationship creates
asymmetry and increases the risk of gendered violence.140 When microfinance loans are given to
women without regard to the historical and social contexts that exist, they inherently create
power asymmetries and gendered violence.
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) argue that impact assessments that measure
empowerment actually measure MFI participation by gender on indicators such as “labor supply,
school enrollment, expenditure per capita, and non-land asset ownership.”141 They highlight the
fact that impact assessments are “very sensitive to unobservables.”142 Kaboski and Townsend
(2005) additionally add to our understanding of how MFIs typically are measuring impact by
looking at village-level MFIs. They measure impacts by looking at membership level, savings
mobilization, and lending ability to make the claim that MFIs have an impact on households.
They show that institutions that follow policies that promote these things have a 5% higher
annual growth in assets to villagers.143 Mayoux (2008) defines empowerment as a “process
through which those who are currently disadvantaged achieve equal rights, resources, and
power.”144 The issue with empowerment is that everyone has a different definition of what it is;
therefore, MFIs typically do not measure any component of empowerment.
Social Capital. When it comes to microfinances’ impact, the major concern with the
literature is its ability to create social capital. Kim (2007) argues that microfinance can create
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social capital through knowledge, skills, and financial resources, which allow participants to
affect positively the outcomes of their own lives. Through social power, social capital is created
as defined as a network of relationships that builds links between communities and groups of
actors. It is in this social capital idea that micro-loan and microfinance programs promise the
greatest movement for empowerment.145 However, the research on the impact of social capital
and microfinance is mixed. Armendariz and Morduch (2005) actually highlight the fact that the
social cohesion that microfinance claims to create through their group lending structures is
actually detrimental to repayment rates.146 Wydick (1999) concluded similarly that in Guatemala,
social ties had little impact on repayment rates and in fact, that friends did not make reliable
group members.147 Ahlin and Townsend (2003) again found that proxies for social ties were
associated with weak repayment performance in Thailand.148 However, Karlan (2003) and
Wenner (1995) found that in Peru and Costa Rica social capital was a positive force.149 Adams
and Mayoux (2001) argue that the idea of social capital imbedded in microloans is “grossly
overstated” and that while microfinance may in fact give access to credit it does not mean the
same thing as open access.150
One of the main problems with the contradictory research on microfinance and social
capital focuses on the multitude of definitions used for social capital. Healey, et al. (1999)
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explains that social capital is typically thought of as a network of relationships plus norms by
which actors have to conform.151 Rydin and Holman (2004) show that social capital is often
distinguished by two separate definitions, those being, networks within the community or group
and links between communities or groups of actors.152 Moses Acquaah (2008) looks at social
capital creation through social networking relationships in Ghana and found that social capital
was responsible for developing social relationships with politicians that can therefore provide
access to resources and information for business activities.153 However, Acquaah points out that
social capital from social ties with government officials can be costly because it can hide the
business’s ability to pursue new opportunities and therefore hinder its growth.154 Woodworth
(2008) additionally looks at social capital and microcredit. He shows that studies concerning
social capital are varied because they are often centered on different concepts of what constitutes
social capital. Woodworth therefore argues that when discussing social capital in the context of
microfinance it should be defined the way Yunus has defined it several criteria, including it
should help poor families overcome poverty, target poor women, and should be based on trust
not collateral, and such credit should be used to create self-employment not consumption.155
Kah, Olds, and Kah (2005) further illustrate this point by looking at the creation of social capital
among microfinance institutions in Senegal. They define social capital as social relationships
“within and between microcredit institutions and financing NGOs, donors, and governments.”156
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Essentially, they define social capital on a broader spectrum bringing in the impact of
international organizations.157 This highlights the obvious problem with social capital in the
microfinance literature and why one study is positive while another is negative, without a
standardized definition of what social capital, it is difficult to measure and therefore determine
its impact on microfinance. What Kah, Olds, and Kah do point out is that there is a move in the
microfinance literature to look at the role of international organizations. This literature highlights
the importance of measuring social capital and its impact, because if the MFI is able to create
social capital it would be successful, however, if it did not create social capital it could fail not
only socially but also economically.
Political Critiques of Microfinance
The literature on microfinance and political issues is still a new approach. The literature
shows that microfinance can interact with the political, but it does not get at the core issue of
how that interaction can hinder poverty alleviation efforts. These studies have focused
exclusively on the financial side of microfinances’ interaction with the government, and
therefore, have little insight into the deeper political processes that are occurring. This
dissertation argues that because of institutional mimicry and the adherence to a best practices
model, loans do not result in poverty alleviation but instead it results in overindebtedness, baring
the very poor from the financial services that they need, and spurring corruption and soaring
interest rates as the domestic political systems frame the interactions between the MFIs and the
state. The political factors that impact effectiveness of microfinance that are covered include
issues of local political practices that lead to corruption and the influence of international
organization on perpetuating the best practices model of microfinance.
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Local Political Practices. A growing theme in the literature has been the issue of the role
of the domestic government in microfinance. The literature in microfinance has become
interested in the impact of the domestic environment in which microfinance institutions operate.
Much of the literature concerns itself over what role the government plays. The arguments in the
literature center on the implementation of a governmental regulatory model for microfinance to
ensure client protection like any other bank would. In focusing on the domestic political system
in which microfinance operates, the literature also highlights how government involvement can
create corruption and therefore, argues the government should not be involved in microfinance at
all. Microfinance’s interaction with the domestic environment is often discussed in the literature
in terms of its institutional capacity to regulate the banking capacity of the MFIs themselves.
Another issue the literature highlights is how the domestic environment can undermine
the microfinance institutions ability to reduce poverty through corruption or weak state
structures. De la Torre, Gine, and Vishwanath (2011) look at the role of the government in
microfinance institutions in India. They found that the frequent interference by the government
could actually undermine the culture of repayment as borrowers take advantage of lax
enforcement of credit contracts.158 Olu (2009) shows how in Nigeria lax government
enforcement over black markets creates unfair competition or micro-businesses.159 Therefore,
their argument is that the role of the government should not be that of replacing private agents,
such as NGO’s and private funders, but the government needs to be a regulatory body that
supports the funding in the market. Shylendra (2006) showed that in India weak state structures
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resulted in subsidies that leaked the benefits to non-poor, high failure rate of self-employment
projects, and loan repayment problems.160 Much of the literature on the role of the government in
microfinance therefore has to do with the government’s role as a regulatory body for the MFI to
ensure not only protection for the client in case of bank failure but for the growth of the MFI
market to ensure repayments. The microfinance and regulation question became a concern when
the institutions as NGO’s began to function as semi-banks but not under the same rules or
regulations of banks. The most important issue is the transparency of interest rates, where the
rates are sometimes not disclosed and involve upfront fees or balance basis calculation.161
The literature also shows how government interaction with MFIs would create corruption
among political elites by making repayment dependent upon votes for candidates. The larger
phenomenon shown here was that when the political elites controlled too much of the MFI they
would use promises of lax repayment or increase in loans to secure votes. Cole (2009) found that
government owned banks did significantly capture more loans during election cycles.162
Sapienza (2004) found that Italian banks charged lower interest rates during election cycles, and
Khwaja and Mian (2005) found that in Pakistan government owned banks would forgive
defaulting loans during the election cycle.163 Dinc (2005) examined the lending of government
owned banks during the election cycle as well showing an increase of about 11% relative to
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private banks.164 These studies show that loans were politically motivated and given to certain
members aligned with the majority coalition. Torre, Gine, and Vishwanath (2011) showed that
the “culture of subsides and frequent government relief undermined the culture of repayment” as
borrowers would take advantage of the lax enforcement during election cycles.165
There has yet to be a consensus on which is the best regulatory system for microfinance.
Schmidt (2000) argues that a “one size fits all approach” will have “adverse effects” because
capital adequacy ratios tend to be country specific as does loan provisioning.166 Instead he argues
for microfinance legislation and regulations that are absent in developing countries. Bates (2007)
argues that the government should support the microfinance industry in Latin America. In
January 2007, the state-owned Banco Industrial made plans to purchase Prodem, a prominent
microfinance institution in Bolivia. In April, of the same year, President Hugo Chavez proposed
a US$1billion bond to fund businesses in Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Then in May, the
Bolivian government headed by Evo Morales established Banco del Desarrollo Productivo for
low-interest microloans. President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia has similarly followed suit
launching his own program to promote microcredit.167
The growing interest in microfinance in Latin America is seen less as an altruistic reason
and more as a way to provide financial services to the poor as quickly as possible. Microfinance
is no longer being considered as a blanket policy plan to solve poverty but as more
comprehensive financial development plan. Despite this, Ernesto Aguirre, World Bank
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consultant and former banking superintendent from Colombia, suggests that the government’s
involvement in microfinance as misguided pointing to the agricultural plans of the 1970s and
1980s that used subsides that turned out to be “unsustainable and generated a culture of
nonpayment among borrowers.”168 Bates argues that while Bolivia has had a successful MFI
industry, the high interest rates were politically unsustainable because of a lack of regulation. 169
Bates hints at the idea that MFIs that are tailored after the Compartamos model are unlikely to
succeed because they are set up in countries that lack the ability to regulate or control the MFI.
This means the MFI is less likely to create poverty alleviation while following the best practices
because it does not take into account the local regulatory and governmental environment in
which the MFI is operating.
The role of the government in microfinance has been greatly debated in the literature.
This starts with the influence that government banks have in channeling funds. Rajan and
Zingales (2003) showed that the political elite control the financial resources. Caprio and Peria
(2000) showed that government ownership of banks was associated with a greater likelihood of
banking crises. La Porta et al. (2002) documented that government owned banks allow
politicians to use the banks to further their own political goals. This literature has shown that
government owned banks is associates with lower economic growth.170 Hubka and Zaidi (2005)
argue that the government should exit the microfinance sector because they create unfair
competition and create corruption among local elites.171
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Some microfinance literature attempts to propose new regulatory models to deal with this
mimicry of best practices. This mainly includes licensing legislation for microfinance
institutions. However, as Kirkpatrick and Maimbo (2002) note where licensing legislation is
present it is rarely detailed, unlike banking laws where regulation is clear with regard to
minimum capital requirements, and financial conditions.172 Christian and Rosenberg (2000)
suggest that the reason that licensing legislation is so ambiguous may be because governments
may look toward this licensing and regulation as a means of “clamping down on troublesome
foreign-funded NGO’s or other groups that they would like to control more tightly.”173 Greuning,
Gallardo, and Randhawa (1998), however, suggest that licensing is uneven because of the
inconsistent application regulatory principles. They point to Bolivia, Indonesia, Philippines,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka as countries that have licensed specialized and regular commercial
banks that provide financial services to MFIs.174 Swain and Liljiorst (2005) showed that some
governments have repressive financial systems and inappropriate regulation that do not allow
microfinance institutions to cover costs and risks and earn a profit. Their study hints at the idea
that the MFIs do not adequately take into account the local political structures when setting up
their programs. Therefore, these programs tend to be mimicked programs of other successful
programs and as such, they follow best practices that hinder their poverty alleviation
capabilities.175
The Role of International Influences. Cull, Demiguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2008)
highlights the importance of funding microfinance institutions in a different way by looking at
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Banco Compartamos in Mexico. The showed that Compartamos’ public offering allowed it to
free itself form donor-supported initiatives and grow from 60,000 to 800,000 customers between
2000 and 2007. They argue that micro-lenders should and can compete with mainstream
commercial banks.176 This version of microfinance is different from the NGO driven MFIs in
that they charge increased interest rates, for which Compartamos may see backlash.
Compartamos focused on serving hundreds of thousands poor customers whom they believe
would have been worse off financially. Compartamos greatly differs from the NGO’s versions of
microfinance in that NGO’s tend to be run like “social businesses driven by social missions,”
whereas Compartamos is focused on reducing poverty by self-help rather than income
redistribution.177 Compartamos is important because it highlights for the first time a significant
shift in the microfinance paradigm. It has shown that microfinance institutions are directly linked
to the private capital markets.178 Since the global financial crisis of 2008, capital markets as a
source of corporate governance have risen, and microfinance is part of this new interaction.179
What the changing global economic system and the growth of Compartamos have shown is that
commercialized providers of microfinance are the fastest growing dimension of the sector.180
This explosive growth shows that microfinance’s ability to create profit for its investors has
resulted in mimicked programs throughout the developing world.
The field of microfinance is a complex one; there are many types of microfinance and
many different ways to do microfinance. In the past thirty years, it has grown in tremendous
popularity as the connection between financial development and economic growth has become
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inexorably linked. The shift in development theories has resulted in a new understanding in the
way financial markets develop and stimulate the growth of the economy. As a result, the finance
in poverty reduction has moved to the forefront of development practices and the prominent
vehicle is microfinance. As microfinance has become the go to practice for economic
development in underdeveloped countries, microfinance itself has changed. Microfinance today
tends to focus more on the international level rather than the local level, resulting in new
problems because they are often constrained by policies that stem from tax regimes, resource
allocation, and trade agreements.181 The problem is that global economic policies tend to be
single-minded in that they focus exclusively on “global trade and attracting inward investment”
and tend to ignore those local level political and socio-economic factors that create poverty.182
Summary and Conclusion
The emergence of the global market has fundamentally changed the way economic
development and financial developments are understood. Neoliberalism has brought to the
forefront the problems of underdeveloped and third world countries to grow their local
economies and sustain basic standards of living. As the problems created by globalization
become more prevalent scholars and development theorists have searched for solutions to the
sustainable development impasse. Microfinance has become a new piece to the puzzle by
introducing economic methods from the bottom up, with the theory that fostering local economic
development will result in macro-economic development and foster integration into the global
market. With the emphasis on microfinance’s ability to result in macro-economic changes, many
development organizations were eager to perpetuate and grow microfinance in the developing
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world. This was done through instituting the best practices model of microfinance, which created
institutional mimicry throughout the industry and, as this dissertation argues, actually hinders the
MFIs ability to reduce poverty.
Programs of sustainable development, like microfinance, morphed into basic programs to
reduce poverty. This view may not be the best way to attain sustainable development or poverty
reduction. First off, this is because poverty reduction is not the same as economic development.
The two terms while linked are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Poverty reduction that comes
in the form of subsidies or foreign aid does not mean that the local economy is growing or
creating business and job opportunities that can be sustained. Economic development on the
other hand would involve an increase in GDI, as well as GDP and GNP. In order for economic
development to be sustainable, it has to involve sustainable financial structures while giving
credence to poverty alleviation.
The central question of this dissertation is does best practices adherence hinder poverty
alleviation efforts of MFIs? This is the main question that this dissertation asked in a multitude
of ways. The literature reviewed here has highlighted the different economic, socio-cultural, and
political critiques the surround the adoption of the best practices model of microfinance. It has
argued that economic factors like neoliberalism, debt cycles, and self-sufficiency seen though
high interest rates and lending to the economically active poor and not the impoverished have
resulted in microfinances’ inability to attain poverty alleviation. Additionally, this literature
review has highlighted how socio-cultural aspects of gender targeting and social capital creation
are overemphasized and do not reflect the realities of social construction and identity in many of
the countries that adopt best practices microfinance.
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Furthermore, it is highlighted how breaking from the best practices model means that
institutions can adopt wider ranges of social programs that include education and support against
domestic violence actually improving the ability of clients to use loans appropriately and have a
wider community impact on poverty. Finally, this literature review has highlighted the political
factors of local practices and international conditions. Influence has perpetuated the best
practices model of microfinance creating corruption and misuse of loans. This has shown that the
local political conditions are important in ultimately reducing poverty, and the mimicry of
programs does not allow for adaptation to local environments. As such, many countries have
sought to adopt best practices, which they deem successful microfinance policies, and therefore,
are often faced with problems when implementing those policies. As such, this dissertation
argues that microfinance policy can be done successfully; however, it must be done so in
accordance with a best fit model of microfinance that accounts for local economic, sociocultural, and political experiences that exist with the developing world.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT: MFIS AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION
One of the most pervasive policy problems in economic development studies has to do
with poverty alleviation. While microfinance started as a poverty alleviation plan that can
“inspire social and economic revolutions,” it has become a device that brings banks, financial
intermediation organizations, and governments together to solve underdevelopment and
poverty.183 With the potential for economic and social growth being so great from microfinance,
many countries have sought to adopt similar microfinance policies. This chapter argues that the
adoption of best practices across the microfinance field prevents institutions from adopting the
best fit approach to development and once again makes it susceptible to the development
problems that have been around for decades. The main questions to keep in mind focus on how
did the best practices model become the predominate form of microfinance, and how does
adherence to this model impact poverty alleviation?
This chapter will be divided into six main sections covering the economic development
theories prevalent in Latin America, several questions on the fit of MFIs and development, the
core theoretical arguments, a theoretical model, and hypotheses. First the theories that have
shaped economic development policy in the region for decades is important in ultimately
understanding why Latin America and the cases understudy specifically would adopt a best
practices model microfinance. This will cover the theories used to help create social and
economic development in the region, focusing on dependency, world systems, and finally
neoliberal development of which microfinance is a leading development program. The next
section will cover the core theoretical arguments focusing on how following neoliberal
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development policies of best practices in microfinance hinder it from creating poverty alleviation
as it forces MFIs to adopt policies and programs that are not tailored to their local communities.
The third section will specify the variables (independent, interdependent, and dependent) in the
theoretical model placing showing how the construction of microfinance institutions with best
practices impacts poverty alleviation. The fourth section lays out the theoretical model. The core
argument of this dissertation is that the “institutional mimicry” in which MFIs rely on the “best
practices” experience simply does not fit the wider variety of realties in developing countries.
The fifth section covers the hypotheses generated from the theoretical foundation. As result, it is
theorized that these MFIs are less effective in alleviating poverty in their target regions. Finally,
this chapter will end with a summarization of discussions presented in this chapter highlighting.
Theoretical Foundations in the Broader Development Literature
The core theoretical argument made in this dissertation is that breaking from the best
practices model can result in greater poverty alleviation. The history of the international
economic system has seen the transformation of liberal economic theory, as well as, propelled
society into a neoliberal construction that diminishes the value of the social welfare state of the
early 20th century, replacing it with a profit driven social structure that prides itself on exploiting
the worker to reduce production costs. So, what has propelled this change in economic structure,
labor, and societal construction? The answer lies in how the development of economic theory has
related to adopted policies in many developing countries. This section will cover the three main
economic development theories, including dependency, world systems theory, and neoliberalism.
These theories are important to understanding how microfinance has perpetuated the best
practices model and how that model became the overriding standard for poverty alleviation.
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Dependency Theory
Raul Prebisch, under the Peron regime in Argentina, began to rework the Keynesian
analysis of economic development to come to terms with the experience of Latin America.
Dependency theory was the first economic theory that was developed specifically for Latin
America. He based his theory on what he and his colleagues at the UN Economic Commission
for Latin America saw in the disparate growth between advanced industrial countries and growth
in poorer countries. Dependency theory revolutionized state and market relationships, placed a
greater importance on the state’s ability to take over strategic sectors of the economy
rationalizing import barriers, and closed economies that were in practice the realization of import
substitution industrialization (ISI).184
Prebisch’s theory was simplistic in its origin and described the relationships between
developed and developing countries in the world economy. He argues that poor countries
exported primary commodities to rich countries who would manufacture products and sell them
back to the poor country. It was seen that value added by manufacturing would prevent poorer
countries from earning enough from their exports to pay for their imports.185 This would make
the poor developing countries in Latin America dependent on the developed economies of the
first world. Prebisch would argue for import substitution policies in an effort to reduce value
added problems, but in later decades would argue that it was still the inability of smaller
economies to compete and develop economies of scale that prevented them from developing and
therefore still left them in the position of dependency on the developed first world. Prebisch’s
theory suggested that the world economy was divided into an industrial center (US, Western
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Europe) and a commodity-producing periphery, such as Latin America. He argued that the
“terms of trade would always work against the periphery” and that international trade was not a
method for development but instead was a method for exploitation.186
World Systems Theory
Economic development in Latin America is a theoretically rich area of study. All the
theories aim at explaining the economic conditions and reality of development in Latin America.
One theory that expands itself outside the box is the world systems theory (WST). At the core of
WST is the idea that it is not enough to look at development as a relationships between certain
regions but needs to take into account an entire world system. Much of dependency theory gets
its core from WST. In fact, WST argues that states are bound together by exploitative
relationships that are weighted in favor of nations that are more powerful.187 WST attempted to
explain the failure of many countries to develop and in fact make a critical argument that the
world is actually divided into three regions of periphery, semi-periphery, and the core. The core
is developed countries, semi-periphery is semi-industrialized countries, and periphery is poor
dependent underdeveloped nations.
WST argues that the capitalist global economic system is unfair, the periphery will
always be exploited, and that the idea that international organizations and governments can
create a fair system is unrealistic. They argue that the inability of global governance to create a
fair system means that the world system needs to be changed. WST argues that a way out of the
development/poverty trap is indeed avoiding exploitative economic relations and foreign
investment, while developing advanced industries locally. What WST then supports is a system
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of ISI. Interestingly, microfinance has the ability to escape the problems of ISI while still
delivering local industrialization and growth when we take into account that Latin America is not
a homogenous social or economic structure and each state is allowed to implement policy that
fully takes advantage of their local industrial capabilities.
Neoliberal Economic Development Theory
The neoliberal market orientation was founded on the belief in the “positive role of
markets and the ability of the market to lead to prosperity.”188 Neoliberal policies follow trends
that support free trade and interdependence.189 Neoliberal policies after the 1980s markedly
changed the way the market oriented with the state, and more importantly it changed the way
developed and developing countries interacted. Neoliberal policies of structural adjustment
replaced older policies of poverty alleviation, these policies led to developing countries shifting
to a more “export-oriented industrialization.”190 This economic system created valued
decentralized open markets, un-concentrated fluid capital markets and a strong antitrust
tradition.191 As such, the neoliberal system tended to devalue the state allowing market forces to
regulate society.
The World Trade Organization (WTO), since the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), has espoused policies of liberal free market and comparative advantage, while
simultaneously preventing these policies from being completely successful. The continuance of
trade barriers, both tariff and non-tariff kinds, has only made integration into the international
trade system thorny for developing countries. There is no doubt that inequalities exist, and the
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only way for such inequalities to be changed is to address them at the level of policy
implementation at the WTO. Developing countries need to use “trade reform and capacitybuilding as tools of growth and poverty reduction.”192 It is no longer rational to push policies of
trade liberalization without taking into account the different levels of development that each
country endures. Open trade is no longer the single component to development strategies. While
the history of the modern international economy has linked free trade with economic growth, for
developing countries the shocks of integration into the open international economy has not
provided them with the political support to maintain this free trade system.193 While barriers
hinder integration, the question arises that if these barriers were cut, would developing
economies experience economic growth.
The neoliberal surge in contemporary Latin American economic policies reinforces the
institutionalists focus and issues of path dependency. What makes Latin America different in the
context of economic development is that while there has theoretically been an overall decline in
neoliberalist driven policy, Latin America seems to continue to structure its policies in this
manner despite the uneven economic results of neoliberalism. As the World Bank and IMF
picked up microfinance programs and started to push that as the way forward, their desire for
replicability and establishing best practices meant that they were creating the same problems that
structural adjustment polices had created in that they were still not taking into account local
political, social, or cultural realities into account. The failure to consider local conditions is the
core theoretical argument of this dissertation, and is highlighted in the next section that addresses
all theoretical questions.
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The Fit of MFIs in Development Models: Four Questions
At the core of the theoretical questions asked in this dissertation, there is a focus on why
microfinance has become the popular economic development policy of choice. In this regard it is
a comparative political economy project that looks at how microfinance challenges state
sovereignty and impacts overall economic growth in its quest to be the leading poverty
alleviation policy in the world development paradigm. In order to answer this main question, this
section will pose a sequence of four questions regarding economic policies and the adoption of
microfinance in Latin America: why did statist programs not work, why did IOs (World Bank
and IMF) become involved; why did MFIs emerge as an alternative type of development agency;
and how did the IMF and World Bank “best practices” then constrain the MFIs?
Why did earlier “statist” development programs and “import substitution” not work?
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) as an economic theory played a huge role in
Latin American economic development history. ISI is a statist policy that favors state owned
enterprises and protection of domestic manufacturing by not allowing exports. You only produce
what you use and reduce trading, theoretically this would mean the country was self-sufficient
and did not rely on others. ISI at its core an economic theory about development by which
developing countries reduce their dependence on developed countries through protecting
domestic industries to make them competitive with imported goods. In theory, this would make
the local economy and subsequently the state self-sufficient. ISI was profound in Latin America
precisely because of their history with military populist dictators. Mexico and Brazil specifically
adopted ISI policies that were based on the reconstruction models of Europe; import substitution
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was a huge part of that.194 The military regimes therefore viewed statist policies of economic
development that focused on state-owned enterprises. At the same time as shifts to neoliberalism
were occurring, a shift to democracy was occurring in Latin America. Consequently, ISI and
statist economic policies was seen as authoritarian and had to change.
ISI was eventually seen as a poor policy for economic development because it had proven
itself to create more debt for countries that followed those policies. It did not spur the growth
they thought it would. This, plus globalization and the adoption of the Washington Consensus as
the epitome of neoliberal economic reform that promoted market-led development strategies,
drove Latin American scholars like Raul Prebisch to decry the problems of ISI in favor of
neoliberal development policies. Specifically, he thought excessive government control meant an
economy that could not react to economic shocks quickly enough. Additionally, in many
countries ISI had actually reduced the tax base and prevented the country from providing social
services, further leading to the overall increase in poverty. Then under ISI, countries were
relying on inflation to bridge the gaps between government expenditure and revenue. This is
overall detrimental to economic development because it reduces the wealth of the nation and
indebts them to larger organizations like the WTO and IMF, as well as other countries. Lastly,
ISI failed because it simply discouraged exports, which are necessary for economic growth and
stability. Prebisch would argue that it was still the inability of smaller economies to compete and
develop economies of scale that prevented them from developing and therefore still left them in
the position of dependency on the developed first world. Prebisch’s theory suggested that the
world economy was divided into an industrial center (US, Western Europe) and a commodity-
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producing periphery (Latin America). In addition, this division would mean trade would always
work against Latin America.
When the debt crisis hit Latin American in the 1980s, the weakness and failures of ISI
became glaring and many countries began to look for a way out. The crisis was sparked by the
increase in oil prices in the 1970s. Latin America was industrializing at the time and had
borrowed huge amounts of money from multinational banks. The obvious solution was to appeal
to the IMF for loans to rescue their failing economies. However, those loans were conditional
and meant that the countries had to drop ISI in favor of neoliberal policies. The shift to
neoliberalism was because ISI failed and because in order to get out of debt the IMF and World
Bank implemented structural adjustment reforms that did away with statist economic policy in
favor of neoliberal free trade policy. This had a resounding impact on Latin America as the debt
crisis and subsequent economic restructuring meant income inequality increased, unemployment
increased because of the sale of state run enterprises, and removal of subsides on goods meant
prices increased into unaffordable. Neoliberal reforms are directly linked with increased
inequality, poverty, and lack of access to social support via programs sponsored by the state.
Why did international organizations become involved—and, at the expense of state
sovereignty?
When addressing the ability of developing economies to integrate into the international
trading system, the work of the WTO is vital. It is through this organization that countries derive
their trading rules. The position of developing countries in the trade system was addressed in the
WTO in three different rounds of discussions the Uruguay Round (1986-1993), the Millennium
Round (2000-2001), and the Doha Round (2002-Present). The WTO in these three rounds began
to address the issues of trade liberalization and focused on issues of services, agricultural trade,
tariffs, subsidies, competition, environmental issues, anti-dumping, as well as other barriers to
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trade. These issues were addressed in the light of the principle of comparative advantage as a
way to enhance global welfare.
International organizations began to enter into Latin America development simply
because they asked for help. After the debt crisis, many countries were dangerously close to
bankruptcy, the international organizations thought renegotiating loans that the countries already
had was better than complete default. As such, they restructured the Latin American economies
shifting them to neoliberal economic reform in an effort to prevent complete collapse. Latin
America had let them in and therefore their sovereignty was not necessarily violated. The impact
of such a decision would be felt for decades and the Latin American economies began to be
stuck in modes of dependency unable to escape because of the exact terms of their agreements
during the debt crisis.
After microfinance had seem some success in Bangladesh, many Latin American
countries viewed this new form of economic development as a way to get out of dependency.
The adoption of microfinance in Latin America was swift, and desperate. Again, the political
structures of these countries were fighting against instability in democratic process and economic
collapse. Microfinance came along and promised not only development but also social capital
that would further ensure democratic strength. Hindsight is 20/20, when it comes to
microfinance. In order to reap the benefits many Latin American countries accepted the best
practices model that was exported from Bangladesh by NGOs without understanding that this
would result in incomplete development and a deepening of dependency.
International organizations move to create poverty alleviation in the developing world is
problematic in the sense that they do not tailor their reforms to local conditions. A prime
example of this is the shift that these organizations created to neoliberal economic practices in
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Mexico. Since the 1930s land in Mexico had been held under state owned collectives, these
institutions came in the 1990s with microfinance, and shifted to neoliberal reform polices where
land was held by corporations and to a lesser extent individuals. This land reform created
political problems in Mexico because local elites were in charge of the redistribution and often
gave land to those who supported them. This patronage, coupled with land now being mostly
owned by corporations meant many families were left with nothing breaking down the historical
cultural and social connections that had previously existed. All this because neoliberal reform
says ownership must shift from the state and collectives to the private sphere. Only the reality
did not fit the local political conditions of Mexico at the time, or many other Latin American
countries for that matter. As such, these neoliberal reforms left people more impoverished which
has resulted in an authoritarian backlash and a further weakening of democracy in Latin
America.
Why did MFIs emerge, as opposed to the World Bank?
Microfinance emerged in Latin America as a hope to break from the dependency policies
that were being forced on them from the World Bank, and the IMF. The shift was precisely an
effort to get away from that type of lending. However, as the microfinance industry shifted itself
to neoliberalism, many Latin American countries were caught in the never-ending cycle of debt
and poverty. This was created because as microfinance became unstable itself due to its own
reliance on subsides and the industry was looking for a new way to protect clients from bank
collapse. In order to that, they turned to the World Bank and IMF away from the less regulated
NGO marketplace to create institutional self-sufficiency that would protect against economic
shock. This turn in the industry coincided with the IMF and World Bank’s own shifts in
development policy.
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Countries in Latin America began to assist multinational companies and allowed these
companies to create enclave economies. This type of economy is prevalent in Latin America and
is essentially nothing more than a region that is economically different from its surroundings.
However, this also means enclave economies do not create macroeconomic gains and that the
benefit for the larger economy is null. These types of policies created poverty by privatizing,
which resulted in pay cuts, and layoffs, cuts in government spending that reduced the social
safety net, and developed new “user fees” which are essentially taxes on common goods. This
meant there was a denial of services that are necessary like healthcare and clean water, high
interest rates that increase unemployment, and trade liberalization that eliminated protectionism
resulting in collapse of domestic economies as they shift to cheaper areas. Microfinance has the
ability to combat these conditions by growing local economies that increase jobs, increase
employment, decrease taxes or make people actually ably to pay them, decrease interest rates
which could spur economic growth further, while providing a stream of revenue to the
government to reestablish social safety nets, and in some cases microfinance can be that safety
net until the government can step in. However, this is conditional on the ability of microfinance
to adapt to local conditions through best fit modeling over best practices. What this would look
like is a microfinance model that allowed collectivization to spur cultural and social cohesion,
providing separate accounts for paying “user fees” specifically, reducing their own interest rates
so only one loan is needed to create a business. This would allow local groups to use the funds
properly actually creating local economies that would stream into the larger macroeconomic
economy, strengthening the state sufficiently to resist dependence loans from larger organization
like the IMF or World Bank.
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Why did World Bank and IMF “best practices” undercut MFI performance?
This best practices model of microfinance became embedded in Latin America as the
World Bank, IMF, and USAID all recast the subsidy driven model into a commercially driven
best practices model. This was seen as a way to commercialize microfinance and essentially
profit off poverty alleviation programs. The basic logic behind this was that the neoliberal best
practices model of microfinance was the only way to reach development goals. The core issue of
why MFIs adopted best practices was the funding stream. Previous examples of subsidy driven
microfinance had proven itself unstable and when debt hit these countries, many of the banks
closed resulting in depression era ramifications as families lost all their life savings. The shift to
best practices was a step by international organizations to prevent this from happening. However,
they only knew of one way of doing this instead of subsidies and non-profit donations running
MFIs they would be funded by the World Bank and the IMF. This resulted in the microfinance
industry actually replicating the structural adjustment programs that these international
organizations had already undertaken in the region, and had already been denounced as poverty
inducing rather than poverty alleviating. MFIs could be more effective if they did not have to
conform to specific neoliberal economic policies and could adjust what they do for the
circumstances they operate in, following more of a best fit design than a best practices model.
The hindrance here is the international organizations community reliance on neoliberal economic
reform and the demand that all those who get support from them must follow these reforms. So,
for microfinance institutions to not collapse they need steady funding from IOs, which in turn
restrict what they can actually do and really prevent the best solutions for poverty alleviation in
the region. The next section addresses this through the explanation of the core theoretical
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argument that a best fit model of microfinance would decrease poverty more than the best
practices model.
The Theoretical Argument:
Why Neoliberal “Best Practices” Undercut the Effectiveness of MFIs
The central theoretical argument of this project is that MFIs are more effective if they
break from the best practices model as defined by the World Bank and others. This is true in two
respects. The first is that MFIs are more effective if they depart from the profit driven ideology
prescribed by the best practices model. The second is that if they are able to develop programs
that work within their local social and cultural situations. The logic of the first is economic; the
logic of the second is socio-cultural. The theoretical arguments are outlined in this section by
first discussing the role of funding in the microfinance industry and how collapse of MFIs lead to
the adoption of best practices. Next, this section deals with what happens when MFIs fail to
recognize local political realities, and how that failure can hinder poverty alleviation. Next, this
section will address issues of gender empowerment. Then this chapter will cover issues of gender
and best practices. Finally, this section addresses how mimicry of microfinance stems from
policy learning and lesson-drawing and how this perpetuates the best practices model of
microfinance as the only acceptable model.
Issues in Funding
There is no greater issue than that of poverty. Development politics has continued to look
at different ways by which states can provide for their citizens while continuing to make strides
in development standards. One of the most prevalent ways is to look toward international
organizations like microfinance institutions to provide the necessary capital to citizens so that
they make engage in their local markets with the idea being that they would contribute to their
state market and therefore build the economy from the bottom up. While microfinance
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institutions have become prevalent for this type of poverty alleviation programs, these
institutions are often hindered themselves by structural and financial concerns that are placed
upon them from the funding organizations. What this means is that as the IMF, World Bank, and
international donors fund microfinance institutions they have expectations of seeing a return on
their investments. The way that this is done is to set up these programs in a specific way as to
maximize profits; this is called their best practices. The best practices dictate exactly how the
institutions, regardless of country or region or even village location, must be set up and run with
an emphasis on certain factors like repayment and interest on loans. The reality of the matter is
that often times these institutions are unable to meet the local domestic political and social
realities of the very people they are trying to help. There is a move toward more encompassing
programs, however those tend to be directed by non-governmental organizations that do not have
the same funding structures. Although that means they do not have the same constraints, it does
mean that they do have other problems of self-sufficiency where funding could be lost and the
entire program could collapse.
One of the major problems with microfinance institutions being funded with subsidies is
that there are no protections for their clients in the event of collapse. MFIs that are not classified
as banks do not have protection from the government, yet due to best practices, many of the
MFIs have compulsory savings programs. While only banks are able to take deposits the nonbanking financial institutions, (NBFI) and NGOs still have savings programs that the clients of
the institutions have to participate in so as to be approved for the loans. The savings programs
can vary based on the type of institutions. When it comes to the unregulated institutions, there is
no protection for clients when the institution is no longer able to support their funding or the
compulsory savings programs. This is problematic because the resulting fallout from an
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institutional collapse leaves a greater burden on the local government and local officials. This is
because when disasters occur, of any kind, people look toward their governments to reassure
them that the bad times are not going to last and that they will be taken care of.
Failures to Recognize Local Political Realities
The failure of microfinance institutions to recognize local political realities mean that
they are not able to appreciate the impact that public pressure on the government can have and
how that impacts states political stability. This is even more important in unstable political
regions where microfinance often operates. MFIs tend to operate in regions where political
structures are weaker, there are issues of corruption and instability, and internal conflict that is
breaching on collapse. This means that when MFIs that have followed the best practice of
creating savings either through deposits or more likely though savings programs where a small
portion of the loan is withheld to ensure that there will be a repayment of some sort. Of course
the problems arise when the MFIs funding changes either through loss of subsides or a decrease
of funds from the World Bank or IMF. This funding change can cause banks to collapse, like
Trust Chiapas in Mexico or SKS in India. This microfinance industry was marked by expansion,
coercive, and deceptive practices that were developed through best practices, all of which would
eventually return the poor to a “condition of financial apartheid.”195 This occurred because the
best practices methodology did not take into account the local political realities.
The previous section discussed the issues that MFIs have when funding agencies reduce
funding, but an important part of the argument is how international funding organizations impact
state sovereignty. When it comes to microfinance loans states have to agree to certain terms in
order to gain the funds that are necessary. States often look toward international funding
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organizations when they lack the internal funding and support to generate development programs
that the citizens want and expect. When states are faced with issues like poverty, they often look
toward other states to see what their solutions have been. This form of policy learning is how
policies of replication like microfinance become so prevalent. Policy transfer occurs when
countries come up against a policy need and therefore look to other countries that have had the
same set of circumstances.
Mimicry of Microfinance from Lesson-Drawing
Lesson-drawing is a “political process” where there is “no assurance that a lesson drawn
will be both desirable and practical.”196 Policymakers can sometimes adopt policies out of haste
and do not adequately tailor those programs to their countries economic, social, and political
conditions. What makes policymakers do this is pressure from not only the public but from
political actors that arises out of dissatisfaction over a current problem or inadequate policy.
Policymakers, therefore to quell the pressure, accept the “costs of uncertainty,” and adopt
policies that are not adequate or appropriate.197 Uncertainty can arise from crises, political
conflict, and absence of consensus, lack of information, new problems, or policy disasters.198 As
such, policymakers “look to experiments” like microfinance to deal with their uncertainties.
The core of the issue with solving problems with a policy of replication is that the state is
willing to overlook their own local conditions. They accept the terms of the best practices
methodology of funding for microfinance because simply they have to in order to receive not
only funding from the MFIs but if they want to receive funding from the World Bank or the IMF.
Essentially, when states look to these international organizations to help them with their poverty
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problems those organizations are only supporting best practices microfinance policies, which
leads to a state accepting international involvement in the functioning of the state so that they can
have the conditional funding from these international organizations. Now, it is understandable to
look at these international organizations and argue that conditional funding is necessary to make
sure that the funds are used for poverty alleviation projects and no other corrupting functions.
My central argument looks specifically at how these organizations, pushing one model of
microfinance is detrimental to the core missions of microfinance, which is to help the poor out of
poverty. There is a lot that goes into the poverty puzzle and it should not be solved by such a
narrowed concept of development policy, instead international organizations should tailor
microfinance programs to take into account local political, cultural, and social realities in which
they are working.
Theoretically, it is important to highlight how autonomy shifts from the state to
international organizations, and how that shift affects development. Starting in the 1930s
structuralism in Latin America was began to be critiqued as a subordination to the industrialized
economics of the United States and Western Europe. In the post-WWII era, policy makers fully
embraced the structuralist policies of national industrialization that was thought of as a
development path in Latin America that would make its nations parallel to that of the United
States. At this same time as structuralism rose, the decline of export-led growth saw the failure of
structuralist economic policies in the region. What occurred at this time was that import
substitution industrialization produced problems with hyperinflation, debt, social unrest,
rebellion, and military repression of the 1960s and 1970s. This lead to the discrediting of
structuralism and lead to the growth of neoliberal economic policies.
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One of the things to be considered and which plays an important part theoretically, is that
development in Latin America is constrained by certain social and political realities. The major
argument of this dissertation is the development policies like microfinance need to take into
account these realities so that they can effectively help the people that they are setting out to
help. One of the issues deals with the local political culture and the role that elites play in their
society. The way that microfinance works in Latin America is important to understand why it
does not work effectively. Historically speaking institutions were set up by nonprofit NGOs that
were typically modeled after the Grameen Banks. Briefly, this meant they were set up as a group
lending organizations by which participants would pool the loan money and all receive a portion
be collectively be responsible for paying it back. This was supposed to work by using group
pressure for repayment as the collateral. These types of loans were traditionally seen by the
banking industry as too high a risk. However, the group lending coupled with small loan
amounts was to negate these risks. The Grameen Bank originally showed that high repayment
was possible with this type of loan and this resulted in a proliferation of this lending type in the
area. The idea spread to other nations as NGOs began to look for ways to improve the economic
lives of impoverished nations.
Defining Empowerment
Gender has become an important aspect for the microfinance field. It has its roots in the
original replication of microfinance out of Bangladesh. The World Bank, when they created the
consultative group for the poor (CGAP), made loans to women a mainstay for the microfinance
industry. To determine if this works to benefit women, therefore, it is important to define what is
really meant by gender empowerment. It is simply not enough to espouse that microfinance
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programs create gender empowerment by providing access to credit. It is necessary to focus on
what that empowerment means, and how that translates into the lives of women.
Gender empowerment can be a contested term in itself. When it comes to measuring
empowerment that microfinance loans give women, it is often defined in terms of empowerment
through mobility, economic security, ability to make small purchases, ability to make larger
purchases, and ability to repay the loans. Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley (1996), Van Staveren
(2001), Weber (2004), Montgomery (1996), Hulme (2000), Duvendack (2011), Bateman (2010),
and Taylor (2012), and countless others measure empowerment in this way. Defining gender
empowerment in such a limited way hides any real impact that microfinance programs could
have and instead focus on the typical measures for microfinance success, that being strictly the
ability to repay the loan. It is an oversimplification of empowerment that prevents it from being a
useful construct.
Instead, a broader more sociologically founded definition of empowerment should be
used to assess these programs. Following Charmes and Wieringa (2003), and Scott (1989), a
more useful definition of empowerment would include what they term gender regimes. These
regimes move beyond the binary constructs of gender and incorporate not only physical
differences, but also incorporate a full range of concerns that women are faced with including
socio-cultural, religious, legal and political. They argue that gender regimes create a hierarchy
where “divisions are suppressed and homogenized” that in turn create embedded power
formations.199 Wright (2000) hints at this failed definition of empowerment by arguing that loans
to women did not necessarily increase their ability to make household decisions because often
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male members of the family control the loans.200 A more encompassing definition of
empowerment should be used. Empowerment therefore should not just include the basic
measures of access or participation, but instead should encompass a broader definition that
incorporates women’s ability to move beyond the gender regime binary and achieve equal status
through equal treatment by all in society.
One of the most important measurements in women’s empowerment is their ability to
participate in government or political processes. Empowerment can be constructively defined as
an increased participation not only at the individual level, but also at the community and state
level that takes constructive action. As such, through these actions they gain power.201 Gaining
such power is not easy, especially when structural barriers exist. Stevens and Morris (2001)
found that in Kabwe, Zambia that the government used parasitic taxation processes to
disempower women. They found that women lacked the political power to demand a shift from
the tax burden for the loan programs.202 Leach and Sitaram (2002) found by looking at India that
microfinance programs failed to create any meaningful political participation because men would
sabotage the projects preventing women from being successful and thereby take on increased
roles in decision making. They found that women in India participating in silk weaving ventures
were subjected to escalating domestic violence when the business venture would fail.
Montgomery (1996), Hulme (2000), Duvendack (2011), Bateman (2010), and Taylor (2012)
have all had similar findings that microfinance has had modest to negligible impact on welfare
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and women’s empowerment.203 Taylor (2012) specifically found that in India “universalized
pretensions” tended to “obscure the location-specific social relations and institutional processes
that produce…inequality.”204 It is assumed that microfinance schemes and micro-loans will be
able to overcome social barriers, give women control over their income, create access to markets
that would give women the ability to make production related decisions, and lead to an
“enhanced role in decision making in the household and community;” however, these
“assumptions were not justified.”205
Gender and Best Practices
One of the core arguments of this dissertation is that best practices do not allow
individual microfinance institutions to incorporate a wider array of social programs tailored to fit
the realities of the societies in which they operate. Best practices is simply defined as replication
of program standards that focus on repayment and transparency and a requirement of giving
loans to women. The consultative groups, such as the World Bank, circulate best practices.206
The sole purpose is to provide financial services to the poor.207 The best practices that the World
Bank follows are set out in the CGAP pink book and dictates the standards and programs that
individual microfinance institutions have to follow in order to retain funding from the World
Bank other international financial institutions like the IMF. By following best practices,
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microfinance institutions are not able to tailor their programs to local conditions and therefore
limit their ability to have greater positive impacts for loan recipients. Cunningham and Stamer
(2005) showed that microfinance’s ability to create sustainable growth is also dependent upon its
interaction with local economic development schemes. These schemes follow the basic premise
that “public businesses and non-governmental sector partners should work together to foster
better conditions for economic growth.”208 Newby (1999) however showed that these types of
programs have often been discredited for their focus on the local level of economic development
because they are often constrained by national and international policies that stem from tax
regimes, resource allocation, and trade agreements.209 The problem however is that global
economic policies tend to be single minded in that they focus exclusively on “global trade and
attracting inward investment” and tend to ignore those local level political and socio-economic
factors that can lead to a program’s success or failure.210
The Perpetuation of the Best Practices Model
The best practices methodology that microfinance institutions use tends to have them
focus on loan repayment rather than on making successful business models with supportive
programing for their clients. Part of a successful model would allow institutions to take into
account the social and political realities of the regions where they are working. This would mean
that institutions would be able to break from the best practices structure and adopt plans and
programs that really help their clients. The previous discussion laid out how microfinance
institutions lack a focus on the domestic political and social structures within which they operate
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and how that can have negative consequences for the loan recipients they are intending to help.
This lead to the discussion on what exactly best practices is and how they influence the
institutions and the loans they give.
As previously stated microfinance started as a microcredit program in Bangladesh with
the main goal of helping a few farmers pool resources and share responsibility for loans that
would be used buy seeds, and improved farming equipment. The idea was to help them become
self-sufficient farmers, while also giving them the capital they would need to resist economic
shocks. The first loans were just that small loans and nothing more. This program, which saw
some benefits for the original participants, also started a revolution in the economic development
field. But why is that? How does the idea of small loans to a few farmers turn into the billion
dollar industry it is today, while still professing to help clients out of poverty. Why has
microfinance become popular as an economic development policy? The answer is at the very
core of the central arguments presented here. It has been established that microfinance
institutions do not tailor their programs to the political or social realities of the regions that they
work in. The main answer lies at the heart of the international economic and development
system. As more international organizations began to find legitimacy in the international realm,
their way of doing things started to become standard practice. This meant that states began to
lose their ability to do what was in the best interests of their people and their own economic
survival.
When it comes to economic development policies there always seems to be problems.
One of the most cited reasons why microfinance is the best path forward as opposed to state
centered policies has to do with problems with structural adjustment programs that began in the
1950s as an ideal way for economic development. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were
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focused heavily on access to credit as the way forward. These programs were built upon the idea
that development was based upon factors of economic growth and equality. These programs
were designed not to take into account social or cultural issues. As such, many SAP programs
saw corruption by state officials. What was obvious from these programs was the social and
cultural determinates needed to be taken into account in order for development to occur.
Ironically, as the World Bank and IMF picked up microfinance programs and started to push that
as the way forward, their desire for replicability and establishing best practices meant that they
were creating the same problems that SAPs created. They were still not taking into account local
political, social, or cultural realities into account, but instead were just claiming to consider these
social issues. New definitions of development need to come into existence that account for social
and cultural aspects; such as, employment, health care, life expectancy, education, poverty
levels, and a decent standard of living. Only by defining development by the social and cultural
factors as well as the economic ones, it is possible to create a new index of development that
makes poverty alleviation a possibility.
Theoretical Model
In order to gain a further understanding of how best practices hinders poverty alleviation,
this section specifies the precise theoretical model employed in this dissertation. This is
presented in Figure 3.1. The “independent variable” that drives the model is MFI adherence—or
“institutional mimicry—to neoliberal “best practices” as required by the World Bank and the
IMF. The dependent variable is impact of the MFI with respect to enhancing the livelihood of the
recipients of its loans—namely, poverty alleviation. The ability to do this is affected by the set of
intervening variables. These variables are factors that are affected—i.e., distorted—by the
adherence to best practice imposed by the World Bank and IMF. These variables are listed in
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Figure 3.1. Box 3.2 then summarizes the how distortions that occur because of “best practices”
for each of these intervening variables. The remainder of the section explains each of these as
they related to poverty alleviation. These dynamics provide the logic for the general hypotheses
linking best practices to poverty alleviation. These are presented at the close of this section.
Figure 3.1 Theoretical Model
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Box 3.2 Distortions that occur as a result of “best practices”

The core question this dissertation proposes is how the best practices model of
microfinance hinders poverty alleviation. Several components are essential to answering this
question. First, best practices is the institutional model that microfinance designs itself on and
consists of various components. These include the loan approval process, a variety of financial
services, if they use a tool to fight poverty, if the operationally self-sufficient, if they accept
deposits, if they cap the interest rate, if they limit government regulation, if they use subsides, if
they have strong institutions, and if they have a performance measurement tool in place. Second,
poverty alleviation is comprised of measuring schooling and education, health improvements
program, gender equality, water and sanitation, housing and poverty reduction program goals,
women’s empowerment services, offers education services including financial, offers health
services, offers gender issues training, and if the MFI offers legal services for victims of
violence. This dissertation focuses on the institutional structure of MFIs, and how they can
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achieve poverty alleviation by adopting best fit policies that would allow them to tailor their
programs to the local political and socio-cultural realities of the regions in which it is adopted.
This is essential to the core argument that a best fit model would lead to better poverty outcomes
for clients. In order to determine the institutional structures that are at play and the ability of
microfinance to generate economic and social development, several intervening variables
highlight how the structure of microfinance hinders development and therefore prevents poverty
alleviation. The variables are creation of debt cycles, commitments to self-sufficiency, the role of
the economically active poor, social capital creation, local political practices, and the influence
of international organizations. All of these components of institutional design hinder
microfinance from reducing poverty.
Independent Variable: Institutional Mimicry through Best Practices
The independent variable is the institutional mimicry perpetuated by best practices
through neoliberal economic development policies. The commitment to neoliberal economic
reforms means that microfinance institutions have to adopt the best practices model that supports
neoliberal ideals of economic development. This meant that developing economies were forced
to pursue neoliberal welfare policies that would foster their growth for international competition.
The state would therefore switch from supporting programs of full employment to targeting
programs that fostered “employability” (which microfinance is a program of employability)
which were designed to reduce the welfare state and resulted in cuts to social services as well as
labor, environmental, and consumer safety standards they have initiated a “race to the bottom.”
Neoliberal policies of structural adjustment replaced older policies of poverty alleviation. These
policies led to developing countries shifting to a more export led economic model that benefited
developed countries. As such, the neoliberal system tended to devalue the state allowing market
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forces to regulate society. By removing the state, the neoliberal policies followed by
microfinance have ignored local political realities and only served to create more poverty as
social programs were cut. A best fit model could be of a benefit because it would allow them to
create the social safety net from which the state has stepped away. However, this could only
occur if they rely less on neoliberal reform and more on doing what is best for the people they
are trying to help.
Intervening Variables: Economic, Social, Cultural and Gender Factors
There are seven intervening variables that concern the ways in which adherence to
neoliberal best practices leads to negative development outcomes. The first one looks at the
current model of microfinance and how it created debt cycles that only encourage more poverty.
Since microfinance’s best practices model is focused on having high loan repayment, they do not
stop participants from taking out multiple loans at multiple banks. The focus on repayment puts
pressure on the recipient to repay the loan or face the sham of defaulting on a community level.
An important part of the story here is that these zero-collateral loans use peer pressure and group
formation to ensure repayment. The social communal makeup of these countries greatly favors
social cohesion and communitive relationships so when faced with the inability to repay loans
recipients rather take out a second loan to repay the first, instead of facing community
harassment. This aspect of microfinance has often gone unnoticed expect for a few stories.
However, what ends up happening in instances of failure to repay is that community harassment
leads clients to suicide rather than facing the shame of default. In order to avoid this the
microfinance industry through their own practices of not preventing multiple loans, allows
clients to have two, three, four or sometimes more loans as each subsequent loan is used to repay
the previous. They boast high repayment rates and the client gets more poverty. If microfinance,
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was to follow a best fit model then they would monitor for multiple loans and ensure that clients
used the loans appropriately and had the ability to repay loans taken out.
The second intervening variable focuses on self-sufficiency. Since microfinance does
focus so much on loan repayment, they also focus on operational self-sufficiency (OSS).
Microfinance self-sufficiency as dictated by best practices focuses on the ability of the institution
to grow by giving more loans. Typically, this is measured by the institutions ability to handle
economic shock. Best practices dictate that interest rates should not be capped. High interest
rates are important because that means that even if a fraction of a loan is repaid then the
institution is profitable. It is not about making loans easier to repay but in fact about being able
to make money off the higher interest rate loan. High interest rates are a mask for selfsufficiency. If microfinance followed a best fit model then they would cap interest rates keeping
costs low for their clients. This capping would focus on poverty reduction and not being
profitable.
The third intervening variable focuses on the impacts of loaning to the economically
active poor over the extremely poor population. The commitment to poverty reduction is
problematic when the institution is not actually focusing on the poor. Instead, the loan programs
followed target the actively economic poor. The distinguishing factor here is the difference
between the extremely poor and the economically active poor. Microfinance claims to help the
poorest of the poor, instead they target the economically active poor, whom are able to deal with
shocks when they arise because they have some resources for doing so. This distinction is
important because both poor and extremely poor populations need access to financial services,
however, because microfinance does not technically target the extremely poor population they do
not have access to financial services they would need to protect against the economic shocks
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they would face. If microfinance was to follow a best fit model, they would support programs
that focus on the poorest of the poor who exist below the minimum subsistence level, those who
live in regions deprived of resources, and those who because of environment, ethnic identity,
politics, and gender have little or no employment opportunities. By focusing on a best fit model
of microfinance, they could have greater poverty reduction.
The fourth intervening variable concerns gender targeting and how it has become the
industry standard for microfinance. Best practices dictates that microfinance loans go to women
because they are often the ones who are systematically excluded from the system. However,
microfinance best practices do not deal with why women are excluded from local political,
economic, and social structurers. Instead, it follows the belief that all that is need for women to
break the chains of bondage is a loan. This best practices approach does not focus on the sociocultural conditions that have firmly established patriarchal structures in the region instead it
focuses narrowly on a perceived path out. A best fit model would address the conditions and
look at why women are excluded from the marketplace. Adjust and fix the reasons for why the
exclusion occurs first then help them compete economically. This would provide for greater
poverty reduction because without addressing the reasons why women are excluded it ensures
loans will not have the full potential for economic development. Giving someone a loan for a
business does not ensure that that person could sell his or her goods in the local marketplace.
This dissertation argues that adjusting to a best fit model could help women overcome those
barriers.
The fifth intervening variable, social capital creation has become the backbone of
microfinance. Best practices of microfinance focuses on social capital creation through their loan
process. Social capital is the ideal that group lending not only ensures repayment but also
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creates trust between members. The makeup of the groups can differ and can likewise contribute
to the program’s success or failure. In a culture that is familial based, loan groups that are made
up of random members do not have the same element of obligation. However, groups that are
made up of family members can have their downfall, as these groups do not have the same
element of community shame if the group goes into default. While cultural differences might not
necessarily solely explain the failure of micro-credit organizations, they can create significant
constraints to poverty reduction. Additionally, there is debate in the field over the ability of
microfinance to create social capital. Most of this is in relation to what social capital actually is,
seeing as there are many definitions. Therefore, my definition of social capital is one that would
create an ideal of power from within meaning that individuals would act together. This social
power would be created through “elements of production” such as knowledge, skills, and
resources to increase the quality of life. Through social power, social capital is created and
defined as a network of relationships that builds links between communities and groups of
actors. It is in this social capital definition that I argue that a best fit model that takes into account
group formation cultural aspect of society that it could create and strengthened social networking
and cohesion that would lead to empowerment.
The sixth intervening variable highlights the role of local political practices. When it
comes to microfinance and best practices there is no commitment to dealing with local political
practices. Instead, lack of domestic regulation creates corruption, as elites are free to use lax
repayment polices in order to garner more votes. This system of patronage not only hinders
poverty alleviation as it only encourages more loans being flooded into the region, but it actively
promotes a faulty economic system. This is seen through the mismanagement of loans where by
loans are not used for business creation or economic development, but instead the loans are used
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as bribes. The lack of knowledge of local political structures hinders microfinance ability to
lower poverty, because it shifts the focus away from economic development to giving out credit
that it sees as profitably to the institution. It is argued that if microfinance followed a best fit
model they would recognize that local regulation schemes and corruption are huge problems and
would adjust their lending to only those with sound business plans and prevent the misuse of
loans. Furthermore, when it comes to local political practices, best practices fail to recognize the
ability of the state to create social welfare programs. Best practices assume neoliberal economic
development where the state is out of social welfare, however, in severally impoverished regions
social safety net are essential for poverty reduction. This dissertation argues that the best fit
model would allow microfinance to step into the social safety net gap by providing funding
through not only small business loans but also remittances that would allow client to improve
living conditions boosting them out of poverty.
Lastly, the final intervening variable looks at the role of international organizations in
microfinance as an important aspect to understanding why the best practices model is mimicked
throughout Latin America in the first place. Funding from international organizations focuses
solely on repayment and operational self-sufficiency and do not really focus on poverty
reduction. This is the backbone of the core argument of this dissertation, international
organization perpetuate the best practices model of microfinance not because it is the best model
for poverty reduction but because it is the most profitable model. A best fit model of
microfinance would follow a more NGO based institutional structure allowing the institution to
change the programs and policies it needed to in order to best serve their clients and reduce
poverty. This model does not focus on being profitable but instead goes back to the roots of
microfinance and focuses on reducing poverty in the developing world.
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Dependent Variable: Poverty Alleviation
Poverty alleviation as the dependent variable includes looking at if MFIs generate
programs that have social benefits, including healthcare, water and sanitation improvement,
education, and educational improvement programs. All of these elements taken together (the
commitments to neoliberal economic reform, creation of debt cycles, commitments to selfsufficiency, the role of the economically active poor, social capital creation, local political
practices, and the influence of international organizations) highlights how microfinance has
pursed the best practices model and neglected many elements that would make the institutions
more successful in alleviating poverty. They form the core of this dissertations arguments that
the best fit model of microfinance would be more successful in alleviating poverty than the best
practices model because best practices ignores the local economic, socio-cultural, and political
realities that exist in Latin America and were laid out in the previous chapter. All of these
elements fit together to highlight how not only best practices hinders poverty alleviation but how
the reliance on best practices generates institutional mimicry that only serves to further prevent
what could be a more successful best fit model of microfinance from being adopted.
If states only adopt policies that are tailored to their specific economic, political and
social conditions then why when it comes to microfinance policy states often overlook such
things and follow best practices policies that are not suited to their specific state situation? In
order for developing countries to adopt microfinance policies they need funding from which they
have to adhere to what those funders would be considered best practices, and as such
perpetuating deficient policy prescriptions for poverty alleviation. The next section highlights the
hypotheses generated from this dissertations theoretical argument.
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The aim of this dissertation is to explain why and how mimicry in microfinance leads to
the best practices model being adopted in developing countries without regard to their local
social and political realities. This previous sections of this chapter have outlined several reasons
why the perpetuation of microfinance occurs because this is a key component to understanding
microfinance’s failure to create poverty alleviation.
Hypotheses
Two hypotheses are generated in this section about how the best practices model of
microfinance is less effective than a best fit model of microfinance would be at poverty
alleviation. The institutional design of microfinance institutions has impact on two main
dimensions, economic and socio-cultural. The hypotheses are generated from the impact that
institutional design has on the outcomes for clients including poverty alleviation and sociocultural benefits. This also encompasses how MFIs generate empowerment for women allowing
them greater autonomy in their communities, households, and the economic marketplace.
Hypothesis 1: Microfinance clients are more likely to have a greater amount of economic
wellbeing if the MFI does not adhere to best practices.
The more MFIs adhere to best practices the less likely they are to improve the economic
wellbeing of the individual because they would be better able to address the direct needs of their
clients through special programming. Individual well-being here is meant as a measure of the
level of indebtedness the client has, including whether they hold multiple loans, ability to
generate income to repay loans, and the ability to have access to educational and health
programs.
Hypothesis 2: MFIs are more likely to address issues of patriarchy and domestic violence if they
do not adhere to best practices.
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MFIs would be generally more effective if they were able to tailor their programs to local
political situations addressing issues of patriarchy and corruption in a pragmatic manner. MFIs
would be generally more effective if they we able to tailor programs to the communities needs
addressing issues of poverty, gender, patriarchy, and violence. This is because best practices
focuses narrowly on the credit access portion of microfinance programs and not on the
educational and community portions of the program. A more broadly conceived program would
allow for additional programs that would benefit the community and have a positive impact on
poverty. This section explained the hypotheses that were generated from the core argument that
best practices in microfinance hinder poverty alleviation.
Summary and Conclusion
The previous chapter has highlighted the many theoretical arguments presented in this
dissertation. The core argument is that adherence to best practices results in less poverty
alleviation than if the countries had used a best fit model that addressed their local economic,
social, and political conditions. This chapter has reviewed the major arguments for how policy
adoption and theory interact by looking at the development of import substitution and
dependency, world theory systems, and most importantly neoliberal economic development
theory. All of these theories lend something to the story for how we got to the best practices
model of microfinance being the only model that is accepted. Next, this chapter has laid out the
core theoretical arguments. While there are many to be made, this dissertation focuses on the
institutional structure of microfinance as being the ultimate cause of microfinances failure to
generate poverty alleviation.
The next section of this chapter showed the theoretical modeling to highlight how the
intervening variables impact microfinance’s ability to alleviate poverty. Finally, this chapter has
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addressed how the hypotheses have stemmed from the theoretical arguments that microfinance’s
best practices model is insufficient to generate poverty alleviation because it does not take into
account local political issues like corrupting practices. Additionally, it ignores social conditions
such as gender relations resulting from a history of patriarchy in Latin America, and how
economic factors within the best practices model of lending actual prevents loans from being
used appropriately and therefore creates more debt not poverty alleviation. The following chapter
will highlight how these hypotheses fit into the larger methodological picture and address issues
of how microfinances poverty alleviation ability is hindered through best practices.
The relationship between domestic and international politics consists of entanglements
between international forces and domestic politics not only from the outside in but also from the
inside out.211 When it comes to considering the interplay between economic development and
state development in underdeveloped nations it is important to look at the rule by which they
have to play. International organizations while they have the best intentions often fail to
recognize the domestic factors by which states often find themselves constrained. Whether those
factors are social, like patriarchal governing structures, or political, like corruption depends a
whole lot on how the state actually is able to achieve the goals it sets out to. Additionally, there
are real concerns in underdeveloped economies when it comes to helping their citizenry; namely
lack of financial and actual resources. The lack of resources often times has the state looking
outside itself to solve problems when its citizens put pressure on the governing structures to
solve issues. There is no greater issue that that of poverty and this dissertation addresses the
issues of poverty alleviation and microfinance’s adherence to best practices.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
Having laid out the theoretical argument of this dissertation, I now turn to an explanation
of the research design underlying the proposed empirical assessment of the best practices design
of microfinance institutions. This dissertation will use a qualitative design. Qualitative analyses
will center on cases studies of MFIs in Latin America. Structured focused comparison will be
used to look within cases for observable implications of alternative explanations and to develop
evidence to elevate one explanation over others for differences in microfinance institutional
design.212 This section will explain the methodologies and the cases selected. Key here is how
they vary with respect to five different aspects of best practices: type of lending institution,
government regulation standards, lending type, percentage of loans to women, and poverty level
of clients target for loans. Although this dissertation is concerned with the larger question of
poverty elimination, the research design presented here will focus on (1) the financial status of
MFI clients (e.g., indebtedness) and (2) the range of social programs, particularly for women,
offered by each MFI.
This chapter is separated into three main sections. First, I will discuss the methodology
this is divided into two subsections including the case study methodology and the structured
focused comparison methodology. The second section lays out the institutional best practices
design. The third section lays out the factors that best practices does not consider and therefore
are considered part of the best fit design. This is divided into three sub-sections discussing
development goals, empowerment and socio-cultural development, and the programs MFIs adopt
to try to reduce poverty. The fourth main section discusses the case selection and has two main
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sub-sections, the first discussing each of the cases briefly and the second discussing the
differences between the cases. The last section includes a conclusion and summary of the
methodology. The next section discusses the methodology used in this dissertation.
Case Study Research Design
This dissertation uses a case study methodology for looking at the impact of microfinance
on poverty alleviation. This was done to examine closely each case and then to compare them to
each other in order to evaluate the best practices/best fit approaches. This dissertation employs a
case study design in order to examine the detailed institutional structure as well as the resulting
policies and programs that each of the MFIs understudy adopt. By examining a handful of MFIs
across Latin America, I am able to observe the effect of institutional design for clients. The core
argument of this dissertation is that MFIs that depart from best practices, and adopt a wider range
of programs, will have a greater impact on community economic and social development.
Employing Case Study Methodology
Case studies can hold explanatory power. Prezworski and Teune (1970) argue that
generality can be achieved with the use of “system-specific indicators that serve to operationalize
the same concept in distinct ways in different contexts.”213 Therefore, despite the unique effects
that can be seen in individual cases, by using system specific indicators the same concept can be
used to explain that effect in other cases. They argue that the field needs to have definitions of
common and identical indicators to make equivalent measurements.214 This is done in this
dissertation by using the categories of economic and socio-cultural development aspects,
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including financial services provided by each MFI and if they adopt additional program aimed at
improving living standards and social development. As such, the case studies about each bank
will comprise three sections that cover the following: (1) the history of the institution, (2) its
adherence best practices, and (3) the ways in which the bank pursued “best fit” by deviating from
best practices.
The use of in-depth case analysis is the best approach for this dissertation because it
allows for the examination of why states would adopt microfinance programs designed by the
World Bank. The different cases used will be three commercialized banks (Banco Sol,
Compartamos, and Banco Economico), and two NGOs (IDEPRO and Pro Mujer). There are
marked differences between these types of organizations. However, there are also similarities.
Discussing the differences first, the most important distinction between all of them is the role of
the government. In NGOs, the state government holds no regulatory body over the organization,
whereas commercialized banks are subjected to regulation. The next difference is concerned with
funding structures. While all MFIs have funding from international organizations like the IMF or
the World Bank, NGOs additionally have funding from private companies. All institutions who
receive funding, of any kind, from the World Bank or IMF must adhere to the best practices.
Those institutions that also receive funding from other private or corporate sources (like NGOs)
have the ability to be a bit more flexible in the programs they offer. While only banks are able to
take deposits NGOs still have savings programs.
By using case study analysis, this dissertation will be able to highlight not only that
following best practices is in line with the World Bank and IMF’s idea of economic and social
development but also that deviating from it is beneficial. There are other factors to consider
when looking at the failure of microfinance to achieve positive outcomes for clients. The in-
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depth analysis will highlight the areas where microfinance institutions deviate from the
international community’s ideal best practices and adopt more of a best fit model to microfinance
by highlighting the different policies and programs that they are able to adopt. This difference is
the important part because it not only can show where different development models can be
successful but it also highlights the areas why neoliberal economic development models
perpetuated by the international community fail by not considering the local economic, and
socio-cultural conditions in which MFIs operate. The case study methodology is the best
approach to studying the institutional deign that can determine success in not only economic and
social development but also poverty alleviation programs.
Employing Structured Focused Comparison
In order to understand the underlying relationship between best practices and the
institutional design, I use structured focused comparison looking at the institutions policies and
procedures over the course of ten years to see which policies are adopted, when and why.
Structured focused comparison provides the arrangement to create causal inference from a small
number of cases for the overall outcomes in the study. A structured focused comparison
methodology will be used to show how the best practices model impacts microfinance
institutions.
Structured focused comparison is best understood as a type of comparative methodology
where focus is on the identifying the problem and then studying the variables of interest for that
problem. The method is focused in that it deals with only the aspects of the cases examined that
lead to being able to answer the main question asked. George and Bennett (2005), Van Evera
(1997), and King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) all highlight that usefulness of structured
comparison because it can clarify the impact of variables while using small-n studies. Here the

102
relatively small number of cases studies can become an advantage, allowing for exactly the sorts
of detailed examinations of processes needed to evaluate claims about causal mechanisms.215
For the structured focused comparison, I ask a common set of questions concerning the
economic and socio-cultural impacts and more importantly if the institution follows best
practices or deviates to a best fit design. The questions asked are divided into economic and
socio-cultural factors. The economic questions concern levels of debt for clients, poverty levels,
overindebtedness, savings mechanism, and level of operational self-sufficiency. The sociocultural questions focus on gender issues training, education, domestic violence services, access
to healthcare, and available development programs. This structured comparison will ask this of
all cases to get at the underlying degree to which each institution adheres to forced best practices
model. In order to understand the underlying relationship between best practices and the
institution program design, I will do a structured focused comparison looking at the institutions
policies and procedures over the course of fifteen years to see which policies are adopted.
Identifying Institutional Best Practices
This section specifies the specific elements in the best practices model of microfinance
encompass. This is important because the core argument of this dissertation is that the best
practices model is less effective than a best fit model. The central independent variable in this
study is the degree to which MFIs adhere to the best practices model. Best practices concerns
itself with fostering the “financial sustainability of institutions that provide financial services” to
the poor.216 Best practices guidelines used are set out in the World Bank’s CGAP pink book. The
World Bank’s suggestions for best practices include, variety of financial services, client poverty
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levels considered, operationally self-sufficient, use of fixed interest rate, use of subsides,
measures the financial and social performance of clients, and finally loaning to women. The
following highlights what the best practices are more specifically:


Offers a Variety of Financial Services – This would include if the MFI offers,
savings, mandatory savings, and insurance products, loans for household repair or
educational attainment, and ATM services.



Measures Client Poverty – If the MFI measures client poverty is part of assessing
who is appropriate for gaining access to microloans. Client poverty measures are used
to see what level of repayment and collateral would be necessary to reduce the risk of
the loan. Therefore, MFIs’ use a client poverty measure to determine who is very
poor or who is economically active poor and ensure that they loan to the latter group,
as they would be less risky.



Operationally Self-Sufficient – OSS is a way to determine if the MFI is able to remain
operational if subsidies or funding would be pulled. After the near collapse of the
industry in the 1980s in Latin America and India, this became an important factor for
institution design. The MFIs are to be able to operate off the loan repayments.



Takes Deposits – Since MFIs have to self-sufficient, like any bank taking deposits
becomes an important factor in financial solubility. This practice is encouraged so
that the banks can maintain self-sufficiency. Taking deposits is also important for
clients because it provides a savings mechanism for them.



Does not Cap Interest Rates – The best practice is to not cap interest rates. This is
based off neoliberal economic policies that believe the market should dictate what
interest rates are. Therefore, it is in the MFIs’ best interest not to cap the interest rate.
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No Government Regulation – Government regulation is important for MFI design
because best practices wants to reduce instances of corruption. However, MFIs that
are full banks still have to adhere to the local regulations and tax regimes in order to
take deposits. This is set up to protect the client. However, the best practice is that no
regulation should be necessary.



Does not Use Subsidies – The best practices is that the MFI should not use
government or private subsidies to fund their operations or loans. The idea behind not
allowing subsidies is that if those funding streams end so does the MFI and their
clients could be hurt by losing their life savings. Additionally, this is used as a tool to
protect the commercial MFI market and reduce competition from NGO based MFIs,
which can use subsides to lower costs for clients.



Measures Financial Outcomes – It is a best practice to measure financial outcomes of
the MFI. This is part of the commitment to transparency in the field. Measuring
financial outcomes allows the institutions to track their own financial stability. It does
not necessarily mean tracking the financial outcomes for clients, although some
institutions also have client level measures.



Measures Social Performance – One of the best practices is to measure social
performance. However, there is no direct definition of what that means; instead, the
industry has taken this commitment to mean measuring the amount of loans to
women, as well as the number of women on institutional decision making boards.
Some MFIs go beyond that and track other development program outcomes.



Loans to Women – This is commitment of microfinance. Therefore, as a best practices
all institutions measure the amount of clients that are women.
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When microfinance institutions follow best practices they are operating within the
existing global development structures, however, because some banks do in fact deviate from
best practices means that it is possible for MFIs to adopt other institutional structures that may
have a greater impact on economic and socio-cultural development. This section has discussed
what best practices are and how the different MFIs follow or do not follow the best practices
model. The next section will discuss how the MFIs fare when it comes to other socio-cultural
development.
Identifying Best Fit Practices
Case study methodology will examine the impact of institutional mimicry through the
forced best practices model. Additionally, it will also highlight areas where each case deviates
from the best practices model and adopts a best fit design. There are three main areas where
MFIs could deviate from the best practices design and accept best fit. These include (a)
development goals, (b) empowerment and socio-cultural development, and (c) programs
designed to reduce poverty.
Determining Development Goals
In order to study the level of poverty alleviation that microfinance institutions are able to
produce a development goals are studied. The different indicators used to study if MFIs have
achieved development goals include a variety of educational programs, as well as, programs to
improve living conditions. The first aspect includes if the MFI had an adult education program,
which would include not only financial and bookkeeping education but also includes general
education programs. The second aspect of youth opportunities includes adapting services to
youth clients, but also includes IT training and trauma counseling. The third second aspect is
childhood schooling and education, and these included whether there was support for educational
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attainment for children that included paying of school fees. The fourth aspect of health services
includes offering health insurance but also includes if they offer additional primary care services
to clients. The fifth aspect of gender equality includes if they have gender issues training, if they
have leadership training and if they provide services in the instances of domestic violence. The
sixth aspect of water and sanitation includes if they provide funds or loans for improving
household sanitation, like putting in indoor plumbing. The seventh aspect includes if they offer
services for home loans that would include not only new homes but also repairs to homes. The
last aspect of poverty reduction indicates whether the MFI uses a poverty reduction tool to
determine the poverty level of their clients.
To determine if the different programs are effective they are compared across the cases
with economic factors that could highlight that existence of the programs also results in better
economic outcomes. This will also be combined with a few vignettes to highlight the programs
designed to of the programs on an individual level. This will highlight how those who use the
programs explain their benefits. This section has highlighted how development is addressed; the
next section will discuss how empowerment is focused on by each MFI.
Determining Empowerment and Socio-Cultural Development
This section highlights how empowerment and poverty alleviation are addressed together.
This is important because microfinance claims to generate empowerment for women by
providing them with loans. This in turn would provide them with autonomy to make not only
their own decisions but also to make more decisions in the household. However, the core
argument of this dissertation is that by ignoring local social and cultural realties this
empowerment is incomplete. Therefore, this section importantly lays out how this will be
discussed. Empowerment is considered among several dimensions including, if the MFI offers
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women’s empowerment services, offers gender issues training, and if the MFI offers legal
services for victims of violence. Empowerment services would include not only gender issues
training aimed at improving relationships between men and women with the goal of women
having more autonomy over their decision-making. It would also include if leadership training so
that women have the skills to take control of their business.
The socio-cultural program adoption aspect is important to look at because it includes
additional equality and social development programs. This will allow for comparison with the
best practices to see how well microfinance is achieving development goals outside of economic
indicators. This also allows for the studying of wider social benefits that microfinance programs
can have.
Determining programs designed to Reduce Poverty
This dissertation will study the institutional design of MFI programs in several ways.
This includes looking at the economic wellbeing of individuals, as well as, socio-cultural
benefits. Taken together they represent the ability of microfinance to generate poverty
alleviation. First, it will look at the MFIs ability to improve the economic wellbeing of the
individual. This will be done through the case studies looking at the levels of debt of each client.
This will include not only poverty levels of clients, if poverty is measured by the MFI and if they
track overindebtedness of clients. This will also be determined by looking at the average debt of
clients and outstanding loan balances. Next development will be looked at by determining if the
MFI offered a variety of financial services, as well as development driven programs that focus on
public goods such as improvements to water and sanitation systems.
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Case Selection and Comparisons
This section covers the case selection process. The benefit of qualitative analysis is that it
can look at not only that a policy change has occurred but also highlight the underlying functions
of policymaking institutions. This allows for the study of how change occurs and impacts
individuals, not just that the change occurred. This is why this study will employ qualitative
methods to look at how changes in the policies of microfinance institutions came about, and what
those changes had on clients. The level of analysis that this dissertation employs is on the
institutional level, therefore each case selected is an existing microfinance institution.
The cases selected are from Latin America because this is where microfinance has seen a
rapid growth because the World Bank and the IMF targeted after the debt crisis of the 1980s. The
debt crisis exploded when Mexico announced in 1982 that it could not repay international loans
and were going bankrupt.217 As a response, USAID as well as the international community
through its trade policies began supporting microfinance programs in Latin America.
Microfinance defused through Latin America through various programs developed by
FINCA, USAID, and IDB in Brazil, Bolivia, Columbia and Mexico all stemmed from the idea
that the expansion of the informal sector would be best way for the continent to reach
development goals. Bateman (2013) argues that the microfinance model was thoroughly
embedded in Latin America’s economy and financial system by the 1990s as significant
resources began to shift to microfinance. Additionally, Bateman (2013) highlights the
importance of the US and then World Bank funding for developing the microfinance sector in
Latin America.218 It is for these reasons that Latin America is chosen for the case studies.
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Banco Sol
The first major breakthrough came in Bolivia when the World Bank and USAID began to
look at restructuring the Bolivian economy to fall more in line with neoliberal policies by
recasting the subsidy driven Grameen Bank style microfinance model to a commercially driven
one. This was done by transforming the NGO PRODEM to Banco Sol. Advising on the Banco
Sol transformation was the US based ACCION that was also working on many microfinance
programs in South and Central America under contract to USAID. The model of microfinance
that Banco Sol follows is a best practices model. It was chosen because other banks model their
institutional structure after them.
Compartamos
Compartamos is an ideal MFI for this study because it is a publicly traded IPO. This
means that they have to adhere to the best practices model in order to maintain not only their
funding but also in order to comply with government regulations for publicly traded entities.
Compartamos is also a model that is seen as the ideal model of microfinance because of its
profitability, again highlighting that best practices places loan repayment and profits at the
forefront of the institutional design for microfinance.
Banco Economico
Banco Economico is chosen because despite following the best practices model, on some
occasions, they had to close branches that went bankrupt. This case is used to show how
following the standard microfinance institutional design of best practices does not mean that the
institution is successful. This is a difference from the other cases which do not have examples of
institutional failure in their history and therefore this is why this case is chosen, to see why the
differed in this aspect and how the institutional l design resulted in this closure.
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Pro Mujer
Pro Mujer is chosen because it represents an NGO version of microfinance that does not
adhere to the standard institutional design. Because they do not rely on funding from the World
Bank or IMF, they have more leeway in programs that they can design and develop. This case
was chosen specifically for its success in adopting additional community development and social
development programs. This would provide a comparative case where institutional design
difference is highlighted.
IDEPRO
The Institute for the Development of the Small Productive Unit (IDEPRO) is chosen
because they break from one of the major tenants of microfinance and that is that they do not
loan primarily to women. Instead, they loan mostly to men. This case is chosen to see how this
difference from best practices impacts the local economic and socio-cultural development. This
section has briefly highlighted each case the following section will cover the differences between
the cases.
Comparison of the Cases
The cases where all chosen because they are formidable MFIs in the microfinance field
and vary significantly with respect to their tight adherence to “best practices”—all of which were
covered in the theoretical section. Additionally, all of these cases were chosen for their differing
degrees to which they follow five basic aspects of best practices including: how they are set up,
how they are regulated, lending type, and percentage of loans to women, and target poverty level
of clients.
The differences in cases were chosen because of the varying locations. Three of the banks
are in La Paz, Bolivia, whereas, the others are in Hidalgo, Chiapas and Juarez. By selecting some
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cases that are similarly located regional differences can be controlled for and highlighted. The
Mexican cases where chosen because the difference in location can highlight the difference in
regional conditions. This will lend itself to the argument that mimicry prevents MFIs from
altering their policies to local conditions, which would be beneficial. Additionally, the cases
were chosen based on type and size. It was important to choose cases that were full-fledged
banks that follow best practices rigidly and choosing NGO type MFIs that can deviate from that
model. The variance in the type of MFI is important to highlighting how important deviation
from the best practices model is for development outcomes. Furthermore, these banks represent a
difference in state regulation, where local tax regimes and interest rate control would affect the
outcomes of the clients. Governments can consider some of the micro-insurance programs
offered by MFIs different from commercial products for tax purposes.219 They can also provide
tax incentives for MFIs to reach poorer segments of the population.220 Some MFIs based on their
design, for example credit associations, “have to follow the country’s laws and pay taxes.”221
The cases were also chosen based on their lending type. While all of the banks make
loans to individuals, three of them engage in group lending as well. This aspect is important
because it can explain changes in social capital and community development. The cases also
represent differences in the type of population that each bank loans to, whereas the only two
banks that loan to those who are considered very poor (well below the poverty line), those that
follow best practices more closely only lend to those who are economically active already.
Therefore, these two additional cases that loan to the very poor highlight a deviation from best
practices that is seen in the NGO best fit model of microfinance. The last area where there is
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deviation in the cases is in the area of loaning to women. While most of the bank’s loan to
women, IDEPRO was specifically chosen because it does not, this difference will have an
explanatory impact in the sense that those banks who deviate from the best practices of loaning
to women would theoretically have better community development outcomes. Table 4.1 briefly
highlights each of the cases similarities and differences:
Table 4.1: Variance in Case Selection

This table shows that the six different banks vary among five basic aspects of best
practice. This includes whether they are a bank, non-banking financial institutions, or nongovernmental organization. Additionally, it shows that there is a difference in whether they are
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regulated by the government or not. Furthermore, the table highlights whom the banks loans to
whether it be individuals, village bank (SHG), of solidarity group (SG). This table also shows the
degree to which women are targeted as clients, as well as, the differing poverty level of clients.
Additionally, this chart highlights variance among number of clients and loan portfolio size. This
table shows that all these cases adhere to best practices in some degree and deviate in other areas.
It is in the deviation that the case study design will highlight how the change impacts community
economic and social development indicators.
Two cases used are Banco Sol and Compartamos because they are considered the most
successful MFIs in Latin America and they were instrumental in the implementation of best
practices. They are the cases used here to illustrate that MFIs do adhere closely to best practices.
Three other cases are ones that have not adhered strictly to best practices and methodology.
These are Pro Mujer, Banco Economico, and IDEPRO. These MFIs vary in other interesting
ways. Banco Sol, Compartamos, and Banco Economico are commercialized banks, whereas Pro
Mujer and IDEPRO are NGOs. Different types of MFIs were chosen to highlight the different
policies that each MFI adheres to and the overall effect that the different structures would have
on their programs designed to. Collectively, these Latin American cases have greatly changed
the way that microfinance is understood.
What is interesting about the cases from Latin America is that government intervention
can occur in different ways. The options for government intervention are as varied as the
countries themselves. There are caps on interest rates, imposition on banking rules and
regulation, and state-run banking. Government intervention is seen as a negative because it can
artificially keep interest rates low and lead to political corruption. Hubka and Zaidi (2005)
echoed this concern in their World Development Report on the Impact of Government
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Regulation on Microfinance blatantly stating, “governments should exit the microfinance
sector… [and that] continued reliance on government funds is both detrimental and
unrealistic.”222 A review of the literature on the opposite side in Latin America does show that
29 of the 35 profitable MFI’s are regulated banking institutions, and many others are pursuing
licenses or some way to part of the formal financial sector.223 The literature is lacking in this
area, as there are few studies that look at the current state of microfinance in Latin America and
the role of the government in the industry. This project will attempt to fill this void. This section
has highlighted the differences between the cases. I use these five different cases to test my
hypotheses that were introduced at the end of Chapter 3, that focus on how the institutional
design of microfinance impacts its ability to generate economic and socio-cultural benefits for
their clients.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has covered the different methodology used in studying the impact that
microfinance has on poverty alleviation. The case study methodology considers, first, the
financial situation of clients receiving loans from each MFI and, second, the range of programs
that each MFI offers focused on broader social issues and deviate from best practices to approach
a best fit microfinance design. This chapter also covered the case study methodology. Finally,
this chapter presented the methodological constructions of the various indexes and scales used
throughout the dissertation. This chapter has laid out the foundations for measuring
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microfinance’s impact in a novel way that not only allows for the study of poverty alleviation but
also adds significantly to the literature on microfinance.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: MFI BEST PRACTICES, POVERTY ALLEVIATION, AND GENDER
EMPOWERMENT
At the core microfinance is the use of small loans to boost domestic economic production
with an eye toward sustainable development. This project argues that because of institutional
mimicry the adherence to the best practices model does not result in alleviating poverty but
instead it results in over-indebtedness, baring the very poor from the financial services that they
need through client targeting practices, creates more problems for women as they are the ones
responsible for the debt of the microfinance loan, and spurs corruption and soaring interest rates
as the domestic political systems frame the interactions between the MFIs and the state.
Demonstrating the impact of MFIs on the poverty rates of its clients and communities is beyond
the scope of this dissertation’s initial examination of MFIs. But, in the analyses to follow, it will
be shown that adherence to best practices has a strong impact on, first, the financial well-being of
its clients (e.g., their level of indebtedness to the bank) and, second, the array of programs that
banks offer to deal with broader social problems and, in particular, improve the position of
women clients.
Today microfinance stems from this model by creating a best practices model. The
original microfinance model was successful because it was designed specifically for the
conditions of Bangladesh and focused on what farmers needed in that area. This is an example of
best fit microfinance. Best fit microfinance is exemplified by those institutions that depart from
the 11 core principles established by the CGAP Pink Book, and are designed with their
communities in mind. Microfinance best fit is an interesting approach to development practices.
It is a community development scheme that simply is where community members come together
to generate solutions to problems. While this is a broad definition put forth by the UN
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Development Bank, it is a foundational argument for the best fit model of microfinance.224 This
highlights the idea that communities are best suited to finding the solutions for their economic
development issues. For a best fit model, microfinance institutions would need to be flexible and
approach development of their communities’ needs. Best practices require that institutions follow
the eleven principles for continued funding and program survival. A best fit model would design
programs for their community as they see fit. The best fit model would include, educational
programs, gender violence programs, agricultural or manufacturing programs that are
appropriate, as well as healthcare and housing programs that members in impoverished countries
need. This approach is best suited toward non-profit MFIs that do not rely on the neo-liberal
Washington consensus economic model for funding. Best fit is exactly that, a model of
development that is the best fit for the community. This dissertation seeks to highlight how
institutional mimicry through best practices neoliberal economic design hinders poverty
alleviation by incorporated several elements of development. These elements include economic
issues of debt cycles and the impact of loaning only to the economically active poor, sociocultural issues of gender targeting and social capital creation, and finally, political issues
including how international institutions push the best practices model and ignore local
conditions.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first main section focuses on best
practices and what development issues it ignores. This section includes three subsections
including a discussion of best practices and the primacy of financial considerations, the failure to
respond to local conditions, and finally the failure to respond to gender issues. The second
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section is comprised of the five case studies. In this section, there are three subsections for each
case. The subsections cover the history of the MFIs, their adherence to the best practices model,
and if they approach a best fit design. The last section is the comparative analysis of the cases,
which includes a discussion of the adherence to best practices among all MFIs discussed in the
case study section. This section has two subsections including economic impacts and sociocultural impacts, which also include a further subsection for each covering hypothetical
assessments. In analyses that admittedly get indirectly at poverty alleviation, they consider the
financial situation of each MFI bank’s clients (i.e., their level of indebtedness) and the variety of
social programs offered in the community. Lastly, this chapter will conclude with a summary of
the arguments made and a review of the chapter. The next section will discuss best practices and
microfinance design.
Microfinance Institutions, Best Practices, and What Gets Ignored
The Grameen Bank was the prototype for today’s microfinance. To reduce nonrepayment, group-lending structures were used where loans were dispersed through either the
MFI or an intermediary small village bank to a group of participants. These participants then as a
group were responsible for dispersing the loan to the group either through rotating turns or
through dividing it among all members. The group would then be responsible for collecting the
loan repayment and sending it to the MFI. The Grameen Bank originally showed that high
repayment was possible with this type of loan and this resulted in a proliferation of this lending
type in the area. The idea spread to other states as NGOs began to look for ways to improve the
economic lives of impoverished of their citizens. The problem with this was that the original
model was built upon a group lending structures. These structures relied on group pressure as
collateral.

119
This is an important aspect of microfinance because the industry is committing to making
small loans to those in need to grow their enterprises. However, to make such loans feasible they
needed to construct a collateral system. Group pressure was used to ensure loan repayment.
Social collateral is seen as a “reliable measure of creditworthiness.”225 The makeup of the groups
can differ and can likewise contribute to the program’s success or failure. In a culture that is
familial based, loan groups that are made up of random members do not have the same element
of obligation. However, groups that are made up of family members can have their downfall, as
these groups do not have the same element of community shame if the group goes into default.
While cultural differences might not necessarily solely explain the failure of microfinance, but
they can create significant constraints that can lead to the increased risk of failure.226 The ability
for the group to pressure members that are not abiding by the rules is an effective method for
keeping repayment rate high. It exacts measures of social stress, discernment, and instills shame
for the member who willfully does not adhere to the rules and regulations.227 The use of peer
pressure and peer support are most effective in groups that are self-selected because then
members do not want to endure the social consequences of close friends and relatives. Group
lending is still a major component in many MFIs lending structure, but the push toward
commercialization has also seen an increase in lending to individuals.
After Yunus won the Noble Peace Prize, microfinance seemed to situate itself firmly
within the westernized development paradigm. Commercialized microfinance became the new
model after NGOs like PRODEM transformed themselves into the licensed bank Banco Sol. This
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shift also saw the microfinance industry particularly in Latin America being run by those with
banking and business background shifting away from community development schemes.228
Adams and Raymond (2008), Engler (2009), Tavanti (2013), Bateman (2014) highlighted how
microfinance had become about making money from the poor, referring to microfinance
institutions as moneylenders.229 This is significant because it shows that theoretically scholars
are seeing the issues with the neoliberal development model that microfinance follows. Yunus
has said that microfinance is a “business with a social objective, which is to help people get out
of poverty.”230 In 2011, Yunus acknowledged that “microloans are designed to improve income,
not add to debt burden, [and] some organizations are wrongly using microcredit…abusing the
concept and creating debt.”231 He argued that the new commercialized model of microfinance
was just transferring the volatility of the global market to the poor who are “ill equipped to
handle it.232 ” The commercialization of microfinance has firmly rooted itself in the development
lexicon of a powerful tool to solve poverty. This section discussed microfinance design and best
practices the next section will discuss the factors that the best practices model does not consider
including two subsections to discuss prominent issues of local conditions and gender issues.
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Best Fit and the Primacy of Financial Considerations
While microfinance institutions have become prevalent for this type of poverty
alleviation programs, these institutions are often hindered themselves by structural and financial
concerns that are placed upon them from the funding organizations. What this means is that as
the IMF and World Bank and International Donors fund microfinance institutions they have
expectations of seeing a return on their investments. The way that this is done is to set up these
programs in a specific way as to maximize profits; this is called their best practices. The best
practices dictate exactly how the institutions, regardless of country or region or even village in
which they are located, must be set up and run with an emphasis on certain factors like
repayment and interest loans. The reality of the matter is that often times these institutions are
often unable to meet the local domestic political and social realities of the very people they are
trying to help. There is a move toward more encompassing programs, however those tend to be
directed by non-governmental organizations that do not have the same funding structures and,
while that means they do not have the same constraints, it does mean that they do have other
problems of self-sufficiency where funding could be lost and the entire program could collapse.
This section will discuss the two main areas where the best practices model comes up short,
including local conditions and gender issues. Both of these things encompass socio-cultural and
economic factors that are central to the theory. The economic factors that are under consideration
include use of subsides, local infrastructure, and issues of government regulation. The sociocultural factors include the impact of a patriarchal society, lack of education, and the impact of
domestic violence on women who participate in microfinance institutions.
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Failure to Respond to Local Conditions
Microfinance institutions failure to recognize local political realities mean that they are
not able to recognize the impact that public pressure on the government can impact that states
political stability, which is even more important in unstable political regions where microfinance
often operates. MFIs tend to operate in regions where political structures are weaker. This means
that when MFIs who have followed the best practice of creating savings either through deposits
or more likely though savings programs where a small portion of the loan is withheld to ensure
that there will be a repayment of some sort. Of course the problems arise when the MFIs funding
changes either through loss of subsides or a decrease of funds from the World Bank or IMF. This
funding change can cause banks to collapse. This microfinance industry was marked by
expansion, coercive, and deceptive practices that were developed through best practices, all of
which would eventually return the poor to a “condition of financial apartheid.”233 This occurred
because the best practices methodology did not take into account the local political realities.
MFI’s also create issues when they do not take into consideration the impact of social or
cultural impacts when they ignore basic infrastructure realities. Many times microfinance loans
are given to women in rural areas, and do so with little regard to how these loan recipients are
going to get to the market place to trade their goods. Often time developing countries lack the
physical infrastructures of roads and passageways for travel. MFIs do not provide the means for
their recipients to participate in the marketplace, as that is not their concern. All MFIs are built
around the core guides of best practices based on loan repayment and therefore are typically
unconcerned with how they are repaid, which means they are unconcerned with how recipients’
physical lack of access to the marketplaces in their communities. It was assumed that with access
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to credit, women would have the ability to make their own “production related decisions.”234
Women in developing countries do not have access to the same types of infrastructure and
agency as women in the developed world. There is a lack of technology and internet access that
can create barriers to buy and sell directly from their own homes online, and a marketplace with
access is needed to ensure enough profit to not only purchase supplies but also repay the loans.
The cultural differences also include instances of women needing to be escorted to buy or sell
products by male family members.235 These hidden barriers meant it was harder to actual
generate a profit from the microenterprise resulting in many using household funds to repay
loans.236 This also plays into the issues of how microfinance claims a commitment to not only
improving the lives of women, but they also use the simplicity of loans being enough to
enterprise your way out of poverty, which is a major appeal for the neoliberal economic
development community. The mission drift is important because it represents how microfinance
on the ground operates differently from the designed best practices. If the MFI says they want to
help people out of poverty but only provide loans, then they are only doing half the job. This is
why providing market access is important, because profits could be higher with a more people
forward approach.
The core of the issue with solving problems with a policy of replication is that the state is
willing to overlook their own local conditions. They accept the terms of the best practices
methodology of funding for microfinance because simply they have to in order to receive MFI
funding from the World Bank or the IMF. NGO based MFIs have similar issues, because the
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state uses the regulatory frameworks to control foreign-funded institutions. So even though NGO
based MFIs do not strictly have to follow best practices they often do to a certain degree in order
to continue to operate within the state. However, NGOs that stray from the best practices are
often able to adopt more programs that would help the poor. The government in some states does
not always want this because they view it as taking over functions of a welfare state, which have
become incompatible with the neoliberal economic development policies. Specifically, states
often regulate NGO based MFIs to prevent them from crowding out the market-oriented
sector.237 States can make it harder to operate a model of microfinance that strays from best
practices.
Essentially, when states look to these international organizations to help them with their
poverty problems, those organizations are only supporting microfinance policies to do so. This
leads to a state accepting international involvement in the functioning of the state so that they can
have the conditional funding from these international organizations. Now, it is understandable to
look at these international organizations and argue that conditional funding is necessary to make
sure that the funds are used for poverty alleviation projects and no other corrupting functions.
My central argument looks specifically at how these organizations pushing one model of
microfinance is detrimental to the core missions of microfinance, which is to help the poor out of
poverty. There is a lot that goes into the poverty puzzle and it should not be solved by such a
narrowed concept of development policy, instead international organizations should tailor
microfinance programs to take into account local political, cultural, and social realities in which
they are working. This section discussed issues with best practices institutional design and local
conditions, the next section will discuss institutional design and gender issues.
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Failure to Respond to Gender Issues.
Gender issues in Latin America need to be considered when looking at how microfinance
in the region works. Microfinance loans target women to mobilize a portion of the workforce that
is often not engaged in the formal market. However, the loans do not address barriers to such
involvement that often occur. Women in Latin America are marginalized not only in the market
place but also in the home. In a culture that places great value on issues of manhood, women are
often thought of as not only property but also something to be controlled. Silverberg (2014)
argued that in machismo societies microfinance could create problems as women move out of the
home and into work. This in turn creates a situation where domestic violence can be increased
especially in the societies where it is already prevalent.238 The region’s issues with machoism are
not the only things at play, the region’s ideas of feminism also are important.239 Microfinance
institutions fail to recognize this dichotomy. MFIs commitment to women means that loans are
given specifically to them, however, since the MFI is generally only concerned with repayment
they often fail to teach the women how to use the loans properly.
The formal banking sector often devalued women’s business in developing economies
seeing them as too risky because of a lack of collateral. Microfinance then started to move into
that market. They further branched out with their commitment to making loans to women. This
commitment meant that they were giving loans to not only grow or sustain businesses but they
were giving loans to start business. The women that would get these loans did not already need
to be engaged in any sector of the market, formal or informal. This meant that loans being given
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to women in the hopes of establishing self-sufficiency and therefore agency were often being
used as short-term crisis loans. MFIs did not realize that in many developing economies women
are agents of their family life. They are the ones responsible for taking care of the children, the
elderly and other aspects of supporting the family. These loans are therefore subsequently used
for sending children to school, treating illnesses in the family, providing food, or fixing up the
home. There are also instances where the loan is used for things other than the family, where the
husband uses the loan for drinking or gambling. Regardless of what the loan is used for, the
women is still responsible for paying back the loan. The burden is the responsibility of the
woman who took the loan. This can lead to further problems in societies where social
responsibilities are tied to the notions of reputation. Often times when women are unable to
repay the loans, they flee the region in the best case or commit suicide in the worst-case scenario
(this happened in Andra Pradesh India after their microfinance market collapsed).240 Part of the
problems with reputation is the way the loans are made. Group lending that many microfinance
organizations employ are centered on this exact type of peer pressure to ensure repayment.
Issues with gender and microfinance stem beyond the use of the loan for short-term
household consumption. In regions where microfinance is prevalent, there is a lack of business
infrastructure. This lack of infrastructure often means that the women who are the primary users
of these loans do not receive the support or education that they need to start or grow a business.
Often times in the male dominated societies in developing regions women lack basic access to
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the same market places that are available to men. This lack of access stems from the social and
cultural ideal that men are to provide for the family by working outside the home, while women
are to care for the family, including children and the elderly. Therefore, in some societies women
are physically barred from common marketplaces. For example, in regions of Latin America,
men control the local marketplace by deciding who gets what stall and where. Often times these
community leaders do not see fit to give women access to the same space as men. Therefore,
even if they could get their goods to the local market, they would find that there was no place to
sell them. Additionally, those who control the space often see women’s inclusion as a threat of
manhood and if they do allow them to participate it is often at a heavy price; they not only
demand more money for the ability to be in the marketplace, but they also demand payoffs in the
terms of percentages of business revenue.241 Women who attempt to sell their goods, no matter
what it is, are faced with numerous barriers for which they have no recourse. The local social
structure and cultural realities in which women live means that sometimes they have no recourse
from extortion of this type.
This is at the core of this dissertation’s argument. MFIs that adhere strictly to the best
practices ideology and are not able to adopt policies and programs that are specific to the regions
local political and social realities, then the less likely the MFIs are able to be effective in their
ability to help their clients out of poverty. There are further differences when it comes to MFIs
that will be discussed later when analyzing the practices of the individual institutions in the case
study. Microfinance institutions that offer additional programs would be more effective in
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helping their clients as well as fostering more economic and socio-cultural development. These
types of institutions would offer not only training on money management and business ethics,
but would also offer domestic violence and gender equity programs to their agendas. The picture
is clear when it comes to microfinance loans and their impacts more needs to be done. The
following discussion breaks down each of the cases and will cover issues of difficulties that
MFIs have with adapting to local political and social realities and therefore their difficulty in
being able to have clients use their loans effectively. This section has discussed the major effects
of microfinance design with a focus on how best practices impacts local and gendered effects.
The next section will be comprised of the case studies of Banco Sol, Compartamos, IDEPRO,
Banco Economico, and Pro Mujer. Each case study is comprised of three subsections that discuss
the history of the MFI, their adherence to best practices institutional design, and how they
approach a best fit design.
Case Studies of Microfinance in Latin America
This dissertation is employing a case study methodology to highlight how the previous
sections discussed effects impact the microfinance design. This section will look at each of the
five cases Banco Sol, Compartamos, Banco Economico, IDEPRO, and Pro Mujer. There will
also be a few vignettes to describe the MFIs impacts on clients themselves. The following
section is divided into three main subsections for each case. First, the history and background
will be discussed. Next, the institutions adherence to the best practices model will be covered
highlighting which of the best practices they follow including; a variety of financial services,
interest rates, measurement of client poverty, operational self-sufficiency, deposits, use of
subsidies, role of government regulation, if the MFI measures financial outcomes, and lending to
women. Lastly, each case study will discuss the MFIs movements toward a best fit design of
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microfinance—and, in particular, if MFIs offer wider arrays of programs that offer social
benefits and, in particular, empower women entrepreneurs.
Banco Sol
History and Background. Banco Sol is the most replicated model of microfinance and
highlights the arguments of how mimicry creates distortions and therefore hinders poverty
alleviation. Banco Sol operates in La Paz Bolivia and is a commercial bank. By 1992, the
positive development of the NGO led to the expansion of the institution leading to the creation of
the commercial bank structure of today. Currently it has more than 160,000 clients with a
portfolio of more than USD $300 million and it has become the leading institution of
microfinances. Banco Sol has formed a consulting group that assists microfinance institutions all
over the world. They provided on-site technical training and transfer of micro-financial expertise
and software.242 Banco Sol was chosen because it is a banking organization that adheres to state
regulatory requirements. Additionally, it lends to individuals, targets the poor, and lends
primarily to women.
The strategies of other MFIs were modeled after the Banco Sol’s solidarity group
methodology.243 Banco Sol has formed a consulting group named FFP Prodem that assists
microfinance institutions all over the world. FFP Prodem provides on-site technical training and
transfer of micro-financial expertise and software.244 Banco Sol has perpetuated its methodology
of microfinance on the field in Bolivia since then. As such, Banco Sol is an important key to why
mimicry in the field of microfinance occurs and if it hinders MFI growth and sustainability. As
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such, Banco Sol is an important key to why mimicry in the field of microfinance occurs and if it
hinders MFI growth and sustainability.
Microfinance in Bolivia has gone through a boom and bust cycle. Most notable, in 19992000, there were major riots in Bolivia by borrowers against lenders, such as Banco Sol.245 The
problems in Bolivia began with the economic crisis that devalued currency in Brazil. This
affected Bolivia because at the time 45% of trade came from neighboring countries, which saw
Bolivian export demand to decline.246 An ensuing recession spread, and Bolivia began to see
demand for their exports dwindle. In response the country “cracked down on informal importing
and exporting” which hit the microfinance market hard.247 The microfinance market in Bolivia at
this time was characterized by heavy indebtedness and extraordinary competition. In mid-2000,
clients that had loans at more than one institution held 34% of the values of portfolios for Pro
Mujer.248 According to Juan Domingo Fabbri of Banco Sol’s marketing department, “clients did
not see multiple loans as risky” at this time and actually thought that having several loans was a
status symbol.249 In 1997, there were roughly 600,000 clients with microenterprises in Bolivia
but only fifty percent of them were successfully able to sell their product.250 Clients took
advantage of the credit from so many institutions and began maintain two or more loans as
outstanding at a time.251 Clients began to take on more than they could handle and began using
one loan to pay off another creating debt cycles that began a quick route to financial disaster for
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many. This overindebtedness coupled with a financial crisis resulted in a backlash against
microcredit.
The crisis in Bolivia was full blown by 1999 as clients began to demand full debt
forgiveness. Banco Sol and other microfinance organizations formed the new association Asofin
to stop the protests and recoup their funds from debtors. While only a handful of cases were ever
resolved, shortly after Asofin’s creation the associations mostly collapsed throwing their own
leaders in jail for illegal financial practices.252 Banco Sol has since formed a consulting group
named FFP Prodem that assists microfinance institutions all over the world. FFP Prodem
provides on-site technical training and transfer of microfinancial expertise and software.253
Banco Sol has perpetuated its methodology of microfinance on the field in Bolivia since then. As
such, Banco Sol is an important key to why mimicry in the field of microfinance occurs and if it
hinders MFI growth and sustainability.
Microfinance in Bolivia today is beginning to show similar signs to trouble that the
precipitated the 1999-2000 crises. The crisis in Bolivia was the first microfinance failure and was
thought to have occurred because of the impact of outside factors on the financial sector in
Bolivia at the time. However, starting in 2008, such microfinance failures began to be seen in
Morocco, Nicaragua, and Pakistan, all marked by huge over-indebtedness, growing client
defaults, and client withdrawals that lead the MFI’s to close or merge.254 This highlights that
there is some other fundamental problem in the core of the forced mimicry best practices model
of microfinance.
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Adherence to Best Practices. Banco Sol has become an industry standard for how best
practices is to operate within the microfinance field. In order to measure the adherence to best
practices several indicators were considered. Using the CGAP Pink Book, MFI adherence to best
practices was looked at through financial services for clients, if they used a poverty reduction
tool, if they were operationally self-sufficient, integration into local financial institutions, if
interest rates were capped, and if government intervention was limited. The use of best practices
as the industry standard for microfinance tends to focus solely on economic factors, although
they do make one consideration for social issues and that revolves around tools for poverty
reduction and a commitment to loaning to women. All of these factors were taken into account
when addressing the degree to which the microfinance institution followed best practices or not.
The central argument of this dissertation revolves around the impact that following best practices
has on poverty and development outcomes, with the main theoretical argument being that those
institutions that deviate from best practices have a greater impact on poverty alleviation. This
section will discuss the degree to which Banco Sol in Bolivia adheres to and deviates from best
practices.
Banco Sol adheres to the CGAP best practices model on a majority of factors. They have
evolved from the group-lending model and now 98% of their loans are made to individual
clients. The majority of the loans are for urban micro-enterprises including street vendors. The
average loan balance per borrower is $4190 US while a gross national income per capita in 2018
being $3370 USD.255 This is on the upper end of loan balance for the cases under study. While
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today they have larger loans, their origin as an NGO means they started with smaller loans. The
story of AM highlights this transformation:
AM started a shop business with a $60 USD loan from PRODEM (the NGO that started
Banco Sol). Over the course of five years, she took out ten loans. In addition, after the
transformation to Banco Sol she took out a $5000 USD loan to invest in a minibus for her
husband’s taxi service.256
The interesting aspect of this story is it reveals a multitude of issues. Not only does it highlight
that clients take out multiple loans, ten in this case, but they also take out increased amounts
going from $60 to $5000. Furthermore, it highlights an interesting aspect of the best practices
models focus on loans for women. Her husband could not get the loan he needed from the
institution to grow his business but she could for him. However, she would still be responsible
for the loan repayment. In this instance, loaning only to women does not help him. A more
encompassing design of microfinance that followed best fit could consider these factors.
Banco Sol adheres to best practices by offering a variety of financial services including
savings, ATM access, debit cards, as well as financial education services. The education services
provided centered on savings and using the loans for capital and entrepreneur growth. Banco Sol
because of its use of common financial services to some extent has integrated itself into the
financial system of the state. The use of ATM and debit cards meant that the bank could do away
with its poorly operated rural branches and install services into the local community. For
example, they branched out and began to build ATM services and branches into gas stations so
clients could have quicker access and they could reach more people. In this sense, Banco Sol has
adhered to best practices by following the standard guidelines for operation.
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The other factors that contribute to Banco Sol’s adherence to the best practices model
centers around government intervention and interest rates. They tend to follow the best practices
that believe that government intervention results in corruption. Corruption is typically identified
by a category of bribes, where institutions may receive lower taxes or government benefits
through contracts, but also involves issues where the government uses delayed loan repayment as
a method to ensure reelection. Banco Sol has limited government intervention for this reason.
They also resisted (like all MFIs) government intervention because they believed it would
increase taxes and instill laws about interest rates. Because Banco Sol is a regulated bank, they
have to adhere to state laws about loaning, savings, assets, and interest rates. As such, when in
2013 Bolivia passed the New Banking Law (NBL), Banco Sol had to comply with the new limits
on interest rates, which was to take effect in 2018. The law capped the interest rate and mandated
that 60% of portfolio loans be in the productive sector.257 In this sense, government intervention
was no longer limited because it mandated direct changes to the portfolio. However, because the
law was not to take effect until 2018 and because Evo Morales passed it lost the election in 2019,
protections for clients remained weak in the country and there was no incentive for the banks to
comply with the state law.258 Banco Sol has continued to follow the industry best practices when
it comes to interest rates and government intervention. Banco Sol’s interest income on loan
portfolio was $226,945,432 in 2018. Their interest rate model conforms to best practices and
ensures that the bank remains financial stable. Additionally, their operational self-sufficiency
(OSS) ratio was 126.99%. This the ratio of operating revenues to expenses, an OSS over 100%
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means that the bank is earning sufficient revenues to maintain stability and cover costs. 259 In all
of the previous factors, Banco Sol adheres to the best practices model of microfinance.
Approaching a Best Fit Design. Banco Sol is doing some things that other banks are not.
They do represent a slight deviation from the best practices model in that they also offer health
improvement programs and water/sanitation programs. One of the healthcare programs that they
offer centers around what is becoming known as micro-insurance. Banco Sol, through Sol Salud,
provides maternity coverage. Essentially, Banco Sol has entered the business of health insurance
coverage, allowing clients to reduce out of pocket costs for healthcare visits. It is an innovation
in the field that involves only a few institutions. Additionally, Banco Sol deviates from the best
practices model by offering products and loans for household improvements that are meant to
increase access to clean water and sanitation services. Because of Banco Sol’s large portfolio
size and stability, they are able to branch out and offer these extra services. In this regard, they
are deviating from best practices. It is important to note that they are able to do this because they
adhere to the best practices model in regards to financial stability, interest rates, and limited
government interventions. This bank is an interesting case because they can deviate from the best
practices but choose to do so not out of altruism but out of offering additional loan programs,
which makes them money. It is for this reason this bank is included in the case study, as it
highlights the ability of the banks to adapt to the local conditions and follow a best fit model.
However it also shows that for most banks to do this they consider the financial implications and
the revenue that can be made off of the additional services. The other banks in this study all
adhere or deviate in similarly, with the exception of Pro Mujer, which offers the additional
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services, not through loan programs but through community development programs which have
no or low cost to clients.
Compartamos
History and Background. Compartamos in Juarez, Mexico is another major case
providing insights into the impact of mimicry in MFI loans. Compartamos is a commercial bank.
Compartamos has its origins in a Mexican youth organization developed in 1982. Gente Nueva
was created to improve the quality of life for communities by providing support for health and
food programs. In 1990, Compartamos was launched as a village bank that loaned to
microenterprises as a pilot program in Juarez, Mexico. By 1995, it separated completely from the
community level social programs and began to focus on the best practices model of microfinance
with a stricter adherence to operational self-sufficiency. The social programs that started
Compartamos just were not profitable for the institution continue. It operates in Oaxaca and
Chiapas. Additionally, it has expanded into 32 different Mexican states.260 Today, Compartamos
is one of the largest MFIs in Latin America and has become the world model for microfinance
institutions because they follow the CGAP best practices model and proved to be widely
profitable.
Compartamos was chosen because it is banking organization that adheres to state
regulatory requirements. Additionally, it lends to individuals and groups, targets the poor low
income, and lends primarily to women. Compartamos was also selected because it became one of
the most replicated model of microfinance after it showed how profitable the industry could be.
Additionally, it highlights the arguments of how mimicry creates distortions and therefore
hinders poverty alleviation. This MFI has drastically changed the landscape of microfinance. In
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2007, Compartamos was put up for Initial Public Offering (IPO) entering the stock market. 261
When Compartamos entered the public market it saw its investors and managers make millions
of dollars while their clients were charged up to 195% interest rates on their microloans.262 The
commercialization of microfinance has ultimately changed the face of the microfinance mission.
The MFIs were no longer focused on social missions but instead were concerned with financial
sustainability and growth. The IPO offering of Compartamos saw high profile MFIs beginning to
follow the Compartamos model. Compartamos is important to look at because it started the trend
of commercializing microfinance after which new MFIs began to model themselves.
At the time of the IPO offering, shareholders of Compartamos was 40% USAID and
CGAP, while other minor funders like ACCION made up the rest. The primary holders of
Compartamos as such, had a deep interest in neoliberal economic development and continued to
shift Compartamos to the best practices model as the ideal microfinance institution.263 This
began the shift to for-profit microfinance and began the debates about mission drift.
Compartamos’ shift away from their original development programs in health and education
highlight this mission drift, and today they tend to focus on the best practices model of
microfinance and continue to make returns for investors.
Adherence to Best Practices. Compartamos is an industry standard for the best practices
model in microfinance. They are the most profitable MFI, and being owned by CGAP and
USAID, they are the most replicated model throughout Latin America. As discussed in the
previous section the best practices looked at include financial services for clients, if they used a
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poverty reduction tool, if they were operationally self-sufficient, integration into local financial
institutions, if interest rates were capped, and if government intervention was limited. The use of
best practices through Compartamos focuses on economic factors and unlike Banco Sol the
private IPO means financial stability and solvency is the most important factor. These factors are
taken into account when determining Compartamos’ adherence to best practices and lends itself
to the central argument that adherence to best practices hinders economic and socio-cultural
development and the MFIs ability to generate poverty alleviation.
When it comes to microfinance in Latin America, Compartamos is the most replicated
model. They adhere to best practices to a high degree on a multitude of factors. They lend to
individuals and solidarity groups as well as smaller village banks. Because Compartamos is an
IPO, it is a regulated bank that provides not only micro-loan services but also savings and
deposit services. Therefore, Compartamos follows best practices by providing a variety of
financial services. They also offer financial education services so that clients know how to
properly invest in their enterprises and maximize returns on loans. They offer insurance products
and payment channels as well therefore they adhere to the variety of financial services of the best
practices model.
They utilize a group lending structure in order to underwrite some of their larger
individual loans and mitigate collateral risks. This is an important structure in their loan process
because group size is 5 to 8 women, applicants are put forth by the group and they rely on group
members for screening loan suitability. Additionally, they focus on group peer pressure for loan
repayment. If someone does not repay their portion of the loan in the group, they are reported for
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delinquency and typically sent to a collection agency.264 The number of outstanding loans in
2018 was 2,850,786, with 2,485,029 of active borrowers. They also have a loan loss rate of
9.6%. While this means they are protected against future shocks, for comparison, the Federal
Reserve recommends a loan loss rate of around 2.5%.265 What explains the loan numbers for
Compartamos? The answer lies within the best practices model. They do not cap interest rates;
therefore, they can be profitable and have more loans out than active clients have. This also
indicates that there is double dipping or overindebtendness where clients have more than one
loan. Compartamos’ interest rates are the highest in the industry at around 120%.266 Interest rates
and a focus on repayment do not always benefit the clients. For example, there are several
Compartamos clients who are struggling to repay loans and their comments highlight the
difficulties they have had in working toward paying them off.
R.C. stated, “The truth is that I am very disappointed with this company, they extend the
term and charge you a good rate of interest, apart from the weeks you have paid, they no
longer count ... sorry, but it is a robbery”
K.Z.R stated, “Apart from the interest rising, they keep the payments that were given”
L.C. stated “there is no money and there is very little work, what comes out is to eat”
H.M. said of her group experience “My group renewed just because the group
representative said that she had to finish her box because she wanted the loan”267
These statements about Compartamos’s working with clients when it comes to repayment
problems highlights that better transparency may be needed and that clients’ could use more
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financial services to deal with the issues of running a micro-financed business. However, these
are not aspects of the best practices model.
Compartamos also follows best practices because they loan primarily to women, and
those who are classified as economically active poor. In order to maintain self-sufficiency and
grow profits they do not lend to those below the poverty line. Compartamos has an operational
self-sufficiency rate of 145.58%. This is better than Banco Sol, which was around 120%.268 This
level of OSS means that the bank has the funds to deal with economic shocks and is stable. This
is a cornerstone of best practices, because they aim to prevent the bank collapses that happened
in the 1980s and 1990s. Looking at the loaning programs of Compartamos highlights that it not
only follows best practices, but it is best practices.
Approaching a Best Fit Design. Compartamos’ gross loan portfolio is 1,279,863,222
USD. They have the largest loan portfolio of any of the cases understudy. This is important
because if we look at Banco Sol in the previous section it was able to adopt other social
development programs because of its large loan portfolio and profitability. Compartamos does
not deviate from best practices in this way. This finding is not surprising, being that the major
stakeholders of Compartamos are USAID and CGAP, which push neoliberal economic
development projects. Therefore, when it comes to development goals Compartamos does the
least while having the most amount of money. In fact, the only indicator on development goals
that Compartamos meets is gender equity. In addition, they only meet this indicator because of
their percentage of loans to women is 93.76%. While they could deviate from best practices
model and instill other development programs like Banco Sol that would have educational
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services, or water/sanitation, or gender issues training, they do not. The lack of additional
programs is highlighted by the story of Mariana:
Unexpected medical problems led to the borrowing of about $1,160 UDS to cover an
appendectomy for her son. At the time, she had four loans from four different institutions.
She stated this left her “living from loan to loan.”269
The reasons behind why they have not deviated could be varied, but this answers the important
question asked throughout this dissertation of whether deviation from the best practices model
means worse development and poverty alleviation for clients. This simply is not profitable for
Compartamos to enter the private sector and they have left most of the social programs they once
did follow to the original NGO that they came from.
IDEPRO
History and Background. The Institute for the Development of the Small Productive
Unit (IDEPRO) was chosen because it is an NGO and therefore is not a bank. IDEPRO operates
in La Paz, Bolivia. It cannot take savings and does not adhere to state regulation. It loans to
individuals, lends to the very poor not just the economically active poor, and is the only bank
that does not loan primarily to women. This MFI was chosen because it represents instances
where it breaks from some best practices, but adheres to other best practices like organizational
self-sufficiency and loan repayment. This is an interesting case because it is the only one that
primarily loans to men. This is an in between case that can show how best practices impact
poverty but also how the ability to stray from best practices could have greater outcomes for
clients.

Scott Graham, Julia Erickson, and Eugene Ericksen., “Over-Indebtedness in Mexico: Its Effects on
Borrowers” Microfinance CEO Working Group, available at: http://microfinanceceoworkinggroup. org/, page 1718.
269

142
IDEPRO entered the microfinance scene in Bolivia in 1991, funded by the Center for the
Study of the Development of Labor and Agriculture (CEDLA). CEDLA is a private non-profit
civil association that researches issues of capitalism and work, located in La Paz, Bolivia.270
IDEPRO was founded as an enterprise development organization that offers microfinance and
training. It is an NGO with a different objective. It aims to strengthen the growth of mass
financial business lines improving the competiveness of small producers, micro, and medium
enterprises in rural and urban areas in Bolivia. IDEPRO was chosen because of its focus on
enterprise development. They give individual loans toward business for the purpose of business
growth. IDEPRO breaks from the best practices methodology by supplying only 36% of their
loans going to women. IDEPRO and Banco Sol are the only two banks under study that loan
exclusively to individuals, and therefore this case offers an interesting comparison of banking
practices looking at how Banco Sol follows the best practices whereas IDEPRO breaks from it.
IDEPRO focuses on generating business in five major areas of the Bolivian economy:
nuts, quinoa, textiles, lumber, and wine grapes. They tailor their lending programs to these areas
because they focus on enterprise development and therefore want to focus on areas that can be
successful for clients. The focus on value chains tends to make IDEPRO different from other
microfinance institutions. They are designed in order to develop small farmers’ ability to
maintain products and sell them effectively. The success of focusing on specific crop markets is
highlighted by Gonzalo Ortega and IDEPRO client of five years:
Gonzalo grows grapes for wine production on a two-hectare farm. While most IDEPRO
clients use 75% percent of their land for the specified crop, he is able to use half of his
land for other commercial and subsistence crops. This means that he has to work part
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time as a driver too. This is typical of households like his in Bolivia. What is different is
that he does not have a vehicle that other farmers do.271
While this does highlight that Gonzalo is able to grow other crops on his land, the comparison he
offers to other farmers and a lack of vehicle highlights that he might not be getting the most out
of his loan with IDEPRO. He was one of 299 clients surveyed about growing grapes for wine
production. His story shows he is able to do as he wishes with his land, but also indicates there
may be a lack of services that would lead him to being able to afford a vehicle and therefore be
more productive.272 This is in line with the best practices model of microfinance that does not
offer additional programs or services that could have positive impacts for clients.
IDEPRO receives financial support from a wide variety of sources. As an NGO, they
make most of their money off loan repayment, but they also secured a $5 mil USD loan from the
Inter-American Development Bank. The purpose was to grow loan portfolios and become more
sustainable.273 They also receive funding from Oikocredit which is a financial cooperative
located in the Netherlands. Oikocredit started as a church based funding institution but in 1978
began to support loans to institutions in Ecuador and India. This is a loan program and funds
would have to be repaid to Oikocredit by the MFI.274 IDEPRO recognized the importance of
receiving funding to support its agricultural development programs, and it has operated with
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Oikocredit in the “capital of quinoa” in Challapata, Bolivia since 1998. They have received
$1,682,707.50 USD in 2012 to support their quinoa supply chain efforts.275
Adherence to Best Practices. IDEPRO is a unique MFI in that they are the only one
under study that does not lend primarily to women. Only 36% of their loan portfolio is to
women.276 This case was chosen because of this deviation from the best practices model of
microfinance that stresses the importance of loaning to women. This is the major deviation from
the best practices model. IDEPRO’s adherence to best practices was looked at through financial
services for clients, if they used a poverty reduction tool, if they were operationally selfsufficient, if they were integrated into local financial institutions, if interest rates were capped,
and if government intervention was limited. These are all economic factors. In fact IDEPRO only
considers economic impacts when assessing their programs and their focus on agriculture and
supply chains explains why they loan to not only to predominately men but also those who are
deeper in poverty as agriculture is a high risk venture due to changing weather patterns. The
setup of IDEPRO also follows best practices in regards to the financial services for clients.
Because of their focus on supply chains, IDEPRO offers a multitude of financial services beside
the loans that include financial education and in some cases advertising for products.277 Mostly
they provide training to their clients on how to be competitive in the agricultural sector. This
leads to a deviation for IDEPRO in that they also provide education through running training
sessions about environmental impacts.
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Additionally, IDEPRO follows best practices because they do track poverty. They use the
Grameen Progress out of Poverty Index. The PPI is used to determine household living
characteristics as well as asset ownership. IDEPRO uses the PPI to determine who to lend to
because the purpose of their loans is to increase enterprise stability they do measure the clients
ability to pay back the loans. Additionally, they follow best practices through their operational
self-sufficiency commitments. Their OSS is 108.61%, which is the lowest OSS of the cases
under study, and while they are sufficient and would be able to deal with economic shocks, a
score of 108 means that major economic issues could result in bank failure.278 The lower OSS is
related to the fields through which IDEPRO operates, specifically their focus on agricultural
products that can be volatile.
The other indicators on which IDEPRO follows the best practices method include limited
government intervention and interest rate caps. When it comes to limiting government
intervention, IDEPRO is an NGO and therefore not subject to government regulation. This does
mean that they are not allowed to take deposits or savings because they cannot be insured. In
regards to interest rates, IDEPRO uses a declining balance interest calculation with interest rates
of around 17% to 33% and most loans have the higher interest rate because they are smaller. The
loaning structure for interest rates floats depending on loan size and loan risk.
Approaching a Best Fit Design. Considering deviation from the best practices model,
IDEPRO does not deviate heavily; in fact, they mostly follow best practices and have a
commitment to offer best practices training for long-term enterprise success. IDEPRO’s gross
loan portfolio is $43,107,837 USD with a loan loss rate of -1.98%.279 This indicates that they
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have the financial stability to develop other community level projects that would deviate from
the best practices model. They do not offer, any health, education, water/sanitation, housing, or
gender training programs. They recover the majority of their loans and about 62% of their loan
portfolio comprises of loan repayment. They serve fewer clients than most banks under study as
well, at 74,106. The capacity for increased programs exists, and this is seen through the fact that
in one area where they do deviate is environmental education programs. The average loan
balance per borrower is the highest among any case under study at $3,908 USD and the highest
cost per loan at $426 USD.280
Banco Economico
History and Background. Banco Economico was chosen because it is a bank that adheres
to state regulatory requirements. Banco Economico operates in Chiapas, Mexico. Additionally, it
lends to individuals and groups, targets the poor, and lends primarily to women. Banco
Economico is one of the banks that follows’ Compartamos’ and Banco Sol models and therefore
is an institution that not only adheres to best practices but also shows how mimicry in
microfinance occurs. Additionally, it highlights the arguments of how mimicry creates
distortions because it does not adapt to local realities. This institution highlights how the degree
to which MFIs follow best practices is also important because it represents a case in which
microfinance was not successful in either generating profit not helping clients.
Banco Economico was founded in 1985 with the mission of supporting small economic
activities of those living in poverty. In 1991, 18 private business people launched Banco
Economico as a commercialized bank. In 1997, it opened its Presto division focusing on
microloans. It was profitable, generating an annual rate of return of 26.2% between 1993 and
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1997. However, by October of 1999, the Presto division was closed because of changes in tax
requirements and falling repayment rates. In the end, it decided that microloans were too risky.281
Banco Economico was chosen for this study because of these facts. Whereas, Compartamos and
Banco Sol also commercialized banks, strengthened and grew their microfinance sector, Banco
Economic stopped its operations. This case was chosen to highlight some reasons affecting the
effectiveness of different types of microfinance banks.
Adherence to Best Practices. When it comes to adherence to the best practices model,
Banco Economico has not only followed best practices but also mimicked the larger banks in
their organizational structures. This bank was chosen because of their adherence to best practices
and further leads to the core argument that following best practices results in worse outcomes for
client’s poverty and economic and socio-cultural development. One of the indicators that is most
prevalent in the following of the best practices model is the institutional structure they offer
financial services in that as a commercial bank they are regulated by the state and therefore offer
loans and savings programs. They do not offer other additional services but they do have a
commitment to loaning to women with 51% of their loan portfolios. Banco Economico has fewer
tools for integration into the local institutions but they do operate several community level banks
through which they make loans. They follow best practices on these indicators in that they focus
mostly on loan and loan repayment in order to maintain the stability of the bank.
Banco Economico also follows best practices in regards to the operational selfsufficiency. They have and OSS of 115.89%, which is higher than the previous case IDEPRO but
lower than Compartamos and Banco Sol.282 They should be able sustain moderate economic
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shocks but the fact that they closed divisions after the financial crisis means that they could not.
In an industry that focuses on self-sufficiency to maintain operations, the instance of bank that is
commercialized not being able to survive where other institutions did is of interest. This shows
that even though they follow best practices and therefore should be able to maintain the bank,
they were not able to maintain their structure and have collapsed divisions when the economy
goes into recessions. In addition, when we look at other indicators of best practices it should be
that this bank is stable and able to move through the industry supporting poverty reduction.
Further complicating the story is that in 2011 Banco Economico reported that they had 658,600
workers hired by financed enterprises. This would indicate that there was a degree of community
economic development. They had a profit margin of 13.7% and financed 197,191
microenterprises in 2014.283 This bank has created jobs and opportunities for economic
development, but they follow best practices and therefore they have not done well on other
socio-cultural development indicators.
Banco Economico follows best practices through their interest rate structure as well.
They do not cap interest rates and employ the industry standard using a declining interest rate
like IDEPRO. The average cost per borrower is $383.25 USD with an average outstanding
balance of $3780 USD.284 They have a substantial cost per borrower and maintained a profit
margin, however, when it comes to offering other services Banco Economico has not been
offered their clients any additional programs that would qualify as a best fit model of
microfinance.
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Approaching a Best Fit Design. Of the indicators used to measure deviation from the
best practices model, most focused on gender issues training, as well as development goals
indicators. In order to measure development that would occur outside of the economic status,
indicators of improvement in adult education, your opportunities, children’s schooling, health,
gender equality, water/sanitation, housing and poverty reduction tools were used. Banco
Economico like the other banks that followed the best practices model (IDEPRO and
Compartamos) they did not offer programs that would classify as development on these
indicators. They only offered two additional programs that included a poverty tool and a gender
equality tool. The use of these tools do not represent a benefit for the community, although both
of those were used to classify clients and make sure that only those who could repay loans were
actually accepted. This is interesting because their debt to equity ratio is one of the highest under
study at 11.28.285 Capital-intensive industries like microfinance often have higher debt to equity
ratios, which often use debt to finance growth. They focus so much on economic development
and growth of their MFI and the basic portfolio standards are good, but they seem to finance a lot
of their growth through debt, meaning that a lot of their loans come from the funding sources of
the IMF and World Bank which focus on neoliberal economic development models and do not
focus on community development.
Banco Economico follows the best practices model because they mimic the larger
institutions structure and because they receive their funding through international organizations
that require the best practices model to be followed. Yet it is possible to see that the outcomes of
poverty alleviation and development of clients is lacking in this MFI. When it comes to other
services for women, they do not offer services that would create socio-economic development.
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When it comes to empowerment indicators that were used to measure educational services,
gender issues training, legal services for domestic violence, health services, and other
empowerment services. The story of Veronica highlights the need for gender issues training and
domestic violence protections:
Using a loan worth $50 UDS to purchase squash seeds, the night before harvest an expartner tried to get Veronica to sign the title of the land over to him. When she refused,
he smashed the ripe crops. The loan group leader and Veronica decided not to go to the
police because little would be done, and there was a fear of further retribution. For
Veronica microfinance had shifted from an opportunity to a debt trap because without
the crops to sell she could not possibly pay back the loan.286
Stories like this highlight the need for a further understanding of gendered relations in the
countries where microfinance operates. This can give us a glimpse into the problems of the best
practices model of microfinance that does not take into account issues of violence into their loan
programs.
Banco Economico only had educational services, and those focused on financial literacy
therefore they did not foster socio-economic development for clients. Like IDEPRO, the stricter
adherence to the best practices model meant that they did not adopt extra community
development programs and therefore they do not have the best indicators for poverty alleviation
for clients as the poverty rate is still at 52.3%.287 Banco Economic is included in this study
because they follow best practices with little if no deviation from the best practices model.
Coupled with the poverty rate and the higher outstanding loan balances, it is seen that even
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though they do follow best practices their ability to impact even economic development of
clients is hindered. Banco Economico highlights the central argument that following best
practices means that there are lower levels of economic and socio-cultural development and
therefore their ability to alleviate poverty is hindered.
Pro Mujer
History and Backgorund. Pro Mujer is a nonprofit development organization dedicated
to providing microfinance loans to women. Pro Mujer operates in both La Paz, Bolivia and and
Hidalgo, Mexico. In 1990, Pro Mujer was founded in El Alto Bolivia by two schoolteachers, one
from America one from Bolivia. They developed this MFI with the goal of improving the
business skills, leadership skills, as well as improving health and human development. They
were focused specifically on breaking the cycle of poverty for women. In 1996, they established
Pro Mujer’s International headquarters in New York City. From there, Pro Mujer moved into
Nicaragua, Peru, Mexico, and Argentina.288 In 2018, they continued to expand and began to
operate in Guatemala. In 2002, Pro Mujer extended their operations into Mexico in Puebla,
Tlaxcala, Distrito Federal, Veracruz, Queretaro, and Oaxaca. They operate at a neighborhood
center where clients can receive all the available services.289 Pro Mujer’s village banking model
is like Yunus’ Grameen model where groups are formed and social ties are used to ensure
repayment. Pro Mujer began to develop a different methodology after the financial crises that
rocked Latin America in the 1980s. Carmen Velasco, the Executive Director, acknowledged that
“the food and oil crises absolutely affected our clients” and decided to develop programs to help
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because “the effects [would] be very dangerous.”290 Pro Mujer’s commitment to community
development has them standing apart from the vast majority of MFIs and is the reason that they
are chosen for this study.
Pro Mujer was chosen because it is an NGO that does not take savings and therefore does
not adhere to state regulatory rules. It lends to individuals and groups, lends to the very poor and
primarily women. This case was chosen because they stray the farthest from the best practices
model and adopt a wide arrange of other social support programs and policies. This case
represents what a best fit model could look like in practices. It not only gives out loans but is one
of the few MFIs that control and keeps interest rates low. They also provide extra support for
short term economic shocks that clients would experience and provide social training programs
to reduce domestic violence and increase the participation of women in society. Furthermore,
this case highlights the arguments of how mimicry creates distortions because it deals with the
local political, social, and economic distortions that the other institutions do not, and therefore its
ability to reduce poverty is greater than other types of microfinance because it breaks from the
best practices model and follows more of a best fit model.
Pro Mujer is chosen for this study because with entry into each new country they have
refined and adapted their programs to meet the local needs.291 They provide not only enterprise
assistance, but also programs to prevent gender-based violence, educational programs, healthcare
programs, and in 2017, they partnered with Microsoft to provide digital and technology skills.292
This is a significant deviation from the best practices model that the majority of MFIs’ follow
and represents a best fit model of microfinance. Pro Mujer as such has become one of the leading
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women’s development social enterprises in Latin America today. I have chosen this case because
they have become successful without following the stricter guidelines for microfinance that are
set out in best practices. This case provides an interesting comparison to the other two larger
banks of Banco Sol and Compartamos, diverting from the commercialized path following the
path of social and economic development.
Adherence to Best Practices. The role of microfinance in Latin America and its impact
on gender has been in the discourse for a while. What is important to remember is that
microfinance in the region began through NGOs. In the 1990s there was a considerable amount
of criticism among feminists that problematized the IGOs support of NGOs as magic bullets
because NGOs did not support feminist ethical principles but instead collaborated with neoliberal ones.293 Even feminist NGOs were seen as supporting global neoliberal patriarchy
(Alvarez 2009, Monasteiros 2006).294 NGOs boomed in Latin America in the 1990s, and
microfinance was no exception. As the region’s governments sought to spread the costs of social
policies while cutting back state expenditures, NGOs were seen as the solution. Many of these
programs, like microfinance, focused on poor urban and rural women in the name of enhancing
participation in the policy process and creating social capital. The trends of NGOs in the region
lead to a strong commitment to microfinance.
Pro Mujer to some extent does follow the best practices model, but they deviate the most
from any other bank under study. Using the CGAP Pink Book, MFI adherence to best practices
was looked at through financial services for clients, asking if they used a poverty reduction tool,
if they were operationally self-sufficient, integration into local financial institutions, if interest
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rates were capped, and if government intervention was limited. Pro Mujer deviates greatly from
the best practices model in their offerings of different financial services. They offer more
educational programs than any other MFI, and they are the only one to offer technology training.
They do follow best practices in that the offer a wide variety of loan services, that include loans
to village banks and individuals as well as credit life insurance. They follow best practices in that
their loan approval process does still require an evaluation of the borrower’s repayment
capability. They deviate from best practices here as well by conducting internal audits to
household debt exposure, lending practices that violate procedures including unauthorized refinancing, multiple borrowers or co-signers per household, and other practices that could
increase indebtedness. Because they are an NGO, they adhere to the idea of limited government
intervention, but still follow basic regulatory guidelines of full disclosure of prices, terms, and
loan conditions, as well as clear debt collection practices.
Pro Mujer also follows best practices when it comes to integration in that they support
multiple village bank ventures. However, they do not adhere because they cannot take deposits
so they do not always attract domestic deposits. They also adhere to best practices considering
their transparency and operational self-sufficiency (OSS). Pro Mujer has an OSS of 103.56%;
while this is the lowest OSS of all the cases, they are still stable and should be able to withstand
economic shocks because of their international structure.295 They also follow basic guidelines for
measuring loan repayment and costs and the poverty rates of clients. For the most part Pro Mujer
deviates from the best practices model.
Approaching a Best Fit Design. Pro Mujer is included in this dissertation as the example
of the best fit model of microfinance because they deviate so much from the best practices model
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that the majority of the microfinance field follows. They deviate not only in the fact that they
offer a wider range of socio-cultural development programs, like healthcare and domestic
violence protections, but also basic economic factors, like loan interest rates and lending
practices. This section will discuss how Pro Mujer deviates from best practices and how that has
better outcomes for their client’s poverty.
When it comes to economic deviations, one of the most important is their interest rate
structure. They have a consistent interest rate policy and use a participatory approach. They use a
fixed interest rate approach meaning that the interest payment for the client will not be a surprise
due to market fluctuations. As such, Pro Mujer does seek longer term financing in order to deal
with market fluctuations. They have standard interest rate ranges that are consistent with the
microfinance field but have some of the lowest rates at 4% to 13%. Pro Mujer’s mission is
affordable microcredit and they do this better than any MFI under study. They also have
significantly larger portfolios. In Mexico, their gross loan portfolio is $14,299,502 USD and in
Bolivia, it is $49,578,372 USD. Despite controlling interest rates, they still are profitable. When
it comes to active clients Bolivia has 123,394 and in Mexico 24,957.296 They do not have many
clients in these areas, and the control interest rates meaning that their loans are more profitable.
They also have some of the lowest costs per borrower ranging from $94 USD to $212 USD.297
As such, there is evidence that deviations from the best practices model can have positive
economic impacts for clients.
Where Pro Mujer deviates from the best practices model the most, is when it comes to
additional programs for their clients. Their adult education, gender training, and healthcare
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policies are redefining what microfinance can do. Their partnership with Microsoft to offer
technical training makes them a unique MFI because they recognize to lift people out of poverty
it is not as simple as providing loans but the need to provide adequate training and education that
can transform clients’ lives is an important building piece. While this is truly revolutionary,
where Pro Mujer succeeds is in the realm of healthcare. They not only offer health insurance, but
they also designed their services to be a “one-stop shop” for healthcare.298 They provide basic
healthcare for their clients and their children, including preventative screenings and gender
specific health services. Pro Mujer’s community centers not only have bank operations, and
group meeting rooms, but they also have primary care consultation. This innovation in social
development means that about 80% of their clients receive basic health screens for chronic
conditions like obesity, high blood pressure, or diabetes. Their healthcare programs reach more
than 250,000 people across different countries.299 The story of Maria highlights this benefit”
Before, a doctor would only see the family if there was an illness, now thanks to Pro
Mujer’s integrated services both Maria and her daughters receive their annual
preventative exams.300
This move into providing basic health services is a radical and welcomed deviation from the best
practices model and highlights that when you develop community level programs the community
thrives.
Pro Mujer also deviates from the best practices model through domestic violence
prevention initiatives. They have continued to revolutionize the microfinance arena by partnering
with groups like the German Agency for Technical Cooperation to provide training for how to
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help victims of domestic violence while also supporting initiatives for strengthening femicide
prevention laws with the aim of preventing violence against women. They are the only MFI in
this study that provides counseling and legal services for victims of domestic violence. Women
dealing with domestic violence has becomes an increasing issue for Pro Mujer staff. Elsa talks of
the training that Pro Mujer offers:
“During training I was asked to motivate clients to fight abuse so they could move
forward,” she says. “I felt bad because I was preaching something I couldn’t apply to my
own life and I didn’t know how to get out of that situation…I worked on myself so I could
stand in front of them and tell them, ‘you can do it.’”301
Elsa joined Pro Mujer not necessarily for the loan program but because they did offer other
services and she saw it a way forward for herself, stating that “what caught my eye the most was
the Advisor’s empowering work with us and the caring way in which she treated us, I remember
thinking, ‘I want to wear a Pro Mujer shirt like hers.’”302 Pro Mujer follows a best fit design
because they are the only MFI that provides women’s rights education to help women speak up
when violence occurs. The recognition that there is more to poverty than loan access represents a
significant break from the best practices model and Pro Mujer’s programs not only represent
what best fit microfinance would look like but also highlights that it can be done while
maintaining financial stability and profitability.
Microfinance in Latin America has presented a wide variety of cases to evaluate impacts
on clients. In this section, different cases were discussed to highlight how different MFIs either
adhered or deviated from the neoliberal best practices model of economic development. The core
argument of this dissertation is that deviation has more benefit for clients that can reduce poverty
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better than following the best practices model. This section has used case studies to highlight
each MFIs background and adherence to best practices. The following section will look at the
different MFIs comparatively. This section will begin with a discussion of best practices and a
comparative analysis of the cases adherence to this model of microfinance. There are two
subsections that discuss the economic impacts and socio-cultural impacts of following the best
practices model.
Comparative Analysis of the Five MFI Cases
The central question in this study is the degree to which MFIs adhere to the best practices
model—defined by neoliberal economic ideology—and how that affects their ability to affect
economic growth and development locally. The best practices model is only concerned with
financial sustainability through the replication of best practices as set out in the World Bank’s
CGAP pink book. The following table 5.1 highlights which best practices each bank follows.

The best practices model dictates exactly how the institutions, regardless of country or region or
even village location, must be set up and run with an emphasis on certain factors like repayment
and interest loans. When it comes to checking for over indebtedness, only the NGO programs
check to make sure that potential clients do not already have outstanding loans at other MFI
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institutions. For offering a variety of financial services, most MFIs qualify for best practices
because they provide loans and savings programs. However, this could also include increased
access to financial services, through ATMs or more branches. As part of the best practices, most
MFIs do not consider client’s poverty level when determining loan access, instead they use
poverty line measures to determine access. This means that they do not often lend to the very
poor. The exceptions to this are the NGOs, which do lend to the very poor as well as the
economically active poor.
All MFIs meet the best practice of self-sufficiency because of loaning structures;
however, NGOs like Pro Mujer receive a larger portion of their funds from donors. None of the
banks under study rely on subsides to function. All of the MFIs measure financial outcomes
because best practices has a more narrow focus on loan repayment, therefore the institutions
need to measure repayment statistics in order to maintain funding structures. Only a few of the
MFIs measure social performance, and this is because best practices does not emphasize social
indicators that can impact poverty. The institutions that do deviate from the best practices model
measure how social programs are impacting clients. Furthermore, when it comes to government
regulation only the commercial banks adhere to this, and that is because they take deposits and
have to abide by tax and financial regulation policies of government. Additionally, this is also a
recognition of limited government intervention in the sense that they do not have any
government funding and as private banks face few governmental restrictions than NGOs. Lastly,
when it comes to interest rates, the only bank the deviates from the best practices of capping
interest rates is Pro Mujer. As a deviation from the best practices, they use a flat rate that allows
them to keep rates low, which is a commitment of the bank to make lending more accessible and
affordable.
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The MFIs that follow best practices do not cap their interest rates and therefore can and
do charge what they consider market values. This results in much higher interest rates. This is a
main focus of best practices because even if the client only pays back a portion of the loan, the
bank is still profiting off the loan because of the increased interest. By following best practices,
institutions are often unable to meet the local domestic and social realities of the very people
they are trying to help. The following section will discuss how the best practices impacts the
economic wellbeing of clients in each of the MFI’s under study.
Comparing the Economic Impact of Best Practices.
One of the most important aspects to the underlying ability of microfinance to achieve
poverty reduction and development is its ability to divert from best practices. Therefore, best fit
organization/structure will be used to highlight the importance of community development
schemes for sustainable economic and social development. The bank loan balances and
adherence to best practices was used in order to look at the ability of MFIs to divert from the
CGAP program and make their own decisions about development programs.
I theorized that the ability of microfinance to reduce poverty is connected to their use of
best practices models instead of best fit models. The debt overhang economic theories show that
as debt increases repayment and true growth decreases. This is something that is hidden with
microfinance. Most microfinance institutions boast a high repayment rate often times in the 95th
percentage. However, the data has shown that client’s usages of subsequent loans to repay
previous loans creates debt cycles creates high levels of debt among MFI clients.
The client’s poverty rate of Banco Economico, Compartamos, and Pro Mujer Mexico are
high when compared with their adherence to best practices index, banks that follow the best
practices models as opposed to the best fit models have higher instances of poverty among
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clients. This is taking into consideration with the average loan balance per borrow. The more the
MFI follows best practices; there is an increase in the average amount of money that clients owe
the bank. The following table 5.2 shows what the average loan balance per client is for each
MFI.303
Table 5.2 Average Loan Balance per Client (USD)
Bank
BancoSol
Compartamos
Banco Economico
Pro Mujer-Mex
Pro Mujer-Bol
Idepro

$4,190
$484
$3,780
$349
$714
$3,908

When looking at this data the connection between the adherence to best practices and the larger
loans it can be argued that the more indebted clients are the more likely the MFI has a stricter
adherence to best practices which could result in lower levels of poverty reduction. When it
comes to Pro Mujer, they have lower loan balances and they also adhere to fewer of the best
practices. This is because they track clients across institutions to ensure over lending does not
occur. This focus reduces the debt overhang and debt cycles that can have negative impacts on
economic development and poverty reduction.
Considering Compartamos, with a higher adherence to the best practices (table 5.1) and a
high poverty rate of clients, they have lower levels of loan balance that we see with the NGO
versions of microfinance that are more in line with best fit models. There are several
explanations for why this may have occurred. First, Compartamos is the only publicly traded
MFI in the study and therefore has stricter rules regarding client repayment and loan portfolios to
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manage the risks that are inherent with microfinance loans. Second, they have more clients then
the other banks and therefore with higher percentages of clients they have lower loan balances
because both new clients who only have one loan are also counted with clients that have been
with the MFI for multiple years.
Findings for Economic Hypothesis. A core argument for this dissertation is that
microfinance best practices does not allow for sufficient adjustment by the MFI to local political,
social, or economic conditions and therefore has a reduced capacity for poverty alleviation. For a
best fit model, microfinance institutions need to be flexible and approach development of their
communities on the community level of analysis. The best practices laid out by the World Bank,
USAID, and IMF requires that institutions follow the eleven principles for continued funding and
program survival. A best fit model would design programs for their community as they see fit.
The best fit model could include, educational programs, gender violence programs, agricultural
or manufacturing programs that are appropriate, as well as healthcare and housing programs that
members in impoverished countries need. This approach is best suited toward non-profit MFIs
that do not rely on the neoliberal Washington consensus economic model for funding. Best fit is
exactly that: a model of development that is the best fit for the community.
Hypothesis 1: Microfinance clients are more likely to have a greater amount of economic
wellbeing if the MFI does not adhere to best practices. This focuses on the economic wellbeing
of MFI clients in relation to the institutional design of their lender. I have shown that the
economic wellbeing of clients is can be positively impacted if the MFI does not adhere to best
practices. As supported by the details laid out in my case studies, those clients who belong to
MFIs that do not adhere to best practices have lower loan amount, lower debt accumulation,
more financial education, more technological support, lower loan balances, and less over
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indebtedness. I found that this hypothesis therefore is confirmed and that a reliance on the clients
overall financial wellbeing means that clients are less likely to take out multiple loans and
therefore have less debt accumulation.
Comparing the Socio-Cultural Impact of Best Practices. When it comes to poverty
alleviation and microfinance, the story is complex because there are many endemic reasons for
poverty, and microfinance is just one tool to alleviate it. However, what is most telling about the
poverty reduction claims of microfinance is not the potential to do so but the lack of outcomes
that occur among reduced poverty rates for clients and communities. The whole story must
include other dimensions of poverty reduction though, specifically state involvement. When
considering the reduction of poverty it is important to count the social public expenditures of the
government. The current best practices model of microfinance is less concerned with social
welfare programs and more concerned with loan repayment. Table 5.3 shows where the different
MFIs deviates from best practices and adopt extra social programs. The different factors under
consideration are separated into three categories: poverty, social capital, and gender equity.
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Table 5.3 Social and Welfare Programs Adopted
Banco Sol

Compartamos

Banco Economico

Pro Mujer

IDEPRO

Poverty Alleviation Programs
---------Housing
--------Water and Sanatiation
--------Tracks Food Security
-------Measures Client Poverty
Social Capital Programs
--------Adult Education
--------Youth Education
--------Health Insurance
--------Schloarships/Education Grants
--------Primary Care
Gender Equity Programs
--------Domestic Violence Prevention
--------Gender Training
--------Non-Discrimination Policy
--------Leadership Training

When considering poverty alleviation, housing and water or sanitation improvement
policies are mainly loan programs to allow for household improvement. Therefore, it is still in
line with the general best practices. The outlier is obviously Bolivia’s Banco Sol. while they do
not deviate strongly from the best practices model they have instituted a few development
programs to increase their welfare goals outcomes, including housing and water improvement
programs giving them the greatest boost in that category. However, because they do not deviate
strong enough their empowerment score is still as low as other banks that adhere to best
practices. The only MFI that goes beyond the standard best practices is Pro Mujer in that they
track food security issues and offer nutritional education programs. It is through partnerships
with other NGOs, that they work to ensure families have proper nutrition. Pro Mujer’s deviance
from the best practices allows them to branch out into areas that would not necessarily be
profitable for the bank and focus on other community level poverty issues. The most consistent
finding was with Pro Mujer, who deviates the most from the best practices and has more
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development programs as well. This is because they follow more closely with the community
development models of poverty reduction and therefore have greater impacts in those indicators.
When considering social capital, education was considered the most important for MFIs.
Banco Sol, which adheres to best practices, offers adult education, but Pro Mujer goes beyond
offering these training programs and has scholarship/grant programs for education attainment.
Additionally, the other difference is on health. Banco Sol does offer health insurance, this is a
financial package and therefore still within the guidelines of best practices. Pro Mujer is the only
MFI under study to offer primary care services directly to clients.
Of the gender equity programs the most common is a non-discrimination policy, this is
expected because each bank loans to women and the policy just includes ensuring women are not
discriminated against in the loan evaluation policy. Only Pro Mujer adopts the other gender
equity programs of services for domestic violence victims, leadership training, and gender
training. This bank deviates the most from best practices and therefore they are able to adopt
other gender equity programs.
As theorized, the NGO Pro Mujer, which deviates from the best practices model the
most, also offers the most additional women’s empowerment services such as gender issues
training, leadership training, and domestic violence services. Banco Sol offers few if any
additional services. Compartamos has alternated between offering additional program and not
offering them, but does offer one more empowerment service than Banco Sol and therefore has a
slightly higher empowerment scale score. IDEPRO, which is modeled after Banco Sol in
program development, does not offer them. Banco Economico is modeled after Compartamos,
and it has switched between offering programs and not offering programs.
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Pro Mujer is the only institution also to offer legal services to victims of domestic
violence. The difference between the MFIs is an important indicator as to why this occurs. Banco
Sol and Compartamos are banking institutions, and therefore, they focus more on formal banking
services. Banco Economico and IDEPRO are both non-banking financial institutions, which
means neither take deposits nor offer savings but do practice giving the small loans. Pro Mujer is
a non-profit and as such, they have different goals in mind when focusing on microfinance. They
do not only consider the provisions of loans and access to financial services as the end all be all
of development and have committed themselves to addressing the Millennium Development
Goals. By paying attention to a wider degree of development barriers, they are able to design
programs that can address more of the factors that go into poverty. For example, Pro Mujer
focuses specifically on preventive care because women often do not seek medical care because
of family obligations, work obligations, but also because of geographical barriers. By setting up
primary care clinics within their loan offices they’ve increased access and created a “one stop
shop” for women’s’ care.
Furthermore, Pro Mujer, which is allowed to design their programs for their clients, is
more likely to develop gender empowerment programs. As such, these development projects
shift from a best practices model to what I argue is a best fit model. This means a commitment to
building upon existing domestic institutional arrangements. Essentially, for microfinance to be
successful it needs to “question the ideological forces, vested interests, and political pressures
that promote institutional mimicry” within the microfinance field.304 In order to move beyond

David Booth., “Governance for Development in Africa: Building on what Works” Africa Power and
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this mimicry, organizations have to take into account the broader influence from the state,
society and redefine socially acceptable economic behavior.305
Findings for Socio-Cultural Hypothesis. Armendariz and Morduch (2010) point out that
the idea that microfinance has a “clear record of social impact” is a myth. This stems from the
different ways in which social impact and social capital can be defined. I propose that part of this
myth centers on the institutional design of microfinance, the adherence to best practices and how
it limits what policies and programs they adopt. The literature on microfinance and
empowerment is not straightforward. Impact assessments of microfinance require adoption of
research methodologies capable of isolating specific effects out of a complicated labyrinth of
causal and mediating factors. Knowledge of social impact can be helpful in assessing overall
program effectiveness. As such, there are two main hypotheses that are addressed in this section
both having to do with the socio-cultural impacts and the failure to generate poverty reduction if
microfinance follows a best practices modeling. The hypotheses addressed in the key findings:
Hypothesis 2: MFIs are more likely to address issues of patriarchy and domestic violence
if they do not adhere to best practices. In my case studies, I have shown that banks that do not
adhere to best practices are more likely to provide programs that would work to resolve issues of
patriarchy and domestic violence. By not adhering to the best practices model, Pro Mujer clients
had far more services provided to them to address gender issues. Additionally, it was the only
MFI under study to provide legal services for victims of domestic violence. I found that while
limited by the scope of this study focusing on a few MFIs, those institutions that did adhere to
best practices had clients that were less likely to have empowerment services. Therefore, I find
that this hypothesis is upheld.

Christine Oliver., “Sustainable Competitve Advantage: Combining Institutional and Resource Based
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The revolution that has become microfinance over the last twenty years has not only
focused on the importance of development for the poor, but many programs have specifically
targeted women in hopes of empowering them and thereby creating equality. This gender
specific targeting, however, does not lead to women using or controlling the loans they are
receiving. The microfinance industry has spawned an important political connection between
women’s empowerment and loans, which has created a social cause for donors and Microfinance
Institutions (MFIs) to get behind and continue to fund microfinance programs. However, such
MFIs have done little to understand the gender relations of their clients so their programs are not
effectively tailored to such issues, which greatly reduce their impact.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined what types of programs that MFIs adopt when they follow
best practices, and what type of programs they could adopt if they deviated and followed a best
fit design. Each of the cases addresses where they follow best practices and where they deviate.
Additionally, they show that when MFIs follow best practices there are distortions among
economic and socio-cultural factors created. One of the most interesting findings is that among
just economic factors banks that follow best practices tended to have higher interest rates, higher
levels of client debt, larger loan balances, and more outstanding client balances. This is
interesting because one of the reasons best practices was originally thought of was that clients
were not being helped out of debt, especially if the bank collapsed. The idea of the creation of
best practices was to shore up the MFIs lending practices to protect clients from institutional
failure. What this does show is that those institutions that follow best practices have more client
debt. This dissertation has also shown that those institutions that follow best practices do not
check for over indebtedness. They do not ensure that clients do not have multiple loans at
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multiple institutions. Those institutions that deviate from best practices and adopt a best fit
design have client poverty checks to make sure clients are not taking out more money than they
could pay back. This is an important indicator of poverty that the best practices model does not
account for. Lastly, among the economic factors considered this dissertation has shown that
MFIs that follow best practices have higher interest rates. This makes it more difficult for clients
to repay the loans and can lead to debt cycles. What this dissertation has shown is that when
MFIs follow the best practices model, economic distortions are created.
Furthermore, some of the strongest findings of this dissertation are that when an MFI
deviates from best practices and approaches a best fit design they have more social welfare
programs. Institutions that approach the best fit model have introduced several social welfare
based programs to benefit clients. They have overwhelmingly tried to address other issues that
affect poverty. They have introduced educational programs that are not just centered on financial
literacy, but also introduced programs to ensure general education as well as scholarship
programs for those wishing to attend higher education. Additionally, this dissertation has shown
that the MFIs that deviate from best practices have introduced programs directly aimed at
helping women in instances of domestic violence. These types of programs are aimed at
benefiting the lives of women who participate in microfinance loan programs. Lastly, one of the
most interesting findings in this dissertation is that those who approached the best fit design
addressed issues of poverty and healthcare. Pro Mujer highlights this finding most directly in that
they deviate from the best practices model the most. They not only have additional social welfare
programs, but they are the only MFI under study that directly supports primary care making sure
women and their families have access to healthcare. What this dissertation has shown is that
when MFIs follow the best practices model, socio-cultural distortions are created. Furthermore,
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when MFIs approach a best fit model they adopt programs to deal with those socio-cultural
issues that impact poverty.
This dissertation has found that those MFIs that follow best practices have fewer social
welfare programs and more problems with increased client debt. What this dissertation cannot
assess the effectiveness of the different programs for clients; it does highlight how a deviation
from the best practices model can result in a wider array of social welfare programs being
adopted. What is done is an analysis of the differences in institutional design between the MFIs.
Moreover, it has shown how a best fit design takes more factors that contribute to poverty into
account and adopting more social welfare programs, than the best practices model does.
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CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
MFIs mission has a great commitment to poverty alleviation. Therefore, they should not
just be banks that are set out to make profits. While that is part of their design through best
practices, microfinance and the institutions that practice it have always held a commitment to
helping the poor from the bottom up. Therefore, areas that have microfinance institutions are
more likely to have additional programs that would help people out of poverty. There are many
things that impact poverty levels, but MFIs that deviate from best practices focus more on the
community needs. This dissertation has analyzed the differences in institutional design and
highlighted how a best fit design takes more factors that contribute to poverty into account by
adopting additional social development programs. Additionally, this dissertation has analyzed
how the best practices model of microfinance does not take into account the local community in
which they operate.
This chapter is composed of three main sections. The first section address the core
arguments made in this dissertation. The second section highlights this dissertations contribution
to the literature. The third section addresses future research directions that can be taken as
showing how studying the best practices model affects clients. At the core of this chapter and the
entire dissertation is the argument that best practices hinders poverty alleviation because it does
not account for local political, economic, or socio-cultural conditions. In this regard, a best fit
model of microfinance would have a larger impact on reducing poverty because it could adopt
programs that are tailored to their respective region’s needs. The following section will
summarize the core arguments made in this dissertation.
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Summary of Core Arguments
This dissertation aims to address the issues of institutional mimicry and the creation of
best practices and how that affects the effectiveness of MFIs to alleviate poverty. Several
arguments are made throughout and all addresses how a best fit model of microfinance would be
more effective. Overall, this dissertation has argued that the adherence to best practices through
neoliberal policies has distorted the impacts that microfinance can have on poverty alleviation.
This dissertation has addressed these issues over the many chapters. The introduction highlights
the core arguments and direction, and the literature review highlights how other scholars have
measured MFI effectiveness and how the best practices and microfinance became the poverty
alleviation policy of choice. This is driven by the WTO and IMF and their adherence to
neoliberal economic development. The theoretical chapter lays out all the theoretical questions
that are asked in this dissertation and highlights the core argument that a best fit model of
microfinance is more effective at poverty alleviation than the currently predominated mimicked
best practices model. The methodology chapter further highlights this argument by layout the
hypotheses generated from these questions as well as how ultimately best practices and poverty
alleviation are related. The substantive chapters each have unique findings that show that best
practices actually are very good at adopting social programs that can benefit the community,
while simultaneously arguing that this is because they do not follow a best fit model. Finally, this
dissertation wraps up with a discussion in this chapter about how microfinance’s impact has been
considered and how this study represents a significant contribution to the literature with a
distinctive approach focusing on the institutional components of the MFIs themselves.
At the heart of this dissertation is the argument that neoliberal economic development
policy has shaped the microfinance field. This is done by addressing how the microfinance came
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about in the first place and why statist development models were abandoned in favor of
neoliberal economic development policies. Additionally, this is addressed by highlighting how
the involvement of international institutions impacted microfinance and actually increased the
level of mimicry in the field that resulted in the best practices model being the only acceptable
model of microfinance. Following this argument, a secondary argument is made that reliance on
neoliberal development policies ignores local economic, political, and social realities and
actually hinders poverty alleviation efforts. This is because these policies are often adopted with
littler regard to what is actually happening in the state, as the microfinance institutions following
best practices become more focused on generating income and being profitable and sustainable
than they do on helping their clients out of poverty. In this way, this dissertation has argued that
following best practices can undercut poverty alleviation efforts. These arguments have led to the
core argument presented throughout this dissertation that if microfinance followed a best fit
model then poverty reduction indicators could be better.
The sole focus of this dissertation has been to look at the institutional structures of
microfinance, and show how these institutions are mimicked through best practices, which in
turn hinders poverty alleviation. The secondary main argument has focused on solving that
problem by addressing a best fit model of microfinance. It is in this argument as well, that this
dissertation contributes to the larger literature on microfinance by presenting an alternative to
best practices and arguing that local economic, political, and socio-cultural determinants matter
when it comes to constructing an effective model for poverty alleviation. This dissertation
focuses on Latin America because this is where microfinance has operated the longest on the
best practices model and highlights how development from the bottom up is not occurring while
offering an explanation for why – the best practices model. It is important to highlight that there
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is no argument against microfinance as a poverty alleviation tool, but instead it is about the
structurer of the policy and institutions that create problems. Microfinance, if it took into account
local conditions and generated policies to fit, then it would be able to adopt programs that clients
need the most, actually fill in the gaps in the state welfare system that is ineffective, and actually
raise poverty levels. It is argued here that, microfinance can be an incredible poverty alleviation
tool, when done correctly, and in regards to local conditions.
Contribution to the Literature
This dissertation adds to the literature on microfinance in two main ways. The first
contribution is the complex analysis of the literature combining economic and socio-cultural
factors. Second, the theory and methodology of this dissertation is unique in that it looks at the
institutional design through best practices and breaks down how the MFIs operate internally
while comparing differences across banks. This is an important contribution to the literature
because it openly critiques best practices instead of just accepting them as is, and takes this a step
further by proposing a solution to the downfalls of best practices through a best fit model that
would adapt policies and programs to the local conditions having a greater chance at actual
poverty alleviation. This section will discuss each of these impacts, starting with the contribution
to the literature analysis.
Complex Analysis of the Literature
The literature on microfinance tends to be fragmented in that there is a separation
between the economic side of microfinance and the social and cultural side of it. Additionally,
impact assessment studies tend to focus narrowly on one set of outcomes. This dissertation is
unique in the analysis of this literature because an intersectional approach to the analysis is
taken. The story of microfinances success is complex and the literature needed to be combined.
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This way economic factors like neoliberal policies and debt cycle with other sociological
literature on gender and the impact that social construction has on poverty; furthermore, this
dissertation combines these two aspects with policy research adding in another layer of how
actual microfinance programs are developed and adopted across the World. Combining all these
approaches to the study of microfinance tells the wider story that a policy pushed by neoliberal
development paradigms creates dysfunctional institutions, which could limit poverty reduction.
This complex overarching view contributes to the field of microfinance study by combining
these multiple aspects.
Extending the Theoretical Understanding of Best Practices
As microfinance begins to move into the mainstream, it is becoming more than an
economic policy for growth. Microfinance institutions have been set up to deal with the loans to
underserved populations that the traditional banks did not know how to deal with because of the
lack of collateral and poverty level. The microfinance institutions have moved into this space to
serve these populations, however, as microfinance has become larger so has debate over its
impact. This literature adds to the debate through the theoretical foundations of how mimicry
impacts microfinances ability to alleviate poverty. Specifically, what is looked at in this
dissertation is how the differences in political institutions (in this case the MFIs best practices)
impact economic effects (poverty alleviation). Theoretically, this rich study combines a
multitude of economic and socio-cultural factors to highlight the impact of microfinance. The
greatest contribution here is the theoretical model that underpins microfinances success to their
institutional design in best practices. This is crucial to the understanding of how microfinance
institutions have generated institutional mimicry in the development politics field.

176
Using best practices to highlight how mimicry distorts both economic and socio-cultural
conditions, this dissertation has made a strong argument that for better results in poverty alleviate
a best fit model is needed. The greatest theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to offer an
alternative to the best practices model – the best fit model. This would entail tailoring programs
to the local political and social conditions in which the microfinance institutions operate. If
microfinance policies were more adaptive, they would have a greater impact on poverty
alleviation. This was seen with the inclusion of Pro Mujer in the cases because they deviated
from the best practices model and represented a more comprehensive best fit model of
microfinance. This dissertation has added significantly to the understanding of microfinance by
adding a new model of microfinance and highlighting the ability of the best fit model to be more
successful in alleviating poverty.
Future Research Directions
The changing nature of the political world has led to an increase in the complexities that
arise when attempting to study politics. There are several methods through which scholars
attempt to answer the “big” questions of politics. The questions are only further compounded by
the state of the discipline. There are many different angles from which to approach a question
and each researcher is working from different perspective within the field of political science
itself. Some of the subfields in political science from which researchers work are policy
orientations, international relations, gender studies, political theory, comparative politics,
American politics, and sometimes a mixture of any of these fields. As such, the complexity of
studying politics arises quickly, and there are just about as many methods to study questions
within these fields as there are questions themselves.
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The best direction for future research is to study the impact of best practices on all
microfinance institutions throughout Latin America. This would present a further picture how
microfinance mimicry has shaped not only the field of microfinance in Latin America but also
shaped the direction of development projects in the region. This would undercover some hidden
factors of poverty that were beyond the scope of this study by looking at the different political
factors that contribute to poverty. The theoretical application of the best fit model to regions
outside of Latin America would also contribute significantly to the literature by linking more
strongly the correlations between institutional design and poverty alleviation. This would
strengthen the arguments that adherence to best practices and institutional design actually
negatively affects the ability of the MFI to alleviate poverty by removing exogenous poverty
indicator variables and focusing more specifically on institutional design.
The larger overall direction of future research would be to explore more in-depth the
links between best practices and poverty alleviation efforts of MFIs. This could be done on a
local level with the use of more qualitative survey methodology that asks clients exactly how
they use the loans and what level of poverty they experienced before, during, and after their
interactions with the microfinance officers and institution. This would specifically focus on
clients perceptions of the MFI as well, so that it would be possible to uncover hidden practices at
MFIs that would either encourage clients to work their way up the economic ladder and out of
poverty but also uncover those indicators that would inhibit such poverty reduction practices.
There will always be future directions when studying microfinance and poverty
alleviation. This is an area with a wealth of new inquires. While this represents a positive note,
there is also a hazard to oversimplifying the poverty processes that occur. There are multitudes of
indicators that can be used in developing poverty reduction schemes, including economic, social,
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and political. With such a wide cross section of possible variables, it is important to refine the
questions and methodologies used. One area of future research would be how microfinance
following a best fit model could help prevent food insecurity, which is an important indicator of
poverty but not one currently addressed. This would highlight how a best fit model could adapt
to the local conditions and really introduce poverty reduction programs that their clients need and
want.
The major question throughout this dissertation has been whether microfinance
institutions hold up their end of the bargain and deliver on poverty alleviation promises. The
starting point for this dissertation was with the massive debt failures and bank failures that
represented massive microfinance failures in Bolivia in 2000. The questions that resulted from
this focused on the failures of microfinance and what causes such failures, however, that is really
only part of the story. In order to see failure, it is also necessary to acknowledge growth and
success. This is where this dissertation started. It further refined the main questions asked down
to really one centralized question does best practices adherence hinder poverty alleviation
efforts of MFIs? This is the main question that this dissertation asked in a multitude of ways.
The aspects looked at were not only economic but also social and represents the wider gamut of
issues in the development studies field. In the end, this dissertation found that institutional design
plays a huge part in the ability of MFIs to adopt social welfare programs to help their
communities out of poverty.
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